Industrial conflict management in a developing country by Fox, P.G.J.
Fox, P.G.J. (1993). Industrial conflict management in a developing country. (Unpublished Doctoral 
thesis, City University London) 
City Research Online
Original citation: Fox, P.G.J. (1993). Industrial conflict management in a developing country. 
(Unpublished Doctoral thesis, City University London) 
Permanent City Research Online URL: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/7537/
 
Copyright & reuse
City University London has developed City Research Online so that its users may access the 
research outputs of City University London's staff. Copyright © and Moral Rights for this paper are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/ or other copyright holders.  All material in City Research 
Online is checked for eligibility for copyright before being made available in the live archive. URLs 
from City Research Online may be freely distributed and linked to from other web pages. 
Versions of research
The version in City Research Online may differ from the final published version. Users are advised 
to check the Permanent City Research Online URL above for the status of the paper.
Enquiries
If you have any enquiries about any aspect of City Research Online, or if you wish to make contact 
with the author(s) of this paper, please email the team at publications@city.ac.uk.
INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT 
IN A 
DEVELOPING COUNTRY 
PETER GEORGE JAMES FOX 
Submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
City University 
- 
London 
in the 
Department of Systems Science 
December 1993 
CONTENTS 
(Vol. I) 
PART I-INTRODUCTION 
CHAPTER 1 BACKGROUND OF STUDY 
1.1 CONFLICT AND VALUES 
1.1.1 Introduction 
1.1.2 Society and Values 
1.1.3 Belief and Execution 
1.1.4 Industrial Relations Rules 
1.1.5 Complicating Factors 
1.1.5.1 Management/Labour Perceptions 
1.1.5.2 Constitutional Exercise of 
Authority 
1.2 FOCUS OF THE STUDY 
1.3 SCOPE AND SEQUENCE OF THE STUDY 
1.4 CONCLUSION 
0 
CHAPTER 2: INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 
(Culture, Modernisation and Trade Union Roles) 
2.1 POST-INDEPENDENCE DEVELOPMENT 
2.2 TIE KENYA EXPERIENCE 
2.3 THE SWAZILAND EXPERIENCE 
2.4 SOCIO-POLITICAL DIRECTION 
2.5 CONCLUSION 
2 
Page 
17 
17 
17 
17 
19 
21 
21 
21 
22 
28 
30 
31 
34 
34 
36 
38 
40 
41 
Page 
PART II- SOCIO-POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC 
ENVIRONMENT 
CHAPTER 3 BACKGROUND TO TRADE UNION 
DEVELOPMENT IN SWAZILAND 43 
3.1 THE SWAZILAND SOCIETY 43 
3.1.1 Socio-Political Background 43 
3.1.2 Industrial Development 44 
3.1.3 Industrial Communication "Framework" 47 
(Historical 'pattern (pre-1980)) 
" 
3.1.3.1. Minimum Legislation Protection 47 
3.1.3.2 In-Company Communications 47 
3.1.3.2.1 Methodology 47 
3.1.3.2.2 Communication problems 48 
3.1.3.3 Company Initiated "Development" 
Action 49 
3.1.3.4 Collective Bargaining/ 
Negotiation 50 
3.1.3.5 Summary 51 
3.2 TRADE UNION DEVELOPMENT IN SWAZILAND 52 
3.2.1 Introduction 52 
3.2.2 Perceptions 53 
3.2.2.1 A 'Union' Perspective on Origins 
and Development 53 
3.2.2.2 Union Philosophy 57 
3.2.2.3 Union Strategy 58 
3.2.2.4 Management Assessment of the 
Communications Environment 59 
3 
3.3 DEVELOPMENT (POST-1980) 61 
3.3.1 Legislation Changes 61 
3.3.2. Post-Change action 
3.3.3 Employer Collective 
62 
62 
3.4 CONCLUSION 63 
Page 
CHAPTER 4 TRADE UNIONISM 
-A SURVEY OF ATTITUDES 
AND PERCEPTIONS IN SWAZILAND 1982 
- 
88) 66 
4.1 A NORMATIVE APPROACH 66 
4.2 THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ENVIRONMENT 69 
4.3 INTERVIEWS AND RESPONSES 74 
4.3.1 Influence on Society 75 
4.3.1.1 Statements 75 
4.3.1.2 Responses 76 
4.3.2 Influence on Industry 80 
4.3.2.1 Statements 80 
4.3.2.2 Responses 81 
4.3.3 Influence on Government 85 
4.3.3.1 Statements 85 
4.3.3.2 Responses 86 
4.3.4 Social Concerns 88 
4.3.4.1 Statements 88 
4.3.4.2 Responses 89 
4.4 EMPLOYER SURVEY DATA 91 
4.4.1 Explanation 91 
4.5 SUMMARY 92 
4.6 CONCLUSION 95 
5 
Page 
CHAPTER 5 ' THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 97 
5.1 GOVERNMENT 97 
5.1.1 Department of Labour 97 
5.1.2 The Industrial Court 102 
5.1.3 The Royal Swaziland Police 104 
5.2 COLLECTIVE EMPLOYEE/EMPLOYER 'ORGANISATION' 106 
5.2.1 Works Councils 106 
5.2.2 Definitions of Association 108 
5.2.3 Staff 
- 
Anomaly 109 
5.2.4 Joint Industrial Council 111 
5.2.5 Union Meetings 112 
5.2.6 Strikes/Lock-outs/Picketing 113 
5.3 CONCLUSION 115 
PART III 
- 
THE CONFLICT OVER RECOGNITION 
(A Case Study) 
CHAPTER 6 THE SUGAR INDUSTRY IN SWAZILAND 118 
6.1 MANUFACTURING 119 
6.2 GOVERNMENT INTERESTS 120 
6.3 DISTRIBUTION AND PROCEEDS 122 
6.4 GEOGRAPHIC DATA 123 
6.5 CONCLUSION 123 
6 
Page 
CHAPTER 7 UNION RECOGNITION 
- 
PRELIMINARY ISSUES 125 
7.1 OPENING MOVES 125 
7.1.1 The Establishment of the Union 125 
7.1.2 Employers' Association and Joint Industrial Council 126 
7.1.2.1 Drafting a J. I. C. Constitution 127 
7.1.2.2 Union Request for Employer's Assistance 129 
7.1.2.3 I. R. Specialist Review 129 
7.1.2.4 C. E. O. 's Joint Decision on Works 
Councils/Joint Industrial Council 
Constitutions. 133 
7.1.3 Summary of Chapter 7(1) 138 
7.2 EMPLOYERS' STRATEGY 139 
7.2.1 Employers' Approach 139 
7.2.2 The Labour Commissioner's Viewpoint 141 
7.2.3 Unilateral Employers' Action 144 
7.2.4 An Industrial Relations' Assessment 148 
7.3 CONCLUSION 150 
CHAPTER 8 A CONFLICT APPROACH 154 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 154 
8.2 RECOGNITION OF THE UNION 
- 
(FIRST ATTEMPT) 158 
8.2.1 'Technical' Rejection by the Employers 158 
8.2.2 'Independent' Auditor Controversy 161 
8.2.3 Verification 162 
8.2.3.1 Process Dispute 162 
8.2.3.2 Union Response 165 
8.2.3.3 Conciliation 169 
8.2.3.4 Industrial Court Proceedings 171 
8.2.3.5 Recognition Agreement 172 
8.2.3.6 'Count' and the Employers' Response 172 
7 
Page 
CHAPTER 9 AGREEMENT AND DISAGREEMENT 183 
9.1 RECOGNITION AGREEMENT 
- 
(SECOND ATTEMPT) 183 
9.1.1 Preliminary Discussion 183 
9.1.2 The Agreement Discussion 185 
9.1.2.1 10 May 1985 185 
9.1.2.2 22 August 1985 188 
9.1.2.3 20 November 1985 189 
9.1.2.4 Mediation 192 
9.2 JOINT INDUSTRIAL COUNCIL 193 
9.3 DISPUTE SUMMARY 1984 
- 
1985 197 
9.4 JOINT DISCUSSION 
- 
(THIRD ROUND) 
- 
MARCH 1986 
- 
NOVEMBER 
1989 198 
9.5 STRIKE ACTION 
- 
RSSC 
- 
SIMUNYE STRIKE REPORT 200 
9.5.1 Strike Summary 200 
9.5.2 Strike Analysis 204 
9.6 RECOMMENDATIONS OF GENERAL INTEREST TO EMPLOYERS IN ' 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
- 
STRIKE CONSIDERATIONS 208 
9.7 CONCLUSION 209 
CHAPTER 10 CONTINUING DIVISION AND CONFLICT 211 
10.1 INTER-UNION CONFLICT 211 
10.2 INTER-EMPLOYER CONFLICT 214 
10.2.1 Philosophy 215 
10.2.2 SSMRI E. A Approach 217 
10.2.3 The Practical Issues 219 
10.2.4 The Need to Re-Assess the 'Approach' 223 
10.3 SUMMARY 226 
10.4 CONCLUSIONS 227 
8 
Page 
PART IV 
- 
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
CHAPTER 11 THE FAILURE OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN 
THE SWAZILAND SUGAR MANUFACTURING 
AND REFINING INDUSTRY. 229 
11.1 CONFLICT BEHAVIOUR 
- 
(1982 
- 
92) 229 
11.2 THE RESULTS OF CONFLICT "MISMANAGEMENT" 233 
11.2.1 Participant Actions Vis-a-Vis 1988 
Survey Results 233 
11.3 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN SWAZILAND 
- 
1990 235 
11.4 CONFLICT SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 238 
CHAPTER 12 BEYOND COMPROMISE 242 
12.1 COLLABORATION 242 
12.2 THE WIDER SOCIETY 244 
12.2.1 Industrial Relations Legislation 245 
12.2.2 Institutional Involvement 247 
12.3 THE INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE 
- 
MANAGEMENT 
APPROACH TO INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 249 
12.3.1 Culture Change and Trust 251 
12.3.2 Understanding Industrial Relations 253 
12.3.3 A '4 Step' Guide to Management Practice 254 
12.4 CONCLUSION 264 
REFERENCES: 
Bibliography and References 257 
Publications 262 
9 
(Vol. II) 
1 Sugar Serves Swaziland (Including Map) 8 
2 Masson JR- 'Swaziland's Changing Political Climate and 
the Role of the Investor Community' 
- 
FSE 
- 
30 April 1992 9 
3 Comparative Wage Rates 
- 
1989 23 
4 'Your Union Organisation' 
- 
'A Study Circle Material' 
(Undated) 25 
5 Ground Rules for Union Negotiators 26 
6 Statement of Intent 
- 
SFTU/FSE 29 
7 Survey Statements 
- 
Personal Interviews 33 
8 Industrial Relations Questionnaire 37 
9 Swaziland Agriculture and Plantation Workers' Union 
- 
Constitution 40 
10 Sugar Manufacturing and Refining Industry of Swaziland 
Employers Association 
- 
Constitution 60 
11 Schedule of Wages, Terms and Conditions of Service 
Comparative 1991 77 
12 Joint Industrial Council 
- 
Sugar Manufacturing and Refining 
Industry of Swaziland 
- 
Constitution 79 
13 Works Council Constitution 88 
14 Letter 
- 
Chairman Sugar Millers Association, to Labour 
Commissioner 
- 
23 September 1982 ' 94 
15 Position Paper 
- 
Employers' Association and Trade Union 
Relations 
- 
June 1983 95 
16 Strategy Proposal 
- 
Industrial Relations 
- 
June 1983 103 
17 Index 
- 
Swaziland Sugar Association 
- 
Annual Report 1986/87 110 
18 Review of Industrial Relations Situation 
- 
26 April 1984 111 
19 SSMRI E/A Letter to Labour Commissioner 
- 
27 June 1984 114 
10 
Page 
20 Considerations in Present Industrial Relations Situation 
- 
July 1984 118 
21 Letter 
- 
SSMRI E/A 
- 
Trade Union Recognition 
-3 December 
1984 121 
22 Schedule 
- 
Union Membership Count as at end 1984 123 
23 Revised Draft Recognition Agreement 124 
24 Union 'Legality' 
- 
Interpretation 138 
25 Letters SSMRI E/A to SAPWU 27 November 1985 142 
26 Letter SAPWU to SSMRI E/A 
- 
27 December 1985 144 
27 Union Compromise 146 
28 Definition of Industry 148 
29 Grievance Procedure 149 
30 United Nations Development Project 
- 
Report July 1990 155 
11 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
The research for this thesis was pursued during the period 1982/92 while I was employed as 
the Personnel Manager and Industrial Relations Consultant for the Royal Swaziland Sugar 
Corporation at Simunye, Swaziland. Concomitant with my employment duties was that of 
RSSC representative on the Council of the Federation of Swaziland Employers, Chairman of 
the Industrial Relations Sub-Committee of FSE, some time member of the Tripartite 
Conciliation Council and Employers Assessor 
- 
Industrial Court (1985 
- 
87). All of the 
professional members of these bodies and government, trade unions and employers associated 
with labour relations in Swaziland co-operated with information and comment, essential for 
the research. Their assistance was invaluable. Among those who freely gave of their time 
and effort particularly were, Peter Dodds, former Executive Director of the Federation of 
Swaziland Employers; Ralph Bhembe, Commissioner of Labour, Jan Sithole, Secretary- 
General of the Swaziland Federation of Trade Unions and my colleagues on the Council of 
the Federation of Swaziland Employers. 
Of paramount importance was the detailed, lengthy, critical comment and advice of Prof. 
Chris Mitchell, formerly Professor in the Department of Systems Science, City University, 
London and presently Director of the Centre for Conflict Resolution, George Mason 
University, Fairfax, Virginia. His constant encouragement, albeit from far distant U. S. A. and 
London over a long period of time, provided the main impetus for my continuation with the 
project. I am also indebted to Dr. Peter Willetts and Prof. Ewart Carson of City University 
for facilitating the project work and advising me on communications with Chris Mitchell 
during my annual visit to London. 
For providing the constant secretarial facilities, often at considerable personal inconvenience 
my thanks are due to Ms. 
-Lillian Culverwell, Veronica Parry, Angie Dube, in Swaziland and 
Ms. Jenny Abrams at the Computer Services Department at University of Natal, 
Pietermaritzburg. Ms. Pat Henry, a sociologist, Swaziland assisted and guided me with 
formulating and interpreting survey data recorded in Chapter 4. 
12 
My grateful thanks are recorded to my colleagues at Simunye for patience and assistance, and 
in particular John Ranger, Director, Booker-Tate at Thame (Oxon) former Chief Executive of 
the Royal Swaziland Sugar Corporation and to the present General Manager, Simunye, Mike 
Boast. 
Finally, and of the utmost concern to me was the constant patience, support and direct 
assistance with references and categorisation, from my wife Laura; without her understanding 
the work would never have been concluded. 
13 
STATEMENT 
I grant powers of discretion to the University Librarian to allow this thesis to be copied in 
whole or in part, without further reference to me. This permission covers only single copies 
made for study purposes, subject to normal conditions of acknowledgement. 
14 
ABSTRACT 
INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT 
IN A DEVELOPING COUNTRY 
(Trade union recognition for the Swaziland Sugar Manufacturing and Refining Industry 1982 
- 
1992 from a human resources management perspective). 
This study has attempted to consider the complexities of labour relations and industrial 
conflict within a developing African country. A major case study was followed. 
The research covers the ten year period 1982 
- 
1992 and follows the interaction and conflict 
between management representatives of employers and trade union leaders in Swaziland's 
major strategic industry. The specific conflict issue was that of recognition by the employers 
of a trade union, as the sole collective bargaining agent for workers within the sugar 
manufacturing and refining industry. Both parties were constrained within the parameters of 
legislation more applicable to an industrialised nation than to a third world state. 
Interaction between participants in an industrial work place occurs within the ambience of the 
wider society but values, norms and ideologies are reflected individually and in the various 
sub-systems of that society. A prevailing ideology however pervades the total socio-economic 
and political system ordered through a framework of rules and regulations determined and 
approved by the governing elite. In one developing country, Swaziland, the authoritative 
framework for the industrial relations sub-system during the years 1982 
- 
1992, was based 
upon the Democratic Socialist ideology of Western industrially developed states, as 
catalogued and promoted by the International Labour Organisation (ILO). Organised labour's 
values and norms were identical to I. L. O. norms but the rank and file of the worker 
collectives in Swaziland rarely understood the concepts involved. Employers and managers 
marginally identified with the concepts but did not fully support their operationalisation. 
The hypothesis is that it was the impact of the respective values and norms of the employers 
and their representatives and union leaders which determined the processing of the conflict. 
The values and norms of industrialised society encapsulated in industrial relations concepts 
and the notion of collective bargaining embodied in Swaziland's labour legislation contributed 
little to the resolution of conflict over union recognition. 
Collective bargaining with its inherent compromise approach provided a model for conflict 
management and a forum for the exercise of attitudes and actions arising from individual and 
group values and norms; it did not provide guidelines for conflict resolution. Overt conflict 
was avoided but the underlying differences and the basic conflict itself were reinforced and 
prolonged for ten years. 
The study concludes with the suggestion that a locally developed conflict resolution strategy 
providing a structure for a consensus approach might have resulted in a long term 
collaborative environment for industrial relations. Such an environment could lead to 
economic stability and capital investment of benefit to employers and employees and of vital 
concern to a developing society. 
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CHAPTER I BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
1.1 CONFLICT AND VALUES 
1.1.1 Introduction 
This thesis is concerned with the attitudes and behaviour determining 
and resulting from people's norms and values as they influence and impact 
upon the industrial relations sub-system of the sovereign independent African 
state of Swaziland. Specifically it is directed at the ten year period 1982 
- 
92. 
The particular issue is that of industrial relations conflict. A major trade union 
demanded recognition as the sole collective bargaining agent of the workers 
with employers within a major industry. The thesis deals primarily with the 
interaction and results of interaction between management and union 
representatives as affecting the process of conflict. 
1.1.2 Society and Values 
A basic premise for this thesis is that of the 'authoritative allocation of 
values' (David Easton as quoted 
- 
Apter D 1965 : 229). It is government, in 
any society, which maintains a formal structure to that society's values through 
legislation. The authority of government approves and forces the application of 
these values, which determines the structure within which societal systems and 
sub-systems operate. Specific to this study of industrial conflict is the 
argument that: 
`the larger society, through its governing elites initially determines the central 
features of an industrial relations system, which includes those features and 
rules of industrial relations that are largely dependent on the power structure 
17 
(Barrett, B. (ed) 1975 : 366-370). 
But the argument can be carried further. Barrett refers only to certain 
features. The contention here is that all features not only of industrial relations 
but of all other sub-systems within a given society, are operative only in so far 
as the power elites permit them to be. Power-elitism, however is not the 
prerogative only of government, but resides also in the economic power of 
employers, sapiential (viz managerial and technological knowledge) power of 
managers, and the collective labour power of workers. The operationalisation 
of all cultural/social and economic phenomena are constrained within socio- 
economic and political values as expressed through legislation and rules/norms. 
This study notes the extent to which these values promote or detract from the 
successful resolution of conflict, while considering the management of conflict 
within the industrial relations sub-system. It does this by an analysis of an 
emergent nation (Swaziland) possessing a political system specific to itself that 
is somewhat different constitutionally from any other emergent nation and with 
a somewhat different political system from that associated with a Western 
industrial society. It has been stated that little research has been done on the 
`overall relationship' between political and industrial relations systems (Barrett, 
B. (ed) 1975: 360). One exception was John T Dunlop (as quoted by Barrett), 
who considered that `industrial communities irrespective of the political form 
set up the major players in the industrial relations game and define their major 
rules of play'. But in developing this theme, he recognised also that the wider 
cultural heritage of a given society has an impact and that it is not a static or 
unique phenomena. It is related both to the stage of economic development 
and `the chronological period of history in which the formation of the 
[industrial relations] system takes place'. (Barrett, B. (ed) 1975: 360). 
Research in this study will show the extent to which the industrial relations 
system in Swaziland has been affected by the politics and economic 
developments which have taken place during its post-colonial phase, but more 
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specifically whether the ideology, operationalised in political and socio- 
economic values of the actors in the system, has significantly affected the 
management of industrial conflict. 
1.1.3 Belief and Execution 
Comment on the concepts of politics and ideology, seems relevant. In 
1980, students of the Institute of Labour Relations at the University of South 
Africa, were asked to consider a statement by the Commission of Inquiry into 
Labour Legislation appointed by the State President of the Republic of South 
Africa on 21 June 1977. The text of the statement read- 
`The Republic of South Africa subscribes to the principles of a 
free market economy based on individual freedom in the market place. 
This freedom relates to freedom of choice either as consumer or as 
producer and freedom of competition within a political democracy. 
This ideology has been practised by successive governments of South 
Africa since the dawn of the industrial and commercial history of the 
country and the Commission has no reason to believe that this 
philosophy will be abandoned' (Bendix, W. 1980: 1-12 as quoted). 
The concepts of freedom of choice, freedom of competition within a 
political democracy, were collectively considered as an ideology by the 
Commission of Inquiry. It was the inseparability of the political and socio- 
economic components but even more the political component as the dominant 
factor of the ideological statement, which caused the author of this thesis to 
focus attention upon the political concepts of the Commission's interpretation 
as being of primary concern. In what was then a restrictive apartheid society 
which limited freedom of choice and competition in the industrial labour 
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market and in most other spheres of South African society the Commission 
members believed that society subscribed to their ideology. 
It was argued (Merkt, P. 
-1967: 30) that the basic values of a community 
relating to the desired basic order are derived from the good, which in turn is 
derived from the values and is essentially political because that which is good 
is determined by the authoritative allocation of values. The relevance of this 
comment on ideology lies in the fact that the argument followed in the author's 
paper was that normative statements (belief) are not always consistent with 
execution. For example, interpretation and execution of such wide embracing 
political values as freedom and democracy can fall anywhere within a spectrum 
bounded by individualism and the collective social reflection of societal values. 
The power-elite of South Africa, while existing in an African industrially 
sophisticated state believed it subscribed to democratic good 
-a belief far 
removed in execution by apartheid. If in an industrially sophisticated African 
state there was such belief, what might be the situation in Swaziland, where 
industrial sophistication was much less? 
Because belief is executed through values it is suggested that the beliefs 
and authoritative values of the legislators and the beliefs and values of the 
industrial relations actors as manifested through their attitudes and actions, 
impact upon conflict processing in industrial relations sub-systems. 
To what extent this contributes to conflict resolution, or militates against 
it by promoting conflict management, is a concern for this study. 
The author interprets conflict management as an attempt to maintain the 
status quo while complying with the legal requirement in Swaziland for 
effecting collective bargaining in the labour sphere. Conflict resolution 
requires a combined team problem-solving approach by both management and 
20 
4-- 
labour, towards the achievement of organisation goals. This and related issues 
are discussed in Chapter 12. 
1.1.4 Industrial Relations Rules 
Adding to the complexity of the belief and values dichotomy, is the 
perception by the actors in the industrial relations sub-system of the 'rules'. 
Flanders quotes Dunlop and supports his contention that a `system of industrial 
relations is a system of rules' (Barrett, B. (ed) 1975: 21). Strong defines rules 
as law viz the `general body of rules which are addressed by the rulers of a 
political society to the members of that society which are generally obeyed' 
(Strong, C. F. 
- 
1972: 5). Rules for industrial relations however, comprise more 
than those established by government and legislation. As listed by Flanders 
they comprise, `legislation and statutory orders, trade union regulations, 
collective agreements and arbitration awards, social conventions, managerial 
decisions, custom and practice', (Barrett B (Ed) 1975: 21) to which may be 
added employer rules and regulations and Industrial and Appeal Court 
judgments. These rules may be divided into procedural and substantive. The 
former establish the regulation of relationships (status) between the parties 
involved in an employment situation and the latter define the rights and 
obligations attaching to the various jobs in the industrial hierarchy. 
1.1.5 Complicating Factors 
1.1.5.1 Management/Labour Perceptions 
Not only the ordering and/or negotiation which occurs in the 
establishment of those rules however, but also the interpretation thereof and the 
differing perceptions of the participants constitute, in themselves, a 
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complicating factor. Simply illustrated, management with its concern for 
shareholders in addition to its common concern with the work-force for a 
continuing viable enterprise, is almost certain to have perceptions on some 
rules at variance with members of the work-force, whose primary concern is 
with obtaining the optimum reward for the work done. In an industrially 
developed country this difference is accentuated by social class differences. 
Conceivably these differences may be even more acute in an undeveloped or 
partially developed state. Often management consists of expatriate personnel 
recruited, because of technical and managerial expertise, from a totally different 
political socio-economic and cultural background to those whom they manage. 
And it is suggested that it is with the substantive rules where differences 
impact upon the resolution of conflicts, rather than in procedural matters. For 
example, there may be little or no disagreement on the need to set a pay rate 
for a job (procedural) but the fixing of that rate (substantive) could be a very 
contentious issue. There may be no disagreement that matters affecting 
employment within an industry should be discussed and debated within a Joint 
Industrial Council, but establishing what are negotiable items and what are only 
for discussion can be contentious issues between employers and labour 
representatives. ' 
1.1.5.2 Constitutional Exercise of Authority 
A further matter for study in this thesis is the type of political 
constitution which existed in Swaziland. It was stated earlier that there was a 
conceptual spectrum. What must be of concern in considering the impact of 
political/social ideology upon the industrial relations sub-system, is the position 
of the respective ideologies within the spectrum. That position can be 
considered in its operationalised form as a type of government exercise of 
authority. 
22 
All governments exercise power within three dimensions 
- 
legislative, 
executive and judicial. These three functions are inter-related but dependent 
upon the extent of the power with which they are invested, and this varies 
dependent upon the position within the spectrum, from individualistic to the 
collective reflection of societal values. The distinctions in the exercise of 
power can become unclear. It is common knowledge that the post- 
independence history of many African States has been that of `power-by-rifle', 
characterised by political coup and counter-coup. Inevitably, the distinctions 
between the three departments of government have disappeared in such 
situations. But even where the use of authoritative violence has not ensued, 
misunderstanding can exist between the legislative, executive and judicial 
branches of government. Junior officials of government departments, who may 
or may not be conscious of their government viewpoint can attempt to impose 
their own viewpoint as an authoritative decision of government when (even in 
terms of their own government legislation) they are only empowered to advise 
and assist. Examples could be quoted of police officers and uniformed armed 
individuals (even at the most junior levels) who attempt to enforce their own 
interpretation of their role. 
However, since this thesis deals with industrial relations, it might be 
more pertinent to note the cases of junior Labour Department officials who 
attempt to impose a settlement of a labour dispute by instructing either 
employer or employee to adhere to what the officials believe to be the intent of 
the labour legislation, rather than indicating to both parties alternative 
interpretations which might be subject to the need for judicial assessment. 
Such instances occur more in the sphere of substantive rules rather than 
procedural or more in cases of disputes of right than in disputes of interest. 
As an independent state, Swaziland has inherited from the former 
British colonial power the concept of the Rule of Law' 
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as distinct from the successors of those continental powers whose constitutions embody 
Administrative Law (Strong CF 1972: 66). In the former case, the executive has no special 
protection, whereas the latter provides protection for the executive arm of government through 
a special system of administrative law. The question arises as to whether the British Rule of 
Law concept has effective application to post-colonial African states, now that the source of 
the concept has been directly removed, but that is not a subject for enquiry in this thesis. 
What does need stating however, is that the apparent and oftimes assumed authoritative status 
conferred on many government servants vis-a-vis the public in developing African states, 
(even in post-British Colonial States), tends, unwittingly to promote the authoritarian 
Administrative Law approach of Continental Europe, rather than the more informal and 
unwritten Rule of Law which emanates from the United Kingdom. 
The early classification for the type of government of a State provided 
by Aristotle endeavoured to assess good or bad government. In doing so, 
whether consciously or not, it included both the ideology upon which the State 
was based and the form of the State's institutions. While Monarchy or Royalty 
(Government of One), Aristocracy (Government of the Few), and Polity 
(Government of the Many), were seen as good, Tyranny or Despotism, 
Oligarchy and Democracy, were seen as bad. Through the centuries Aristotle's 
descriptions of governments have themselves become more complicated. For 
example, the British Monarchical system of government is no longer 
`government of one' and the `Polity' or `government of the many' could be. 
seen as a form of democracy by some politicians. The point is that the 
authoritative allocation of values originates from the perception accorded the 
ideological foundation of the values by the actors who form the power-source. 
More simply, both the former Soviet Union and the United States of America, 
claimed that their values reflected democratic ideology. However democracy 
can be positioned anywhere on the spectrum. That being the case, the 
operationalisation of democratic values can differ in practice, although both 
power-sources would claim democratic values. In developing African States 
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the perception of values and the practical application thereof can change 
rapidly through an overnight coup or similar change. 
For example, the inherited Rule of Law concept pursued by the former 
Rhodesian Government, albeit eroded by emergency legislation, would no 
doubt still be claimed by the existing Zimbabwean Government. Such claim 
and/or perception by government was inconsistent with the violently 
authoritative actions of the Korean trained Fifth Brigade of the new 
Zimbabwean armed forces against the perceived rebels of Joshua Nkomo in 
1982/83. A further example of expedient change was the suspension of the 
constitution of Lesotho in 1970 by the Chief Minister Leabua Jonathan when 
his ruling Congress Party was in danger of losing an election. In Kenya, the 
threatened attempts to stifle all forms of opposition following apparent 
democratic election of President Arap Moi suggests a difference between belief 
and execution of democracy. 
These extreme cases illustrate the confused perception of ideologies 
operationalised through values, which in turn are manifested by the actors in 
any of the sub-systems of societies. It might be argued that the less politically 
and socio-economically developed the society, the more confusion extends to 
the actors. This thesis will provide supporting evidence for the argument. 
It is argued that all the influences to which reference has been made 
and which culminate in societal and individual values, all bear upon each 
industrial conflict situation through the specific actors behaviour. 
Figure 1.1 as conceived by the author, illustrates the combined 
involvement of such influences as they impact upon an industrial conflict 
situation. 
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Fig. 1.1 
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Explanatory Notes: 
(i) Industrial relations conflict is seen as a collective activity 
- 
there is no conflict if individuals resolve the difference between them 
without recourse to an outside agency. 
(ii) All individual values are also embodied in the values of the collective 
- 
Viz individuals have either accepted/helped establish the 
collective group values or subordinated their own and represent their peer group values in conflict activity. 
(iii) Four collective group values are represented, Government, Management, Workers, Government officials. These government officials 
are expected to represent values coincident with government values. In practice however, as individuals, their perception of their 
roles may be at variance with government intentions and become manifest in a different value approach to that expected by the other 
actors and thus produce the fourth group of values. 
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Confusion can exist between ideology and values arising therefrom or, 
simplistically, between belief and execution as expressed in the authoritative 
institutions of modern states. This can be positioned on a spectrum bounded 
by individualism, rationalism and the social reflection of societal values and in 
the operationalisation of these values as manifested in individual behaviour 
within differing sub-systems of society. These concepts can also be expressed 
in their manifestation by classification of government and it is argued that in 
the modern world the classification of the Greek philosophers requires further 
development to describe modern political and socio-economic parameters. One 
such development is that of Edward Shils, (Political Development in the New 
States 1966). A more recent classification, is that of Beck and Linscott's 
`Paradigms' (The Crucible' 
- 
1991), which give substance to the basic 
assumptions which cohesively maintain a given social system. Discussion of 
the paradigms relative to management and worker assumptions is given in 
Chapter 12. 
Perhaps the Western 7 European concepts of democracy, even with 
additional authoritative implementation as followed by the former colonial 
powers in Africa from time to time, led to expectations that those concepts 
would continue to be the guiding basis for independent post-colonial 
governments and for the inhabitants of their countries. The values arising 
therefrom would be the major influencing factors on the governmental 
machinery, which in practical terms gives effect to the authoritative allocation 
of values. Some of that machinery was already operative in the colonial era, 
for example in the Labour Department in Swaziland. 
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There was a structure for effecting government in practice. What 
appears to have happened is that the machinery of government (in the guise of 
officials) has in some respects, become unaligned with basic values upon which 
the machinery of government was originally established 
- 
namely, the desire for 
stability, the desire for liberty and the desire for justice (Partridge P- 1967 : 44 
as quoted by Quinton A (Ed)). 
It is within these or similar parameters that the thesis will describe the 
socio-political environment within which the conflict management activity of 
the industrial relations sub-system occurred in Swaziland. 
1.2 FOCUS OF THE STUDY 
Specifically the present study will: 
(i) Discuss the development of industrial relations sub-systems and the role 
of trade unions within the `third world'; in this case Africa. A 
comparison is made between the uniqueness of the independence 
process in Swaziland and the more overtly violent approach in Kenya. 
It argues that such differences caused the trade unions in Swaziland to 
be less politicised than in many other African states. 
(ii) Describe the socio-political values of the main actors within the 
Swaziland industrial relations sub-system as part of the national value 
system and as they related to each other. Chapter 4 reports upon an 
attitude survey conducted specifically in relation to industrial relations 
issues during the period 1985-88. Chapter 5 describes the authoritative 
values reflected in Swaziland's legal framework for the country's 
industrial relations. 
(iii) Describe how those values affected industrial conflict management 
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within Swaziland's sugar manufacturing and refining Industry. (the 
country's major industry). In chapters 6- 10 a major case study shows 
how the society's overall values were reflected in the handling of an 
industrial dispute over trade union recognition by the employers 
association and which extended from 1983 
- 
1992. The study is 
empirical in form but contains normative comment as the conflict 
management process is analysed and it becomes apparent that collective 
bargaining enabled discussion to proceed from time to time, but 
differing value perceptions and tactical power utilisation prolonged the 
conflict. 
(iv) Present a final analysis and conclusions including the author's own 
evaluation of what went wrong, and the actions which might have 
established a less confrontational situation. 
This research is essentially practical rather than theoretical. The 
introductory chapter is intended to argue that much industrial relations conflict 
originally arises from the broader value-systems of society, and the differing 
values and perceptions of the collective actors. These are reflected through the 
behaviour of the individuals towards the conflict and each other as they 
actually meet face-to-face through the collective bargaining process to manage 
the conflict situation. 
It will become apparent that no attempt has been made to indulge in 
deep psychological analysis or to develop sociological theories or a model for 
the analysis of industrial relations within developing countries or for the 
resolution of social conflict. In 'so far as the study follows any academic 
discipline, it tends, as a point of departure, towards political reality, in that 
industrial relations conflict frequently, even in Swaziland, has some political 
connotation. The basic premise is that the complexities of power concentration 
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in human inter-relationships creates conflict and while it may be economically 
prudent, to seek ways and means of managing conflict, the realities of 
industrial relations require recognition that conflict is an inherent part of 
contemporary industrial life. This argument is discussed further in Chapter 12. 
Both the ILO (PSLRA/1991/JLO : 5) and Siddique (Siddique SA: 
1989) conclude from a macro-analysis of the socio-political and economic 
environments of third world countries, that the state continues to play a 
dominant role in industrial relations `and is likely to do so in the foreseeable 
future'. 
This study will examine whether this is the case with industrial relations 
in Swaziland. 
1.3 SCOPE AND SEQUENCE OF THE STUDY 
The study is divided into 4 major parts. 
Part I Background to the Study (Chapters 1 and 2) 
- 
Chapter 1 discusses collective and personal values of society and the 
state as the authoritative power for imposing values in relation to concepts of 
democracy and industrial relations sub-systems and the issue of conflict. 
Chapter 2 discusses the problems of developing societies with particular 
reference to industrial relations and the role of trade unions. 
Part II 
- 
Socio Political and Economic Environment (Chapters 3,4,5) 
This part of the study essentially describes the Swaziland industrial 
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relations sub-system as it was located within the overall socio-political and 
economic environment during the period 1982 
- 
92 and of the development of 
the main Swazi institutions which became parties to subsequent conflict. 
Part III 
- 
The Conflict over Recognition (Chapters 6- 10) 
This section contains a historical analysis of the conflict over trade 
union recognition by employers. It follows the development of this issue 
within the major industry of Swaziland and shows that over a nine year period 
the participants were unable to resolve the conflict. Chapters 8 and 9 consist 
of a lengthy description of the interaction; the chapters have been structured so 
as to maintain the continuity of the conflict content for the reader. 
Part IV 
- 
Analysis and Conclusions (Chapters 11,12) 
The reasons for non-resolution of the conflict are analysed. Practical, 
rather than theoretical observations are made from the author's own experience 
and as a participating manager. Suggestions for minimising and reducing 
conflict in industrial relations situations in African developing countries are 
proposed. 
1.4. CONCLUSION 
This introductory chapter has sought to establish the relationship 
between a society's (industrial) values (ideology) and conflict as it occurs 
within the industrial relations sphere. Much industiral relations conflict 
originally arises from the broader value systems of society and the differing 
values and perceptions of the collective actors. Within the conflict arena of 
industrial relations the value (ideological) sets, influence the processing of 
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conflict. 
First, the government through the authoritative allocation of values 
establishes those of the governing elite which reflects and dictates those of 
society. In Swaziland the industrial relations sub-system embodied the (Swazi) 
non-traditional values of post-colonial Western style industrialised countries, 
viz. democratic socialism. This is reflected in the I. L. O. 's concept of collective 
bargaining. 
Secondly, the collective values of worker organisations were encouraged 
and promoted by Western government agencies, international worker 
organizations and the ILO in accordance with the industrialised countries' 
concepts of collective bargaining. 
The third set of values, management/employer values, tended to derive 
from authoritarian, paternalistic colonial sources but were forced into a 
collective bargaining mould by the legislation. The conflict arena 
accommodates, through collective bargaining, these sets of values as an 
organised approach to conflict management. Essentially the aim for 
management and labour is to obtain through compromise the best of the 
bargain in any conflict situation. This process is repeated when the next 
similar situation arises. The central theme of this study is that of the actors' 
approaches to conflict over almost ten years as they reacted to the demand for 
recognition of a major trade union by employers in Swaziland. 
Given this background as orientation the problems of developing 
societies in adapting relationships to industrialisation are described in the next 
chapter. 
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ENDNOTES 
1. In practice the lower courts of the Swaziland National Administration, do not adhere to the concept. These 
tribal courts assume guilt unless proved otherwise. But S. N. A. Courts are not concerned with the level of 
incidents normally dealt with by the Magistrates, Industrial, High and Appeal Courts. 
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CHAPTER 2 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
(CULTURE, MODERNISATION AND TRADE UNION ROLES) 
2.1 POST-INDEPENDENCE DEVELOPMENT 
The concept and structures of Industrial Relations are essentially 
associated with a modernised society. And the definition of a modernised 
society in this context relates to those of the developed nations of the Western 
World 
- 
economically industrialised and politically veering between Social- 
Democratic (Western Europe) and controlled capitalistic (United States of 
America). It is true that the industrial developed nations of Communist 
political orders also had Industrial Relations structures, but two specifics are of 
concern here: 
- 
First, the industrial society itself, originated, as did the formalised 
industrial relations structure, in the comparatively liberal society of the United 
Kingdom. This was one result from the Industrial Revolution of the late 
eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries. 
Second, the tendency in Communist political systems was for organised 
labour to be seen as, or was expected to be supportive of, the dominant 
political ideology. The point to be established is the extent to which industrial 
relations in developing societies that are only at the `economic take-off stage' 
(Rostow W: 1960) follow either the Western or Communist pattern or have 
evolved an original model for themselves. 
There appears a paradox between what has emerged as a one-party 
political order (viz African Nationalist or Marxist) and industrial development. 
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The former born out of the independence conflict situations of many ex- 
colonial states and the latter inherited from and oftimes maintained, by the very 
states, from whom independence was sought. Simplistically, British colonial 
political rule was rejected, British financial, technical, industrial and 
managerial aid was accepted. The complexity of the issue was accentuated by 
the fact that political and economic (industrial) development evolved 
simultaneously, if not always in harmony, in countries such as the United 
Kingdom. In the developing states, the industrial structures because they had 
been inherited from the former colonial masters or had been impatiently 
initiated by the 'new' modernising elite, were in place before the politically 
developed system necessary to sustain them. 
Merkt (1967: 380) noted the danger of `expecting the politics of 
developing societies to conform to standards which not even Great Britain 
observed until she was well along the way on her journey to modernisation'. 
The same may be said of the industrial relations (viz the industrial political 
values) sub-systems in developing countries. The teaching and learning of 
technical (pure science) processes is somewhat more rapid than the 
development and change required of values consistent with an industrially 
orientated society. Authoritative values are the constraints imposed by 
governments within which any society exists. It is those values which give 
energy to industrial relations sub-systems and give direction to all of the sub- 
systems of their respective societies. If those societies are at an early stage of 
modernisation then they are beset with the difficulties and problems (Merkt P: 
1967: 381) of 
(a) unity and consensus 
(b) government stability and effectiveness 
(c) political communication between leadership and the masses 
(d) articulation of interests and organisations reflecting those interests 
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(e) psychological aspects of political development 
It is argued in this thesis that precisely the same problems are reflected 
within the industrial relations sub-systems of developing countries. -It is 
observed that technical development and societal (human group) development 
are `out-of-gear'. Many African societies are endeavouring to pursue both 
economic and political modernisation and development. South Africa, as a 
contrast, already has both a well-established and technologically advanced 
political and socio-economic society endeavouring to absorb a socio-political 
undeveloped heterogeneous additional society. The process of modernisation 
appears in different forms. Industrialisation and the values which determine its 
progress can be `directly linked' to the industrial revolution, which had its 
origin in the midlands of England 200 years ago (Dalton G 1975: 42). 
But those values were uniquely English based upon a liberal tradition 
which while inhibited from time to time by government action, evolved over 
many centuries and continues to change today. The challenge of modernisation 
in the underdeveloped nations is that of developing or evolving their own 
values to sustain and direct a ready-made, but imported technological sub- 
system. The tendency is to adapt or simply accept the regulative (industrial 
relations) values inherent in the industrialisation of Europe and America. For 
example, employment and industrial relations legislated structures take little or 
no account of traditional national or sub-group values. 
2.2 THE KENYA EXPERIENCE 
There is a need to consider the effect of the following phenomenon 
which has arisen in the post-colonial era since 1945 in any study of industrial 
relations in developing states. In some states (e. g. Kenya) labour organisations 
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were identified with the perceived struggle for independence. A contrast 
between Kenya, for example, and Swaziland relates specifically to the 
difference in the process towards political independence. It has been stated that 
native Kenyans opposed European settlers from the beginning of British 
occupation in the late 19th Century (Lubembe C 1968: 31-37). This opposition 
almost of its own volition gained ground throughout the first-half of the 
twentieth century. In 1920, in opposition to a proposed reduction in the pay- 
rates of African workers as a counter to poor harvests and drought conditions, 
and to what was perceived as a discriminatory measure, the young Kikuyu 
Association staged a demonstration in Nairobi. 
Perceived exploitation by employers gradually led to the formation of 
organised workers associations, which, from the start, were concerned not only 
with improving wages and conditions of service but with `a wide range of 
other matters appertaining to the growth of the economy and rapidly changing 
social status of the workers' (Lubembe C 1968: 31-37). The situation of 
political involvement became more acute throughout the 1940's and the African 
Study Union, a political body, began to make representations on African 
political rights in 1944. It later became the Kenya African Union, headed by 
Jomo Kenyatta. 
By 1948, a strike by the East African Workers Federation in Mombasa, 
at the railways and harbours, clearly demonstrated the political nature of the 
workers struggle. By 1949 a number of nationalist movements emerged 
following the lead by the Kenya African Union. 
The Kenya Government declared a state of emergency on October 20th 
1952 and arrested and detained a number of prominent trade unionists as well, 
as some leading political figures, including Jomo Kenyatta, the President of the 
Kenya African Union (Lubembe C 1968: 76). It was considered by government 
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that the trade union movement harboured most of the Mau Mau adherents. The 
labour movement denied any Mau Mau involvement and indicated that any 
unionist implicated in the violence and political subversion by Mau Mau 
`should therefore be judged in an individual capacity' (Lumbembe C 1978: 76). 
It is interesting to note however, that the trade union movement clearly 
identifies itself with the independence of Kenya, `if it were not probably due to 
the role played by the workers during the emergency, Kenya would not be 
independent' (Lubembe C 1968: 190). A similar situation developed in South 
Africa during the late 1980's in so far as political violence and trade union 
involvement were concerned. 
2.3 THE SWAZILAND EXPERIENCE 
By contrast, the same identity of interest between the independence 
movement and Swaziland's trades unions was not apparent. While some 
challenge to the political power base occurred prior to independence, it 
ultimately manifested itself as an attempt to obtain employers' recognition of 
trade unions, rather than attempts to obtain, by violent means, a political 
independence from the protecting power. Swaziland was a British Protectorate, 
dating from the conclusion of the Anglo-Boer War (1899 
- 
1902). It was not a 
self-governing colony with governments dominated by European Settlers as for 
example Kenya, Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), Nyasaland (Malawi) and 
Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). A further influencing factor was that of single 
tribe 
- 
Swazis 
- 
whose King was the acknowledged leader by both natives of 
Swaziland and the protecting power. It was expected, and in fact became the 
situation, that the King negotiated the removal of the British political 
administration. The independence movement as such did not become an armed 
challenge or Maoist-style guerilla movement of attrition against the colonial 
power. What collective action occurred was confined to two series of 
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(employer and government perceived) political strikes 
- 
at Big Bend (sugar 
industry) and at Havelock Mine (asbestos). Whoever advised the workers 
movement would seem to have perceived the strategic importance of these 
industries to the Swaziland economy. Both play a major part in the economic 
development of the country. A follow-on strike within the Railways 
Construction project in 1962, as with the earlier strikes, did not succeed in 
forcing recognition of the unions. 
From 1962 until 1980, trade unions were restricted in practice, if not by 
legislation, and from 1973 when the late King, Sobhuza II, suspended the 
Westminister type of constitution left by the British Government in 1968, all. 
forms of public gathering and association were prohibited by the Crown, unless 
permitted by the Commissioner of Police. Political activities and political 
parties were prohibited; this was still the situation in 1992. 
One consequence of the independence identity phenomena, as observed 
in Swaziland, was that those politicians or administrators who occupied high 
positions of state (1992), but who were formerly junior members of the labour 
force, tended towards a worker-orientation in the administration of legislation. 
Thus, for example, suggested amendments to labour legislation which were 
agreed in 1985 between the employers' representatives and the then leaders of 
the trade unions, as members of the Labour Advisory 
-Board, had still not been 
discussed in Cabinet by December 1990, although there were two changes of 
government during that period. 
However, the Kenya experience indicates that the opposite effect, can 
occur, in which those senior members of government previously active in the 
labour movement `are only interested in securing their position and see ' 
collective labour activities as directly challenging their power'. (Lubembe C 
1968: 190) 
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2.4 SOCIO-POLITICAL DIRECTION 
In so far as political leadership has influenced labour movements and vice 
versa, it is clear from the foregoing that socio political considerations and labour 
relations as in Europe and the United Kingdom during the late nineteenth century 
and even to the present day, are inseparable. In developing countries this pattern 
has been followed and as indicated previously, a similar situation appears in South 
Africa in so far as Black trade unions are involved. 
To improve social well-being is seen as requiring political power. In Sri 
Lanka, for example. `Almost every political party has its own trade union arm 
and the chief office bearers are the leaders of the respective political parties' (Da 
Silva W 1978: 53). Nevertheless, the actual political power and the collective 
bargaining power of African Unions (apart from South Africa) are very far from 
having a significant impact either upon the state or the employers. It would be 
unwise to assume that they have no impact however. The fact is that, except in 
South Africa, most African Unions are limited in size and poorly organised 
(Jackson M 1977: 66). It has been suggested that much of this is due to the fact 
that trade unions have developed directly as a result of the contacts with European 
unions promoted, and, in some cases, encouraged by colonial governments, prior 
to independence. The theme of the argument lies in the fact that the concept and 
structure of trade unionism has generally created a poor potential leadership in 
African societies, (other than in South Africa) which is out of touch with the rank 
and file of the work-force. However two exceptions occurred. In Zambia, it was 
the leader of the trade union movement who successfully ousted Kenneth Kaunda 
as President in a multi-party election in 1992. The Prime Minister of Swaziland 
in 1992, although directly appointed by the King, was also a former Trade Union 
official. 
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s 
Jackson (1977: 60) states `This line of reasoning argues that because of the 
European influence unions were introduced too early and with the wrong kind of 
organisation for the situation in which they have to work'. To a large extent the 
writer of this thesis would, from direct observation, support the statement, in so 
far as unions are active in the former Southern African colonial states. The 
paradox of the independence struggle as it was labelled by unions, has been that 
the political power which was desired, has nevertheless not yet succeeded in the 
equalising of wealth. The unions which supported the so-called struggle seem no 
longer capable of pursuing it to achieve the ultimate re-ordering of society which 
was part of the original objective. However, the country which was perceived to 
be restrictive, (South Africa) permits well-organised and somewhat Marxist- 
orientated trade unions which wield very considerable economic and major 
political influence. The reasons for this are politically and socially complex, the 
details of which are beyond the scope of this study, but the observation offers an 
interesting field for comparative research. 
2.5 CONCLUSION 
It has been shown in this short chapter that the ideology of independence 
has tended to be one focus for developing industrial relations activity in African 
states recognised by worker collectives and employer associations. What must be 
noted however, was that in developing trade unions in Swaziland, the political 
independence theme was of much less importance to the unions than was the 
situation in other former colonial states and also in South Africa. For Swaziland 
it was much more a question of the values reflecting the right to worker collective 
representation. As stated in the previous chapter, that right was established 
through the authoritative value system via industrial relations legislation and thus 
became a central feature of the industrial relations sub-system values. This will 
become more evident from the first section of the following chapter which 
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outlines such development from a union perspective. 
Guidance for labour organisations in developing countries has stemmed 
largely from European unions, while legislation has been enacted in accordance 
with United Nations conventions. In Swaziland, for example, the legislation was 
drafted by an International Labour Organisation official (1980) (Dodds P 1981). 
The problems of industrial relations sub-systems however reflect the problems of 
African traditional life attempting to adapt to twentieth 
- 
century technology and 
to the problems of economic, political and social modernisation. It may be added 
that the concept of traditional life encompasses the impact of colonialism, in so 
far as it still importantly reflects the values of both employee and employer within 
the African context. 
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PART II 
- 
SOCIO-POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC 
ENVIRONMENT 
CHAPTER 3 BACKGROUND TO TRADE UNION 
DEVELOPMENT IN SWAZILAND 
3.1 THE SWAZILAND SOCIETY 
3.1.1 Socio-political Background 
Swaziland, while appearing to follow an underdeveloped country's pattern 
of political and industrial progress, has since 1976 reverted in many respects to 
an almost feudal system (Government of Swaziland 1983/84: 1987/88 23-30). 
Government is based upon an absolute monarchy, advised by a Council of Elders 
(Liqoqo) or National Council (since 1990) who consult with a part elected, part 
nominated Senate and House of Assembly. ' Elected members represent districts, 
supervised by Chiefs (the Tinkundla); political parties as such are prohibited. 
In practice, this may not be dissimilar to the pattern of one party states or 
military totalitarianism which prevailed in Africa until 1991, except that in 
Swaziland elements of popular democracy, defined as participation in discussion 
of proposed legislation, exist in parliament. From 1982 non-political trade unions 
were permitted. These trade unions permitted and protected by legislation made 
some progress in recruiting members (see previous chapter). The significant 
feature of this socio-political infrastructure is that the overriding political power- 
base is essentially traditional and emphasises the cultural heritage and the 
Tinkundla electoral system. The recognition of the need to progress industrially 
however is also present and was given approval by His (late) Majesty King 
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Sobhuza II when he assented to the thoroughly modem and sophisticated labour 
legislation. 
Economically, there is undoubted acceptance of the need to industrialise. 
Encouragement is given to industrialists to pursue modem management methods 
and techniques in the communication process. It is against/within the framework 
of a traditional society, that the rules in practice ensure that while giving substance 
to internationally accepted standards of conduct, in management/worker 
communications, the implementation thereof does not preclude the traditional 
petition to the Chief. Petitions can be made to the Elders of the Nation or any 
one of them individually in the event that any decision by an employer is 
unacceptable to the petitioner. 
In a land-locked country of only 3/4 million people but with a population 
growth rate of 3.4 percent per annum (Government of Swaziland 1988 : 33), there 
are major social problems of illiteracy and malnutrition. The determining vagaries 
of nature, alternating between drought and flood (a disastrous cyclone in 1984-cost 
some R150 million to repair the infrastructure alone) pose an additional burden 
for the authorities. There is however, a superimposed industrial and modern sub- 
system, which draws the majority of its labour force from among the subsistence 
social strata. The workers in this sub-system however, have progressed to the 
extent that economically they are dependent upon industry as wage earners and 
are socially, in terms of Western standards, beginning to `climb-the-ladder'. 
3.1.2 Industrial Development 
There is very little completely up-to-date statistical information available 
(Govt of Swaziland 
- 
1988: 84) concerning the composition of industry within 
Swaziland. In general terms however, it can be stated that gainful employment 
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for a total estimated 80,000 adults, is provided by: sugar cane growing, milling 
and 
- 
processing, forestry and timber extraction (e. g. ý paper), fruit growing 
(pineapples) and canning, mining of iron ore and asbestos, government and public 
utilities (electricity, railway, government departments) public transport operators, 
three major hotels and two major banks. In addition, a small number of 
manufacturing units exist: furniture, brick works, textile plant and one or two 
larger organisation such as a brewery, cold drinks processing and bottling, and a 
great number of one man business activities of the cafe type. 
While primary production operations have been established for many years 
and the addition of one large sugar cane growing and milling unit employing +- 
3 500 from 1981, the light industries only emerged within the period 1975-90. 
As indicated, accurate statistical information is lacking, but it would seem that 
"sugar" employs some 25% of the labour force and probably another 35% is 
employed in some form of primary activity (agriculture, mining). 
As might be expected, the majority of work consists of low level activities 
of the general labouring and unskilled type and the labour force comprises of 
probably 60% illiterate and semi-literate workers. The remaining 40% 
, 
however 
covers those with Junior Certificate (or equivalent) to "0" Levels and beyond. 
These members of the work force perform skilled (artisan) work, clerical and 
secretarial activities and increasingly supervisory and junior managerial 
responsibilities. 
Except in government service, almost all higher level industrial 
appointments during the period of this study (1982.92) were held by expatriate 
staff, many of whom significantly came from Southern Africa. It must be 
understood, however, that all expatriates require Temporary Residence Permits, 
issued every two years, and because of Government localisation (affumative 
action) policies, the total number of expatriates existing in industry and commerce 
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reduce each year. Larger business organisations were committed to training 
(often of the `lip service' type however, except for artisan/apprentices) and had 
produced written localisation and succession plans. For example, one large sugar 
milling operation reduced its expatriate complement from 123 in 1982 to 53 in 
1990 and thereafter reduced to no more than 30 within the succeeding three years. 
Numbers could change slightly thereafter dependent upon diversification and the 
initial need for technical and managerial staff. 
On the assumption that the most important single component of labour 
relations, centres on pay-ratest it may be of interest to note that the lowest paid 
worker existed in agriculture where the Wages Regulations Order (Agricultural 
Industry) 1992 set the minimum rate of E3.97* (R3.97) per day, plus basic food 
and meat ration. Employers also provided accommodation (and fuel), which 
ranged from the primitive to a relatively sophisticated house with coal stove, for 
low-level employees. 
Housing of a progressively higher standard according to job, or a housing 
allowance, was usually provided. 
In practice, larger employers usually paid well beyond the minimum 
legislated pay rates (for example, the Sugar Millers' minimum was E9.00 (R9.00) 
per day in 1992 for permanent employees, on the basis of a six day week; plus 
one additional day's pay as `attendance' bonus and on the larger agricultural 
estates the employers provided all medical services, social centres, lighting, water 
and similar services and primary schooling in conjunction with the State. 
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3.1.3 Industrial Communication "Framework" 
Historical "pattern" (pre 1980) 
3.1.3.1 Minimum Legislation Protection 
The former Colonial Administration sought to provide minimum protection 
for employees in terms of Wages Protection, Workmen's Compensation, terms and 
conditions of employment and the regulation of industrial relations. Government 
was advised by a Labour Advisory Board and established Wages Councils 
consisting of employer/employee representatives whose recommendations endorsed 
by the Chairman, were embodied in `Orders' issued by the responsible Minister 
and thus became law. 
r 
3.1.3.2 In-Company Communication 
3.1.3.2.1 Methodology 
Much of industry's methodology in the labour relations sphere in 
Swaziland, was akin to that pursued within the traditional (defined as paternalistic) 
process industry of South Africa as it existed prior to the legislation for Black 
trade unions in 1980. Thus communication systems ranged widely. The formal 
highly structured production-orientated management/worker relationships, with 
well established, management dominated Works Councils existed on the sugar 
estates and in larger companies. But most followed the almost totally non-existent 
structure of disciplinary/autocratic meetings on an ad hoc informal basis, whenever 
management felt it had something important to announce. Wages had been 
negotiated, under government appointed Wages Councils but collective employee 
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representation as generally understood and as associated with the labour relations 
concept, was virtually non-existent. 
3.1.3.2.2 Communication problems 
Within the industrial relations sub-system of developing Swaziland, as a 
generalisation, it was observed at the end of 1982 that conflict and related 
communications problems were generated by misunderstanding of differing 
government, employer and worker values manifested in management and worker 
attitudes towards each other. This phenomena gave rise to mistrust and further 
misunderstanding. A low-priority rating was given by middle and junior 
management for personnel problems. This is not unique and persists even in 
industrialised countries in production-orientated organisations. There was a lack 
of education among managers on people problems and on management, 
particularly among middle and junior management. There was a lack of 
education, by workers, concerning the whole profit goal concept of business 
enterprise. 
Additionally, the cultural and ethnic differences between White (and a 
small number of Black Swazi) managers, many of whom were of Southern 
African origin, and the almost tribal culture of traditional Swazi society, 
attempting to communicate within an advanced industrial organisation, generated 
much frustration on the part of both management and workers. 
Communication at the management (supervision level) worker interface 
other than work-related, consisted of such matters as requests by workers to 
management on "other" factors. Apart from wages these were of a very localised 
nature. More often than not such requests were difficult to agree; changing 
working hours, additional/protective clothing, improved quantity and quality of 
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rations which were perceived to be of inadequate amounts and poor quality. Also 
included were requests and complaints concerning transport to social events 
(football matches); extra medical benefits to families, which because of the 
extended family system would be impracticable. Because of the increased costs 
involved in acceding, and often the mishandling by management when rejecting 
such requests, there was a continuing tendency to alienate both parties from each 
other. 
A disciplinary code, formulated by management, implemented without due 
consideration of all of the facts, frequently resulted in unfair terminations. The 
whole incident upon incident created an environment far from an acceptable level 
of good labour relations. 
The paradox was that most managers were unaware of the poor level of 
communication. They were convinced that their workers were contented and 
seemed incapable of recognising as managers the explosive nature inherent in this 
type of situation. One might almost have predicted the difference between 
management/worker responses to a given attitude survey on "what do you think 
of the company and its communications? " This situation still existed in 1992 in 
some companies and was certainly so when the Industrial Relations Act came into 
being in July 1982. 
3.1.3.3 Company Initiated "Development" Action 
Certain elements then of poor communication continued to exist throughout 
the 1980's and into 1992 but the legal rights given to workers'by the Employment 
and Industrial Relations Act to 'negotiate', 'collectivise', and to 'strike' caused 
management in some of the major companies to reassess its policies and 
procedures, sometimes to standardise as an industry (e. g. sugar milling) on much 
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of the personnel methods and to instil credibility into the works council system. 
Internal training courses were conducted for both management and labour to 
explain the implications and practical application of the new legislation; to show 
the problems which arise as a result of ill-advised management action, and to 
explain the reasons (and advantages) to be derived from a carefully developed 
Disciplinary Code and Grievance Procedure. Personnel staff were accorded 
greater management support from senior and middle level managers and were 
increasingly seen by both managers and labour as facilitating the introduction of 
the machinery for negotiation and the resolution of disputes and grievances, 
permitted by law. It is naive to think that communication, with all of its facets, 
had improved since the 1982 labour legislation, but it had become a live issue 
towards the end of the decade and caused a greater depth of thinking about human 
problems, often for the first time, other than in an autocratic/paternalistic or 
subservient anti-management manner. 
3.1.3.4. Collective Bargaining/Negotiation 
It will now be apparent that legislation had encouraged the more 
progressive employer and spurred others to recognise that collective 
agreements, either with individual works councils or trade unions, provide 
a basis for working in an environment of understanding, if not of complete 
satisfaction. Simultaneously, the permitting of negotiation through 
collective association of workers, had given an impetus to trade unions and 
a new lease of life to some works councils and to formalised disciplinary 
codes and grievance procedures. 
Some 50 or so cases usually of unfair dismissal, had reached the 
Industrial Court by 1988 (December) with judgement almost always in 
favour of the employee. A spelling out of agreed wage rates and 
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conditions of service in collective agreements should have reduced the 
problems of localised misunderstanding. These formal agreements 
however identified more specifically disputes at this higher level, thus 
giving some credibility among the labour force to the concepts of 
industrial relations. 
3.1.3.5 Summary 
This section has described in broad terms Swaziland's socio- 
political and economic development as background to the communications 
process and situation within the industrial sub-system. Communication 
may be seen as facilitating management/labour interaction. 
From the earlier Colonial Administration attempt to establish 
minimum protective employment conditions and regulation of industrial 
relations to the newer I. L. O. promoted legislation of independent 
- 
Swaziland there was a developing awareness by government, employers 
and employees of the importance of communication between management 
and labour. The criteria for important varies with the actor, but what was 
significant was the realisation that traditional autocratic concepts and 
methods inherent in Swazi culture, but also practised by management, 
required some modification. There was recognition of a need to provide 
for articulation and representation of the collective 
- 
worker viewpoint. 
' The following section 3.2 describes the development of trades 
unions in Swaziland as the representative bodies of those worker- 
collectives. 
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3.2 TRADE UNION DEVELOPMENT IN SWAZILAND 
3.2.1 Introduction 
It was observed in the previous chapter that whereas there, was a close 
association between the struggle for political independence and union movements 
in most ex-British Colonial States in Africa and in particular Kenya, no such 
identification existed in Swaziland. In Swaziland, trade unionism was and is 
concerned initially with obtaining employer recognition as the one legitimate voice 
of the worker collective. Some employers, however, did perceive attempts for 
union recognition as a potential bid for national political power. 
This section describes briefly the socio-political environment in terms of 
union and management perceptions within which Swaziland's trade unions have 
sought recognition. More detailed qualitative analysis of the normative 
environment, specific to trade union activities, is reported in the following chapter. 
Most of the content of this study is written from a management perspective, 
because of the author's active involvement in management in Swaziland. 
However, because of the nature of the involvement, that is to say the active 
concern with all aspects of industrial relations development in Swaziland during 
the years 1982-92, some personal contacts with individual trade union leaders 
were established by the author. 
Sufficient data were accumulated to provide a union perspective on the 
development philosophy and strategy of trade unions in Swaziland as part of the 
background to the study. It would be naive to expect that anything confidential 
was divulged, but in so far as the general development of the trade union 
movement was concerned it was possible to obtain a union view to some extent. 
Additionally a union publication (undated) also provided much material. ('Your 
Union Organization' 
-A study circle material - SFI'U) - Appendix 4. 
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3.2.2 Perceptions 
3.2.2.1. A 'Union' Perspective on Origins and Development (SFTU 
1983: 13-197) 
Swaziland was seen as providing 'an excellent climate for employment' 
especially in the mining, sugar and forestry industries. These economic activities 
provided a stimulus for organised labour as a counter-force to employers and a 
safeguard against social injustice and poor working conditions and low pay. As 
a result of these conditions the gospel of trade unionism was already being 
received during the 1960's. The British Colonial Government early in 1960 
recognised the urgent need to develop communication between workers and 
management and to assess working conditions. In May 1960 the F. C. Catchpole 
Commission was appointed to study labour relations in the face of the growing 
socialisation of labour. The report of the Commission found that the labour 
relations of the future would be dominated by mass attitudes. The law should 
therefore provide the framework for peaceful industrial relations, guarantee 
minimum conditions of employment and minimise opportunities for discontent by 
establishing the machinery for negotiation. Cognisance should be taken of changes 
in the basic attitudes to employment by Swazi labour as a concomitant of the 
establishment of a large permanent industrial labour force. The report appeared 
coincident with African nationalist political movements. It was received with 
scepticism by some but `the workers were quite happy with it'. 
The first trade union in Swaziland was formed in 1962 but legislation did 
not exist to establish collective employee recognition. The Pulp and Timber 
Workers' Union sought not only to improve conditions in the forestry industry but 
also to promote collective workers' movements in other industries which could 
then unite in a federation of trade unions. 
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On 6 April 1962 poor working conditions and the employers' attitudes 
forced the union to call a strike 
- 
initially affecting only the forestry industry. But 
early in 1963 a national strike developed throughout Swaziland spreading from 
Ubombo Ranches Limited on 18 March, in the east of the country to Havelock 
Mines3 on the Western border with South Africa on 20 May. Two newly formed 
political parties, the Swaziland Democratic Party and Swaziland Progressive Party 
supported labour, while the indigenous, traditional Swazi National Council and the 
European Advisory Council together with the employers opposed the strike. The 
involvement of political parties caused the strike to be seen as political rather than 
industrial and led to bitter differences between opposing political parties. Failure 
to avert the strike caused King Sobhuza II to issue a Royal directive for workers 
delegates to visit Royal Headquarters. Striking workers defied the King's 
commands; an unprecedented act, foreign and unacceptable in Swaziland. The 
British Government was asked for assistance and troops of the First Battalion 
Gordon Highlanders were airlifted from Kenya to augment the 350 strong Royal 
Swaziland Police. The strike was crushed. Hostility to trade unions by employers 
and Swazi traditionalists increased considerably and a compulsory mass de- 
registration of trade unions ensued. `Internal squabbles due to political differences 
also rocked Trade Unions' (SFI'U 16: 1983). 
After independence from Britain in September 1968 when the Unions 
organisers `expected a change of attitude', it became apparent that Swazi 
traditionalists and the Government opposed union formation because trade 
unionism was seen as a foreign concept unnecessary for Swazi Society. As an , 
attempt to placate labour feelings, Government sponsored one national trade union 
body for all workers in the country. This was totally rejected by labour. 
Poor working conditions caused ILO intervention and ILO support was 
given for the study of union formation in Canada. The International Confederation 
of Free Trade Unions sent a representative to Swaziland to assist in the formation 
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of genuine democratic trade unions `free from employers and politicians 
domination' (SFTU 16: 1983). 
An attempt was made to form a Swaziland Federation of Trade Unions as 
an umbrella body to promote the. formation of trade unions in all industries (19 
October 1971). This federation would have included the established Swaziland 
Citrus Plantations, Agricultural and Allied Workers Union but the effort was 
ineffective. Political upheavals, not directly connected to trade unionism, led to 
the King's suspension of the Westminster style Constitution in 1973. A State of 
Emergency was declared and the effective banning of the few trade unions which 
did exist (e. g. the Agricultural, Mining and Timber Industry Unions). However, 
Swaziland's new membership of the ILO in 1973 and its ratification of 15 ILO 
Conventions caused the reactivation of the Federation of Trade Unions as an 
umbrella body, to which were affiliated the following Unions: - 
- 
Swaziland Agriculture and Plantation Workers' 
- 
Swaziland Commercial and Allied Workers 
- 
Swaziland Union of Financial Institutions 
- 
Swaziland Manufacturing and Allied Workers 
- 
Swaziland Transport Workers. 
The Prime Minister (January 1992), The Honourable Obed Diamini MP, 
was the first Secretary-General of the Federation of Trade Unions. Consultation 
within the Labour Advisory Board led to the enactment in 1980 of the current 
labour laws. However it required considerable time to revive individual unions 
and the support of the ILO and the Organisation of African Union Unity-Nairobi 
Project Office. Five trade unions were registered in May 1983, one of which was 
the Swaziland Agricultural and Plantation Workers' Union. The Commonwealth 
Trade Union Council funded an office and typist for six-months for the Federation 
of Trade Unions anticipating that sufficient union funds would become available 
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within that period to sustain the office. 
Unions initially contributed part of their funds for the maintenance of the 
Federation and their responsibilities vis-a-vis the Federation are contained in the 
Constitution (Appendix 4). All unions follow similar organisation structures and 
operating procedures. Each union has a national executive committee which 
manages the day-to-day affairs of the union and which interprets and implements 
official union policy. Policy is decided at a general meeting. The general 
meeting, open to all paid-up members takes place annually. Issues are discussed 
and resolutions passed by open majority vote. Adopted resolutions determine 
union policies and the members attending general meetings have powers to 
appoint full-time union officials. 
Once every two years a Biennial Delegates Conference is strictly confined 
to the election of the national officers and trustees and the national executive 
committee. In addition to the existing officers and trustees, the general meeting 
is attended by delegates from union branches or from industries (where no union 
branch exists) forming the union. It must be clearly understood that while a union 
may exist and have been registered and legally established, it does not follow that 
a branch of that union exists within every undertaking within the industry. 
It is emphasised that the supreme authority for the conduct of union 
business emanates from the Annual General Meeting. Major emphasis is placed 
on union democracy operationalised by Unions as follows: 
- 
- 
By Consensus 
- 
after discussion there is general agreement on the course 
to follow. 
" 
By Show of Hands 
- 
this is the most common form of voting. 
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- 
By Acclamation 
- 
sometimes used at large congresses or conventions. The 
decision is taken in favour of those who `shout loudest'. 
- 
By Ballot 
- 
sometimes ballots are used for the election of officers. The 
ballot can be a direct one taken at a meeting or a secret ballot where no 
one knows who voted for whom or what. 
3.2.2.2 Union Philosophy 
A major premise for union activity is that of unity; it is sometimes 
described as the first principle of trade unionism. The bargaining strength of 
unions depends upon member support and this is considered of particular 
importance when dealing with both national and local issues. Management is 
perceived as being concerned with divide and rule strategies which are especially 
common in capitalist societies. Unions must ensure that such attempts are 
resisted. 
Unity also minimises opportunities for splinter unions and it is the aim of 
most unions to achieve 100% membership in the industry within which members 
operate. Particular group interests can only be served within the confines of union 
policies and divisions must be minimised through firm -leadership. Energies 
directed by minor officials in quarrelling among themselves distracts them from 
their main task of representing members. Peace and stability must be achieved 
through constant recognition of the need for unity. The emphasis upon union 
unity and the problems arising from disunity leads to a basis for union strategy of 
dividing employers. Particularly relevant to the Union insistence on unity is the 
fact that legally (I R Act 1980 
- 
Sec 20 (1)) 
- 
unions in Swaziland are in respect 
of an industry as distinct from craft unions (such as exist, for example, in the 
United Kingdom and South Africa). ' There are no craft unions in Swaziland. What 
constitutes an industry, however is contentious and was one of the major issues 
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of the recognition conflict between SAPWU and SSMRI E/A. Reference is made 
to this in more detail in Part III. 
3.2.2.3 
. 
Union Strategy 
The formation of demands or proposals are considered by Swaziland union 
leaders as a crucial problem area between officials and union members. Members 
will invariably pursue `huge and wishful' demands which, if submitted to 
employers without modification, can destroy the opportunity for beneficial mutual 
discussion. Union officials must convince their members to put forward realistic 
and reasonable proposals. However, no matter how unreasonable workers 
demands may be, they have a democratic right to be involved and to know that 
the strongest possible representation is made on their behalf. 
Negotiation with management must be in good faith in order to bring about 
compromise and secure agreement without involving a third party. Union 
strategies include timing negotiations to coincide with an economic boom period 
thus building union economic power, but realism in negotiation can mean tactical 
use of personal attacks upon the integrity of members of the management 
negotiating team and allegations of anti-worker, anti-Black attitudes. (Appendix 
5 `Ground-rules' for Union Negotiators). It is also part of union strategy to 
maintain an image acceptable to government in Swaziland. Satisfactory settlement 
of all disputes requires exhausting the legal machinery for settlement without 
resort to strike, thus maintaining industrial peace `for the good of all, the workers, 
employers and the nation'. 
On 9 December 1986, the Swaziland Federation of Trade Unions and the 
Federation of Swaziland Employers agreed at an informal meeting to a statement 
of intent embodying their joint views on the need for and methods to achieve 
`constructive and harmonious industrial relations in the Kingdom of Swaziland' 
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(Appendix 6) (Part III of the study will indicate that the SAPWU executive was 
divided over this `commitment'). 
Such was the unions' formal approach to relationships with employers and 
government. The author's perception of the relationship between management 
(employers) and the work force up to 1990 was as follows. 
3.2.2.4 A Management Assessment of the Communication Environment. 
Discussion and contact with those who experienced the situation in 
Swaziland industry prior to 1980 and who were still employed in industry and 
could make comparison with the situation in 1990 revealed that the 
communications environment prior to 1980 was not effective. Indeed, this was 
the situation even well after the introduction of the Industrial Relations Act (1980) 
which became operative only from 1 July 1982. Such an environment was 
continually reinforced, in that the colonial superiority of management not 
necessarily to be considered bad, was additionally sustained, not only by the 
ethnic superiority considered by the managers themselves, inherent in the Southern 
African upbringing of many managers, but also by the rigid Swazi respect for the 
"Chief' (Elder), be he White or Black! And indeed, where local Swazi junior 
management existed, it pursued the identical autocratic/paternalistic pattern, often 
more severe in its implementation than was originally intended by the superior 
senior management. 
The more sophisticated employers, which does not imply a necessarily 
more progressive management style, had arranged works councils. These were 
intended to provide a means of consultation on day-to-day matters usually of a 
minor nature (e. g. quality of rations, protective clothing, transport to sporting 
events and similar) but certainly not consultation on wages and conditions of 
service. Negotiation was not a consideration. More often than not, what was 
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supposedly initially intended by top management, to be some freeing of 
communications in an attempt develop mutual understanding, became a one way 
dictatorial activity by middle and junior management. This approach was tacitly 
encouraged by some senior managers. The whole exercise became time-wasting 
and frustrating to management and workers alike. 
The works council system as such was not popular with the work force in 
Swaziland. This reflected a dissatisfaction common throughout the whole of 
Southern Africa. Some of this frustration manifested itself, as early as the 1960's 
viz prior to "independence" in two series of strikes as already indicated - at Big 
Bend (sugar industry), and at Havelock Mine (asbestos) and a further 
Railways/Construction strike in 1962. Political and union observers would assess 
these as indicating the frustration of workers generally and as a union move to 
force employers to recognise unions rather than that of challenging the political 
power base. At that time they did not succeed and from then until 1980, trade 
unions were restricted in practice, if not by legislation. From 1973 when the late 
King suspended the Westminster Constitution left by the British at independence 
(1968), all forms of public gathering/association were prohibited by the Crown 
unless permitted by the Commissioner of Police. Political activities were banned 
(this was still the situation in July 1992. )
In essence then, in assessing the usefulness or otherwise of the pre-1980 
industrial communications, it seems almost self-evident that they were ineffective. 
If communication is defined as joint consultation, negotiation, collective 
bargaining, freedom of association and the right to organise then such 
communication did not exist. It was one-way communication from the top down. 
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3.3 DEVELOPMENT (POST 1980) 
3.3.1 Legislation Changes 
To comply with ELO conventions and to establish formally an industrial 
relations sub-system within the wider society, the Employment Act 1980 and the 
Industrial Relations Act 1980 were made available via an ILO Adviser at the 
request of the Swaziland Government. The legislation reflects the then 
Government's desire to establish a labour policy for Swaziland. The draft bills 
were reviewed by both employer and employee representatives of the Labour 
Advisory Board. The Employment Act became effective in November 1981 and 
the Industrial Relations Act in July 1982. The Acts take little account of the 
customs and cultural requirements of Swaziland, but incorporate provisions which 
reflect internationally accepted employment practices. The laws are essentially 
protective and although their main effect is to improve the status of employees in 
the employment situation, they include safeguards and protective clauses for both 
employees and employers. All previous Acts pertaining to employment and 
industrial relations (e. g. Trade Unions and Industrial Conciliation) were repealed 
with the introduction of the new legislation. 
Since this study deals with union recognition and by association, conflict 
management, as distinct from conflict resolution, concern is more properly focused 
on the Industrial Relations Act. In essence, it provides for legitimate trade union 
activity, including strikes (and for employers to use lock-outs), except for essential 
services. The basic principles of Freedom of Association and the Right to 
Organise, are clearly established as is negotiation on wages and salaries and 
conditions of service and collective bargaining with an Industrial Court as the 
ultimate adjudicator and arbitrator. The Court consists of a President 
-a judge of 
High Court status, and one assessor each from the Federation of Employers' and 
the Federation of Trade Unions. Appeals on points of law only are possible to the 
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Appeals Court. (See Ch. 5 The Legal Framework) 
3.3.2 Post-Change Action 
- 
General 
Immediate reaction on the part of employers generally to the introduction 
of the Act was that such sophisticated legislation was inappropriate and premature. 
Employees viewed the Act with some suspicion, based on the earlier suppression 
of trade unions and many were totally unaware or apathetic concerning their rights 
under the Act. 
By 1987 the original 5 (1973) trade unions had increased to eight and by 
1988 to fourteen trade unions registered' with the Department of Labour. This 
did not mean recognition by employers and only the small Financial Institutions 
Union and the Metal and Allied Workers Union had been accorded recognition 
by 1990. The Agricultural and Plantation Workers Union, seeking to represent all 
employees in Swaziland connected in any way with agriculture had still not been 
accorded recognition by the major employers by April 1992. By March 1988 a 
Joint Industrial Council for the Sugar Manufacturing and Refining Industry (12 
- 
14000 employees) had been agreed between employers and a works council 
system of elected representatives, but without trade union representation. This 
system, unlike the earlier works council system provided an industry wide 
opportunity for attempts at collective bargaining. The trade union (SAPWU) 
rejected this J. I. C. because it was promoted by employers. 
3.3.3 Employer Collective 
Anticipating collective employee action via trade unions, however long 
delayed, the foremost employer groupings developed employer associations. The 
most effective of these were the Swaziland Sugar Manufacturing and Refining 
Industry Employers' Association and the Swaziland Cane Growers Employers' 
62 
Association. 
As already indicated various groupings of employees sought to establish 
trade unions. Indications were that by April 1992 little real progress had been 
made vis-a-vis major employers, with the exception of the Union of Financial 
Institutions 
- 
the employees of the commercial banks. 
3.4 CONCLUSION 
An attempt has been made in this chapter to record on a broad basis the 
significant background and features of the Swaziland industrial scene as it related 
to the major issue of union existence and recognition by employers. 
It has been noted that from the reshaping and reintroduction of legislation 
relating to employment the Government of Swaziland sought to establish a 
framework for labour relations within which both employees and employers could 
operate without too much disruption of the status quo, a situation which employers 
favoured. Continuously at first, organisers steadily developed the union 
membership and organisation structure. They also conducted, over several years, 
- 
education meetings to acquaint those less familiar with union rights and 
responsibilities with a basic understanding of the principles and regulations 
established by the new Acts. While not actively encouraging union organisation 
and membership, the major employers reluctantly acceded to requests for union 
meetings, to be seen to be assisting with the implementation of the Acts. 
For the unions, it was necessary to be seen, in view of the earlier 
suppression, as non-political and acting strictly within the law. The worker- 
collective movement sought to enhance the concept of unity and the legal right 
to challenge the employers. Initially this was done through representation of 
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individual worker grievances, even as far as the Industrial Court, but eventually 
by discrediting the employers promoted Joint Industrial Council for the Sugar 
Manufacturing and Refining Industry. SAPWU ultimately sought recognition from 
the employers. in that industry on three occasions before 1992, but without 
success. 
The employers through their Association, sought to keep within the law but 
made no attempt to collaborate with the union movement. Unions, hopefully, 
would fade out because of incapability and many employers saw them as alien to 
the Swazi culture, a breeding ground for subversion against employers and 
possibly even against orderly government. 
As expected, unions welcomed the opportunity for Freedom of Association 
and the Right to Organise. Employers appeared to view both with apprehension 
and sought ways of legitimately minimising the perceived adverse effects of 
unionisation against themselves and national socio-economic and political stability. 
This was the author's observation, but was this the reality? An attempt to 
establish a more precise, if qualitative assessment of the industrial relations 
environment was undertaken in 1988 and the report follows in Chapter 4. 
ENDNOTES 
1. For an up-to date (1992) review see Appx 2- Masson JR `Swaziland's Changing Political Climate and the 
Role of the Investor Community'. 
2. See Appendix 3 for `Comparative Rates'. 
3. It is of note that in November/December 1989, Havelock Mines again experienced a strike of workers, 
against the advice of their own representatives who were negotiating with management. Violence erupted 
during which the lives of both European and Swazi managers and families were endangered. On December 
13,1989 Ubombo Ranches Ltd was served with a notice of dispute for failure to Recognise the Swaziland 
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v 4b 
Agricultural and Plantation Workers' Union. The order was answerable in the Industrial Court on 15 
January 1990. It was rejected on a 'technicality' and finally came to Court 
- 
April 1992. (see Ch. 12). 
Comment: 
- 
Twenty six years on from 1963, the same two major companies were involved in disputes with Trade Unions! But 
in 1992, the 'progressive' employer 
- 
Royal Swaziland Sugar Corporation 
- 
Simunye 
- 
was also subjected to a strike, 
for failure to recognise SAPWU as perceived by the Union Executive. 
4. See Footnote 2 of Chapter 4. 
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CHAPTER 4 TRADE UNIONISM 
-A SURVEY OF ATTITUDES AND 
PERCEPTIONS IN SWAZILAND 
- 
1982 
- 
88 
4.1 A NORMATIVE APPROACH 
Chapter 2 noted the inseparability of politics and industrial relations. A 
major concern in this work therefore is with socio-political values as they affect 
industrial conflict situations and attitudes towards trade unionism. It is pertinent, 
at this point to consider the concept of political values, as they derive from 
political ideology and to locate those values within the overall structure of the 
sovereign state. 
David Apter (The Politics of Modernisation) extensively considers the 
coercive nature of social systems. The premise for this thesis is that the 
mainspring for coercion in practice is that the political ideology gives direction to 
the `authoritative allocation of values'. Problems arise, however, when normative 
argument is processed for popular consumption (Jackson M: 1977 : 180) and 
when political rhetoric is used to mobilise mob support in pursuit of a particular 
socio-political objective. There is need to note, in passing, the distinction between 
ideology for non-cognitive purpose or more simply `emotive' language and 
ideology which gives collective identification to a broad direction for the ordering 
of a given society; (for example, Marxism or Capitalism). This is not to say that 
such basic ideology does not become used for emotive purposes; it very often 
does. (Landau : 1972: 147 
- 
176). The suggestion in this thesis is that ideology 
(values and beliefs) influences the respective approaches to industrial relations of 
government, employers, trade unions. 
It is not intended to engage in lengthy sociological argument here, but in 
describing the political values of the society under review, a point-of-departure 
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must be specified. That specification relates to what it is that is to be evaluated. 
Essentially it is the practical impact of socio-political values upon the industrial 
relations sub-systems. Norms (values) may be divided into `relational' 
- 
(the 
`positive' aspects of interpersonal or sub-group relations) and `permissive', or 
`regulative', relating to those norms which are imperatives for a given society 
(Napier & Gershenfeld, M. 1972: 77 
- 
102). If transgressed or rejected the result 
is the use of legitimate pressure (de facto if not always de jure) to ensure 
adherence. In this context, `norm' and `value' are considered the same and 
comment will consider both positive and regulative norms/values as necessary, 
with the latter of significance in terms of the `authoritative allocation of values'. 
The concept of political value and practical impact is basically the 
reduction of ideology to its elemental form. It is its application to the day-to-day 
operations of a society; its practical effect upon the actors and upon the 
authoritative regulation of those components of social interaction; in this case 
those involved in industrial conflict situations. 
Simplistically, where, in a given society does socio-political thinking 
(values) impact upon the resolution of industrial conflict situations? It must be 
accepted that for conflict to arise, there must be social interaction and social 
interaction is essentially the contact which actors or groups of actors within 
society or a sub-system of that society, have one with another. Given the fact that 
conflict situations arise from the interaction of people, it is necessary to recognise 
the identity of those people (actors). It is a' basic sociological premise that 
irrespective of the individual's role in society (in this case whether a member or 
executive of government, management or labour) all are conditioned by and help 
to establish conditioning, as a result of education and cultural background. This 
experience is carried over to the peer group and in so far as the group expresses 
socio-political values common to the group, it may be asserted that the individual 
both influences and is influenced by the group. In this study of industrial conflict 
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management, it may be said that the actors are government, management and 
labour, acting through their representative institutions and organisations which in 
this Swazi case are the Department of Labour, SSMRI, B/A and SAPWU. 
Simplistically government will legislate in line with its socio-political 
values. Management will manage in terms of legislation and its own socio- 
political values and labour will articulate its interests in terms of legislation, 
management policy and labour's own socio-political values. It must be noted that 
neither management nor labour need necessarily subscribe to government's socio- 
political values, which of itself can create a conflict situation (for example the 
leftist orientation of the UK miners in their strike in 1985, compared with that of 
the rightist Conservative government). 
The concept of ideology as a normative determinant of the `authoritative 
allocation of values' was referred to in Chapter 1 and an attempt made to locate 
the principal actors in the industrial relations sub-system and place that sub-system 
within the influencing sphere of the authoritative value system. The need now 
exists to reduce the concept to reality as a subject for study and measurement if 
meaningful observations are to be made. Having considered the subjective view 
of the development of trade unions in Swaziland and a management (subjective) 
assessment of the (1986) situation, it seemed appropriate to try to establish more 
precisely the attitudinal situation if subsequent meaningful comment was to be 
made. 
It is not the intention here, to indulge in discourse concerning analysis of 
ideology itself as a concept. For the study it is taken as given that ideology is 
envisioned as the summation of actor attitudes pertinent to potential conflict (thus 
socio-political situations arising from the recognition process for trade unions). 
In effect, it is the socio-political environment which is the subject of analysis, as 
it particularly relates to trade unions and other structural forms of collective 
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relationship between employers and employee. This environment may be 
constructed from a qualitative analysis of categorised data. 
The particular point to be understood is that the analysis (empirical) is of 
the normative environment. The method is that of a positive approach to 
normative criteria which may influence the development of collective bargaining 
and a negotiating environment which is the ultimate aim of a modern industrial 
relations sub-system. It is suggested that the normative criteria are derived from 
the socio-political ideology embraced either consciously or sub-consciously, from 
the collective norms of the peer group in the wider society. As has been argued 
in Chapter 2, those norms may not necessarily accord with those of the other 
actors in the industrial relations sub-system. 
4.2 THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ENVIRONMENT 
Dunlop (1958 : 128) considers that the full environment of the industrial 
relations sub-system consists of `technical conditions, the market or budgetary 
context and the power context, and the derived status of the actors is always to be 
appreciated'. In summation, this may be termed the normative ambience which 
pervades the full environment; that ambience may be seen in the attitudes 
displayed by the actors in their inter-relationships. These attitudes as they affected 
the Swaziland situation are now to be considered, through a qualitative analysis, 
with a minor emphasis upon some quantitative measurement. The study, indeed 
this whole work, has been that of a participant observation (S R Parker :RK 
Brown et al : 1972 : 20) in which the observer can immerse himself in the 
situation to grasp its subtlety and complexity. - It must be clearly understood that 
this particular participation has been solely in the nature of observation; it is not 
intended to deduce any specific scientific thesis nor even to disguise value 
judgments as scientific fact (Landau 1972 : 25). However, if an understanding of 
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the total sub-system is to have meaning, the attitudes of the actors must somehow 
be identified. That is all that has been attempted here. 
It has been stated (Farbey BA : Mitchell CR et al : 1979 : 29) that most 
political movements have at their centre one or a few principles which, in 
principle, structure the nature and responses to other issues and problems'. It is 
this kind of assumption which the observer in this study used as a basis relative 
to employers, unions and government officials for the identification of attitudes 
towards the concept of unionisation in industry in Swaziland. In this context 
socio-political movement is equated with political ideology 
- 
belief 
- 
attitude. 
This simple analysis, then, attempts to describe attitudes towards the 
existence of trade unions in Swaziland. It is based upon the observer's collection 
of commonly expressed statements made over a period of six years, by employers, 
unionists and government officers. The survey statements (Appx 7) were then 
utilised as guidelines for 16 in-depth personal interviews'. A series of eighteen 
statements were then extracted from the in-depth initial list of fifty statements to 
reflect the specific and important issues as seen by the interviewees and then 
circulated as a survey questionnaire (Appx 8) to members of the Federation of 
Swaziland Employers who attended that body's half-yearly General Conference 
in May 1988. The intention was to obtain a wider response from employers if 
possible. Of the ninety-two delegates to that conference, fifty-four responded 
including all of the major employers. 
It had been anticipated that a similar wider survey could be conducted 
among trade union members. Unfortunately, either because of lack of co- 
ordination among union officials and/or suspicion among the union rank and file 
of the employer (observer) initiated survey, it was not possible to obtain the hoped 
for response. A similar non-participative attitude from trade unions was 
experienced in May 1991 by an independent survey group attempting to establish 
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the corporate image of `large business' in Swaziland (Human Resource Services 
- 
Swaziland 1991). What may be reiterated, however, is that of the- sixteen in- 
depth interviews, six were with the top ranking officials of five different Unions 
and of the Swaziland Federation of trade unions. Each interview lasted some 2 
hours and was in the nature of a discussion about the need (or otherwise) for 
industrial relations legislation and about the legitimacy of trade unions in 
Swaziland. As already indicated interviews were conducted with six chief 
executives of business organisations, six elected senior officials of trade unions 
and four high ranking and ministerial government appointees. During the 
discussion each person interviewed was asked to agree or disagree each of the 
fifty statements listed. Although the fifty statements were compiled randomly and 
thus in a number of cases duplicated each other, it was possible to identify eight 
specific and important issues. 
These were: 
- 
1) Union existence 
2) Political power 
3) Economic power 
4) Conflict potential 
5) Union effectiveness 
6) Legal action 
7) Police involvement 
8) Social involvement 
These issues are explored in more detail in Section 4.3 of this chapter. 
To the extent that the trade union officials determine and influence 
(Jackson MP 1977 : 21), the policy and action of the trade union movement and 
there were, at that time only eight registered `industrial' type Unions in 19872 it 
is a reasonable assumption that trade union attitudes towards employers and 
industrial relations issues were obtained. 
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It should also be noted, particularly in the African context that leaders are 
frequently self-appointed in the initial establishment of an organisation and/or 
maintain their position via a public denunciation of those who would seek to 
challenge their leadership. The leadership also frequently remains because of the 
apathy of the masses or through intimidation including the fear of witchcraft. 
A further manifestation of attitudes to public matters arises from the 
statements of those appointed leaders of specific organisations who then assume 
the mantle of a leader of the masses. For example, Archbishop Desmond Tutu 
allegedly elected by one vote from among his peers as the appointed leader of the 
2 million member Anglican Church in South Africa, claimed to speak 
authoritatively on behalf of the nineteen million members of the heterogeneous 
society of black people within the borders of South Africa. ' Even in the United 
Kingdom and the USA political parties use rhetoric to claim majority viewpoints. 
Not unique, as such; and it is common knowledge that the relatively limited 
membership of the Communist Party of the former Soviet Union acted as the 
leaders of the two hundred and fifty million population of Soviet Russia. It was 
also a common characteristic of African Nationalist `One Party' states - e. g. 
Zambia, Nigeria, Zimbabwe4. It might also be said that in many pluralist 
societies the government actually represents only a clear minority of the 
population, an argument used by those in favour of proportional representation. 
The governing Conservative Party in the United Kingdom (1991) was a minority 
government - by this criterion as was the (then) democratically elected Kenya 
government of Arap Moi (1991). 
The point argued here, however, is that leadership in a Marxist or African 
Nationalist context, cannot be equated with leadership as evidenced by most 
Western democratic societies. As considered in chapter one, it is conditional upon 
the definition of democracy. These comments are not unique nor even original, 
but observers of African societies will recognise the need to draw attention again, 
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to the characteristics of such societies. 
However, it was reasonable to accept that the senior officials of the trade 
unions in Swaziland were those unionists who influenced the industrial relations 
situation as it pertained, especially to relationships with the employers and 
government. It is emphasised again, that all in-depth interviews, were conducted 
among the top echelons of the organisations concerned as was the limited 
questionnaire. 
The attempt to establish attitudes derived from the perception that trades 
unions influence society at large, influence industry, influence government and 
influence wider social concerns (See Sec. 4.3 of this chapter). Inevitably, in the 
behavioural sphere, many of the statements used in the survey can be related to 
more than one of these influences. As already indicated, the statements formed 
the basis for the content of the in-depth interviews and for the shortened 
questionnaire and were listed at random. This was done in order to avoid a 
conscious attempt to direct attitude towards any particular influence. Spontaneous 
attitudes predominate in daily interpersonal communication. 
To summarise, the interviews and survey were conducted on the 
assumption that the socio-political ideologies embraced by an individual influence 
that individual's attitudes towards specific issues in society. The major purpose 
was to determine a collective profile of Swaziland opinion among the decision- 
makers concerned with industrial relations and to establish their specific view of 
the issues concerned with the concept of collective bargaining in industry and 
employers' legal recognition of trade unions. 
"......... the industrial relations arrangements of a country require an inner 
consistency to operate and persist" (Dunlop J T: 1958 : 335). The interviews and 
questionnaire were designed to explore the actors' attitudes to common statements 
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arising from that inner consistency 
- 
which in the case of Swaziland had as a 
common basic core an authoritative allocation of values (viz legislation). In 
reviewing the data, some insight may arise from observation of these attitudes as 
they apply to `contending elites' which in this situation seek to determine `the 
industrialisation process and the building (developing) of an industrial relations 
(sub) system' (Dunlop JT 1958 : 335). 
One further concern, before reporting on the interviews and survey. J. K. 
Galbraith (Quoted by Napier T and Gershenfeld M: 1973 : 92 
- 
93) referred to 
the `life cycle' of organisations, analogous to that of the individuals who comprise 
them. These range from youthful vigour, aggression, evangelistic, and `even 
intolerant' to conservative in old age. 
To the extent that group norms may be described as `conservative 
mechanisms' (Napier and Gershenfeld 1973 : 92), it is pertinent to reflect upon 
what might be the conditioners of employer attitudes 
- 
and the union attitudes, to 
the same value statement. What is being stated here is the simple fact that in 
Swaziland, employers as a group professionally, have a very much longer 
association with each other, than do the trade union leaders in Swaziland. And 
further, "Norms are developed by the group as expectations 
.... 
perceived as 
appropriate by that group. They are highly resistant to change! " (Lewin (1947) 
quoted by Napier and Gershenfeld 1973 : 93). 
4.3 INTERVIEWS AND RESPONSES 
The full statements (50 items) and questionnaire (18 items) formats are 
shown in Appendices 7 and 8. The balance of the statements tend, roughly in the 
ratio of 3: 2, to reflect an anti-union perspective on the part of employers. This 
perspective derived from the perceived environment by the observer both in 1986 
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(see Sec 3 Chapter 3) and in 1988 before the commencement of the interviews 
and survey. It will be recalled that the statements had been noted and collected 
over several years. In essence there appeared to be a hostile environment, and 
respondents' answers confirmed or rejected that assessment. What were the major 
issues and the attitudes towards these issues? 
It was possible to identify specific statements as they pertain to the various 
influences, but as previously noted, there is considerable overlap with both 
statements and responses. This is due to the fact that a given statement can relate 
to more than one type of influence. The results of the interviews indicated the 
following: 
4.3.1 Influence on Society 
4.3.1.1 Statements 
The following statements were perceived as being clearly concerned with 
influencing society at large: 
- 
Trade unions are: Communist inspired/exploited. 
Trade unions provide a democratic form of expression in an authoritarian 
(industrial) environment. 
Trade unions should not be permitted in developing countries. 
Trade union rights should be restricted to work related matters. 
Collective bargaining subverts the industrial society. 
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Developing societies must forego the desirable institutions of developed societies 
until they reach the same level of development. 
Industrial relations is a conflict situation. Industrial relations can best be controlled 
through the legal system. 
Industry unions cause fragmentation of the union movement. Trade Unions should 
be prohibited by law from political involvement. 
Trade unions should be consulted by Government on any matter of social concern. 
Trade unions provide a breeding environment for political agitation. 
In a capitalist/free enterprise society trade unions are unnecessary. 
The concept of collective bargaining is alien to traditional Swaziland society. 
The police have no part to play in the industrial relations sub-system. 
Strikes and lock-outs should be prohibited. 
4.3.1.2 Responses 
There was an even division among employers on the question of 
Communist inspiration of trade unions, but all recognised the potential for 
political, not necessarily Communist exploitation. A similar response was 
recorded from government officials and while a majority viewpoint amongst 
unions rejected any suggestion of Communist influence, there was some 
uncertainty in so far as there was an awareness of attempts from outside 
Swaziland to influence union affairs. There was some suggestion that the 
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influence emanated from a Marxist 
- 
orientated country. There was also reference 
to attempts by Libyan delegates at an international union conference in a West 
African state to dominate and coerce those delegates from Southern Africa to 
adopt a more revolutionary stance towards affairs within their own countries. All 
three types of respondent recognised the possibilities inherent in the provision for 
democratic expression for political exploitation. Half of the employers rejected 
the concept of permissible democracy in the industrial situation and some 
commented that in Swaziland, particularly, democratic expression at that stage, 
was of theoretical concern only. Nevertheless, with only minor dissent, all those 
interviewed accepted the establishment of trade unions in developing countries. 
From the employers there was a 50/50 preference for negotiations with 
union leaders, who might at least have some understanding of the issues involved, 
rather than to attempt to discuss industrial matters with those who had little real 
awareness of business economics. Employers were required by law to recognise 
the negotiation process; in these circumstances unions were preferred to any other 
collective body by rather more than half of the employers. 
It was evident that while all trade unionists strongly supported unionisation 
in African Countries, employers by a 3: 2 ratio believed that such activity requires 
a level of sophistication not yet attained by African workers. Those employers 
who supported unionisation did so however, with qualification that the conceptual 
requirements were at present too subtle for worker understanding, `but the labour 
force will only learn if given the opportunity', (quote). 
Unionists commented that trade unions can help in the economic 
development of an African country. A powerful 
- 
union, in terms of member 
contributions, can make financial loans even to government `as has happened in 
Zambia' (quote). As expected, government, Labour Department and judicial 
officials supported unionisation; other members of government including police 
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and those employers in the large minority category, were of the opinion that trade 
unions should NOT be permitted in developing countries. 
Given the existence of trade unions, all three types of respondents were 
equally divided on the question of restricting union activity to work-related 
matters. Those who accepted that unions should and could comment upon wider 
socio-economic matters did so mainly from a perspective that once unions are 
established it is pointless to believe that their activities can be effectively restricted 
to work-related matters only. A pragmatic argument certainly, but an answer to 
those employers who believed that unions should be permitted to discuss only 
work-related issues. 
On the question of political rights, employers and government believed that 
unions should not be permitted to indulge in nor be affiliated to political 
activitism. This attitude conformed to the existing legal situation in Swaziland. 
With very limited exceptions union leaders took the opposite view. 
All participants were divided concerning the statement that industrial 
relations is a conflict situation. A minority commented that it need not be so, but 
that it was the situation at present. Those who supported the statement were of 
the opinion that conflict is inevitable where two parties have different perceptions 
of the issues involved; a situation which is unlikely to change. External influences 
(viz from outside the country) could foster conflict for political gain. 
An interesting paradox arose concerning Government consultation with 
trade unions on matters pertaining to social conditions. The majority of employers 
and government officials thought this desirable, with an emphasis on consultation 
only. Unions did not see the necessity for such consultation. 
On the necessity for trade unions in a capitalist free enterprise society, 
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there was very much support from virtually all respondents. 
Although most employers and trade unionists thought that the concept of 
collective bargaining was alien to Swazi society some illuminating comment from 
government and unions, suggested that the traditional negotiation between families 
for `Lobola' (viz for a bride's dowry) which is very prevalent in African societies, 
is not perhaps so far removed from collective bargaining! 
Total agreement existed between all respondents (including police) vis-a- 
vis police activity. Such activity was seen as legitimate only in so far as it 
preserved law and order. The police have no part to play in settling disputes, 
neither individual nor collective, and can, in fact, have an intimidatory and 
negative effect upon the resolution activity. It was noted by some officials that, 
in Swaziland, the police had an overt role as political watch-dogs. Bearing in 
mind that all three types of respondents were at very senior level, they recognised 
that, unfortunately, a common occurrence in most independent African states, is 
for junior police commanders and their subordinates like their counterparts in the 
military and Labour Department to sometimes exceed their legitimate duties. 
Unnecessary problems are caused by their ill-founded interference and often 
complete misunderstanding of what is involved. 
A small number of employers believed that strikes and lock-outs should 
be prohibited. The majority agreed with the unions and government officials that 
such were the ultimate weapon, acting as a safety-valve but both parties to a 
dispute should adhere to the procedures for settlement. However, there really 
should not be a need to use the final sanction. 
In summary, the potential to influence national stability adversely was seen 
as being mainly political, subversive and disruptive, with employers and 
government concerned with the need to monitor, if not actively control, the 
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potential for political agitation. Unions were aware of the inherent problems, but 
were virtually unanimous that they should not be prohibited from political 
involvement. The fact that they are does not negate their belief. They were 
conscious, however, not only of their lawful responsibility, but also that they were 
very much in the spotlight and could not afford to be seen to pursue political 
objectives. At that stage they had no desire nor intention of doing so, nor did 
they wish to become involved in wider social issues. 
4.3.2. Influence on Industry 
4.3.2.1 Statements 
Trade unions are: essential for effective industrial relations. 
Trade unions provide a democratic form of expression in an authoritarian 
industrial environment. 
Trade unions seek to destroy management rights. 
Trade union rights should be restricted to work related matters. 
Workers should be encouraged by management to join trade unions. 
Employers should facilitate union organisation. 
Government should provide 'umbrella' legislation only for industrial relations. 
Collective bargaining subverts the industrial society. 
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It is necessary to formalise the worker/management relationships. 
Industrial relations is a conflict situation. 
A strongly organised trade union is a prerequisite for effective industrial relations. 
Employers have a responsibility to train trade union members in industrial 
relations concepts, skills and practice. 
Industrial relations can best be controlled through the legal system. 
Employers have a right to determine wage rates and conditions of service. 
Worker (trade union) meetings should be conducted outside of work hours. 
Industry unions cause fragmentation of the union movement. 
In a given industry, an industry union is more reflective of worker demands, 
than general unions. 
Trade unions should be prohibited by law from political involvement. 
4.3.2.2 Responses 
Trade unionists totally endorsed the need 
- 
the `essential' need 
-for trade 
unions, for the maintenance of effective industrial relations. The premise was that 
capable trade union leaders can help to minimise conflict and reduce potential 
conflict situations. Employers were equally divided on this issue as they were 
upon whether or not the localised works councils were a more effective 
communication forum than trade union/employer meetings. It will be recalled 
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from the previous section, that many employers preferred a strong trade union to 
any other form of worker representation. 
Employers were divided on the question of fragmentation; unions and 
government agreed, but employers and government coincided on industry unions 
being more reflective of worker demands in a given industry. The union officials 
interviewed rejected this statement. 
Government and employers saw unions as usurping or encroaching upon 
management prerogatives; unions totally rejected this view stating that they sought 
only to protect workers from exploitation. 
Employers rejected, but government and unions agreed, that management 
should encourage workers to join the union movement. The apparent 
contradiction by government can be explained by the hypothesis that the more 
organised the workers the easier it is to ensure adherence to procedure 
- 
it was not 
an acceptable premise to those employers who saw organised labour as a threat 
to authority. While government and unions believed that employers should 
facilitate union organisation, the employers were far from agreed among 
themselves upon the desirability of doing so. Traditionally this has been the 
attitude of employers until they have experienced the advantages of dealing with 
an organised trade union movement. British and European experiences have 
followed this pattern, with the development of professional management (Dunlop, 
J. 1958 : 311-2). 
Legislation should be of the umbrella minimum protective kind, ensuring 
Freedom of Association and the Right to Organise and the right to seek redress 
for perceived unfairness. All parties were agreed that this was the major concern 
for government in the industrial relations sphere. 
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A further paradoxical response was that while government and employers 
generally accepted that financial support for unions could come from outside the 
country, the unions, with only one dissenting voice rejected this, with comments 
concerning the `he who pays the piper calls the tune', variety. Clearly, the union 
leaders in Swaziland wished to control their own affairs. 
Instances of support from the American AFLICIO, British 
T. U. C., Commonwealth F. T. U. and initial attempts by the W. F. T. U., were 
mentioned. Financial aid was taken, power-bloc influence was rejected. 
All those interviewed were of opinion that industrial relations should 
ideally reflect an employer/employee partnership, but this did not necessarily 
imply lack of conflict, since even partners disagree. Conflict was not seen as 
disaster, but rather inevitable on major issues. Such conflict could be jointly 
resolved through union/employer negotiation. With minor exceptions, all three 
actors believed that union ('labour') power, if adequately organised, was a 
reasonably effective counter-balance to the employers' economic power and would 
become more so as union influence was seen by workers to produce an 
improvement in their working conditions. A formal'union/employer relationship 
was seen by the majority of respondents as providing an open channel of 
communication between shop-floor level and top management which had not 
previously been effective under a simple works council system. Such a democratic 
opportunity was not seen as being incompatible with the system of authoritative 
hierarchical industrial organisation. 
Total agreement was recorded that direct, non-legal, conciliation between 
the parties involved was preferable to the legal judgements of the Industrial Court. 
In summary, the attitudes reflected by statements of direct relevance to the 
industrial situation showed concern at preserving and maintaining control of 
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respective power-bases and a maintenance of prerogative. While the need for an 
established formal system of relationships was necessary, referral to legal 
machinery and the Industrial Court should be reduced to a minimum. The desire 
was for harmony but recognition existed that disputes (conflict was not envisaged 
in its harshest sense) should be resolved between the parties. 
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4.3.3 Influence on Government 
4.3.3.1 Statements 
Trade unions are by their nature anti-authority. 
Trade unions provide a vehicle for agitation. 
Trade unions should not be permitted to affiliate to international worker 
movements. 
Government should become actively involved in chairing union/employer bodies. 
Government should provide umbrella legislation only for industrial relations. 
Collective bargaining subverts the industrial society. 
Industrial relations is the concern of government and not employers/employees. 
Industrial relations can best be controlled through the legal system 
Industry unions cause fragmentation of the union movement. 
Trade unions should be prohibited by law from political involvement. 
Trade unions should be permitted to receive funds from outside the country. 
Trade unions should be consulted by government on any matter of social concern. 
Trade unions provide a breeding environment for political agitation. 
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Inter-union and intra-union rivalry will ensure that the union movement will never 
`get-off-the-ground'. 
The police have no part to play in the industrial relations sub-system. 
Strikes and lock-outs should be prohibited. 
4.3.3.2 Responses 
That trade unions are by their very nature `anti-authority' was subscribed 
to by four of the six employers interviewed. Government officials were divided 
equally on the statement and union officials vigorously rejected it. 
The question of affiliation to international worker movements received total 
support from unions. Employers and government representatives were equally 
divided among themselves, with those who did not support affiliation concerned 
at the importing of ideas and ideologies alien to Swazi society, qualified by an 
acceptance of Western influence if necessary but a rejection of what was, at that 
time referred to as Eastern bloc approaches, equated with extreme militancy and 
revolution. 
There was no clear evidence that anyone from government, employers or 
unions, knew anything detailed about the role and functions of trade unions in 
Europe. There was no clear indication about absolutes concerning direct 
government involvement in the collective bargaining/negotiation process except 
that comment was made of the need (and legislation provided for this) for 
arbitration/conciliation. The inference was that unless the Labour Commissioner 
himself became involved, then no real purpose would be served by existing 
Labour Department officials attempting to intervene in disputes. A local cultural 
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reflection by workers was that only the chief has power, but employers at that 
time were of the opinion, that only the Labour Commissioner was capable. 
The role of the Industrial Court as the final arbiter was accepted, but even 
then, employers were not totally convinced that the weight of judgement was not 
in favour of employees. This viewpoint was specific to individual rather than to 
collective disputes. Unanimous agreement existed among all respondents that 
industrial relations was primarily the responsibility of employers and employees. 
Government's role was as watchdog to ensure non-exploitation by unscrupulous 
interests. To believe otherwise was a contradiction of the basic concepts of 
industrial relations. 
Unions and government recognised that industry unions caused 
fragmentation of union-power. Most employers did not see it this way. Union 
power could be maximised through the Federation of Trade Unions, in any event. 
All parties were aware of the perceived danger to government of the mobilisation 
of General Unions power. 
As reported under sections 1 and 2, it was the unions who rejected 
consultation by government on matters of social concern. Opinion was divided 
almost equally in all three interviewed groups, concerning the problems of 
personalities, leadership and inter and intra-union faction disagreement, but no 
party actually believed that unionisation was a non-starter. 
Unions did not agree that strikes and lock-outs should be prohibited; they 
were not a challenge to authority. Even those employers and government officials 
who were in favour of prohibition saw it as a need primarily to prevent disruption 
of industry rather than as an exercise in the suppression of political unrest. 
However, industrial unrest-was seen as a possible generator of political unrest. 
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4.3.4 Social Concerns 
4.3.4.1 Statements 
Trade unions are: Too sophisticated (concept) for Swaziland. 
Trade union leaders are elected through intimidation. 
Trade union leaders are only concerned with establishing personal power. 
Workers should be encouraged by management to join trade unions. 
Employers should facilitate union organisation. 
Developing societies must forego the desirable institutions of developed societies 
until they reach the same level of development. 
Employees have a moral right to bargain for wages and conditions of service. 
Employers have a right to determine wage rates and conditions of service. 
Worker (trade union) meetings should be conducted outside of work hours. 
Industry unions cause fragmentation of the union movement. 
Trade unions should be permitted to receive funds from outside the country. 
Trade unions threaten the `right to manage'. 
The concept of collective bargaining is alien to traditional Swaziland society. 
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Inter-union and intra-union rivalry will ensure that the union movement will never 
`get-off-the-ground'. 
The aim of collective bargaining is to produce industrial harmony. 
The Industrial Court provides protection only for the employee. 
4.3.4.2 Responses 
In addition to comment already made concerning the sophistication of 
concepts beyond local comprehension, it was emphasised by high-ranking 
government officials that all societies are dynamic organisms. To develop and 
improve, commitment must be given to specific concepts. For effective industrial 
relations, commitment must be given to the concept of trade unionism. It has 
i been established that it is not so important if many industrialisation goals are 
unattainable (Apter D. 1965 : 261); what is essential is a commitment to 
achievement in a developing country, which leads to greater social and political 
stability through an increasing entrenchment of a unified system. This is 
important in the sphere of industrial conflict situations. Most of the employers 
disagreed with these comments. 
A 3: 1 majority of employers were convinced that union leaders in 
African countries are concerned only with establishing personal power, 
they were undecided whether or not intimidation is the basis for election. 
Trade unions and government by a 9: 1 margin rejected these viewpoints. 
Employers were divided on the issue of facilitating union organisation and 
encouraging workers to join unions. As to be expected, unions and government 
totally subscribed to this view. 
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On the moral right of employees to bargain with employers on wages and 
conditions of employment, employers and government were divided within their 
own groups; unions were totally in support, but negotiation must be via the union. 
A high ranking policeman agreed on the negotiation issue but believed it should 
be dealt with by workers direct with management 
- 
"where the shoe feels the 
pinch" (quote). But to the more specific statement concerning the right of 
employers to determine wages and conditions of service the employers themselves 
and unions rejected this, but government reinforced this `right'. 
With only one dissenter, all employers considered that union meetings, as 
distinct from joint employer/union meetings, were entirely the business of the 
union members alone and should therefore be held during out-of-work hours; the 
unions and government, also with only one dissenter, thought the opposite. 
Union power was a matter of concern to all employers, with a preference 
for industry unions in spite of extending the power base vis-a-vis single/craft 
unions, they were more reflective of local matters. Fragmentation of unions 
however would help to decrease solidarity and the strength of the unions power- 
base. As indicated already, combination within the Swaziland Federation of 
Trade Unions acts as a cohesive counter effect. Unions and government were also 
opposed to fragmentation; the industrial relations legislation specifies industry 
unions. 
Detailed comment on the receipt of funds in support of unions from 
outside the country, was given in the previous sections as were notes on the threat 
to the right to manage, political agitation, social concerns, harmony, strikes and 
lock-outs. 
There was divided opinion among employers as to the impartiality of the 
Industrial Court 
- 
the unions and government representatives responded that the 
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intention was for the court to be impartial. 
It will have became apparent that the attempt to segregate statements 
specific to social and moral concerns has been more difficult to achieve than with 
those pertaining to society, government and industry. 
In essence however, the issues considered were: 
- 
Unions are essential to developing economic, social and political 
stability which should be encouraged by all parties. 
- 
Social responsibility of union leaders requires them to subordinate 
personal power aspirations to the overall good. 
- 
There is an inherent right as employees for labour to 
bargain/negotiate with employers. 
Industry based versus plant-based and numerous smaller unions 
subscribing to or detracting from socio-economic and political stability. 
Obviously, moral concerns permeated comment and discussion of what are 
essentially value statements. 
4.4 EMPLOYER SURVEY DATA 
4.4.1 Explanation 
It should be noted that attitudes are general conceptions held by people. 
Attitudes cannot therefore always be measured by a response to a single question 
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as this may measure only one aspect of the attitude and may evoke idiosyncratic 
responses. 
A sample of items/questions covering a range of dimensions of the attitude 
is therefore desirable initially. From this initial large pool of items/statements, it 
is possible to reduce the dimensions by relating a number of responses to a 
number of statements relevant to specific issues. It is then possible to establish 
the extent of agreement/disagreement with a specific issue question/statement. 
This is a somewhat superficial approach. Nevertheless in what was observed to 
be a generally hostile environment towards unionisation, it was possible to 
determine opinion on specific issues by following the above approach and to 
obtain a more detailed quantitative indication of the then prevailing environment. 
In assessing attitudes by this method, the 1ý Questionnaire Statements 
(Appx 8) were selected by the observer which, in his judgement, were indicative 
of the major issues identified during the personal interviews and discussion of the 
dpool' of the fifty initial statements. These eighteen Questionnaire statements 
were then grouped and interpreted to give dimensions to the specific issues. 
There is no claim to sophisticated statistical method. However some 
quantitative indication of attitudes was obtainable which provided a wider base for 
assessing employer attitudes to unionisation in Swaziland. 
4.5 SUMMARY 
The socio-economic: and political environment at least as it appeared, can 
be established, as at mid 1988 by summarising the attitudes/values reflected by 
both the interviews and survey. Thus the author's assessment hat there was little 
change in this situation in mid 1992. The process for union recognition in 
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Swaziland as it concerned the issues between the Swaziland Agriculture and 
Plantation Workers' union and the Sugar Manufacturing and Refining Industry 
Employers' Association was pursued within this environment as follows: 
A tolerant acceptance by employers of union existence; both union 0 
and government, as expected have a higher acceptance. 
2A high emphasis by employers that unions should not become 
involved in politics; apart from noting the existing legal prohibition, the 
union would not concede the principle that it should not become involved 
in politics but at that time had a priority with the industrial work situation. 
3 Employers were aware of the potential economic (viz effect of 
manpower withdrawal) power of the unions and there was a high 
recognition by the union of this latent power which they had available. 
Government recognised this situation but believed that there were 
sufficient legal safeguards to prevent abuse. 
4 Employers saw the union/employer relationship as a conflict 
situation of medium seriousness 
- 
they recognised the potential for, but did 
not see the need for conflict. The unions, however, saw the situation as 
essentially conflict. This is the major difference 
- 
perhaps the most 
significant difference 
- 
between the employers and unions to collective 
bargaining. Both parties aspire to harmony and a joint partnership, but 
unions and some employers found it difficult to believe that this ideal 
could be attained. Government was very much aware of the potential for 
conflict. 
5 tmployers were not completely convinced that unions, as effective 
organisations were effectively established. Unions, while noting the need 
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for improvement, believed they were already effective as collective 
bargaining bodies; they had internal administrative problems which they 
could overcome. 
617 All three actors believed that there should be minimum concern, 
with involving both the legal (viz judicial) machinery and the police in 
industriaf relations. Primarily employers and unions should resolve 
differences between them, without outsiders intervening. 
8 Employers and government recognised that unions could become 
involved in social affairs on a national scale. The unions saw that as a- 
a low level of priority at that stage of development. 
A further 'dimension_ was that of the 54 responses (employers) to the 18 
questions survey, only half indicated an anti-union bias, but only marginally so. 
In pursuing the survey itself it was observed that there was a trend towards a 
scientific approach to the problems of industrial relations, perhaps iub-consciously 
by the actors involved. This stemmed from a need to find practical solutions. 
Apter (1965 : 344) has noted that 'As societies modernize, the ideologies of 
socialism and nationalism can be expected to give way to the generalized ideology 
of science, which today includes Social Science'. Perhaps practicalities force 
recognition of the need to subordinate emotion to more pragmatic activity. 
Nevertheless, it is also to be noted that, in Swaziland in 1988, there were 
still the problems arising from attempts to reconcile the attitudes and beliefs of the 
'Dynastic-feudal, Middle-class, and the Revolutionary-intellectual' elites (Dunlop 
J. T. 1958 : 318). Not as starkly categorised as indicated by Dunlop's study, but 
rather of the order of perceived tendencies in individual participants in the 
industrial relations sub-system. 
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It is within this environment that the process towards union recognition by 
the employers is documented. 
4.6 CONCLUSION 
It has been argued in this chapter, that a generally hostile environment 
towards unions existed in Swaziland on the part of employers during the period 
1982/88. The measured survey indicated that hostility, however, was marginal. 
The survey attempted from a participant observer (human resource 
management) perspective to identify the main issues and attitudes within that 
environment, and the extent to which the actors were concerned with those issues. 
More particularly, it attempted to outline the boundaries within which the major 
.1 issue of union recognition by employers was constrained. It should be 
remembered, however, that while all of the major employers participated in the 
survey, only half of the delegates to the 1988 employers conference were 
motivated to participate and a further 100 or so employers did not even attend the 
conference. This might be further evidence, perhaps, that union issues were at 
best a nuisance and at worst dangerous. Ibis is a subjective assessment by the 
observer but one based on progressive employers' views at that time. 
This chapter has thus provided the overall environmental description as 
background and explanation as a prerequisite for following the process of union 
recognition in the ensuing chapters. 
Institutions, government, judiciary and similar, can be studied as 'systems 
of related individual behaviour or systems of social action' (Merkl, P. 1973 : 24). 
The research reported in this chapter followed this behavioural approach in the 
study of the industrial relations sub-system of Swaziland. 
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I 
Many of the values of a given society or sub-system of that society are 
reflected in the legal structure and sanctions. The values of individuals within a 
society may not always be identical to the legal totality however. 
The research attempted to establish what elite members of the sub-system 
considered important values for industrial relations in Swaziland. The 
operationalisation of those values impacted not only upon the sub-system itself, 
however, but also upon the wider society. Simply expressed, it might be argued 
that a strike of workers within an industry arising from a difference in values 
between workers and management could have affected the socio-economic, socio- 
political structures and activities of the wider Swaziland society. 
The actual impact of the values and behaviour of the actors, within the 
industrial relations sphere as they related to the issue of employer recognition of 
a major trade union will be considered in Chapter 9. 
ENDNOTES 
It will be understood that in a small country such as Swaziland it is inappropriate to identify individuals or 
appointments. 
There were actually fourteen types of Unions included in SFTU but the remaining six were representative 
of teachers, broadcasters, civil servants etc. - not quite the same as 'industrial' unions. (Annual Report - 
Department of Labour : 1987) 
Such 'elements in the community may be trying to establish the leadership of the revolutionary intellectual' 
: (Dunlop JT: 1958 : 334). 
............. the party is the state' (Apter D- 1969 : 298). 
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CHAPTER 5 THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
5.1 GOVERNMENT 
Reference was made in Chapter 1 to the authoritative aspects of a societal 
system and to the incorporation of the industrial relations sub-system within the 
wider society (Chapter I Figure 1.1). 
There is need therefore to describe the authoritative structure and 
implementation and in so far as the study pertains to conflict management there 
is also need to describe the interface between the three main actors in legal terms. 
It was stated in Chapter 2 that the actors in the field are government, 
employers, trade unions. The approach in this chapter then, will examine the 
actors in their respective legal roles at the interface 
. 
5.1.1 Department of Labour 
The historical development of the Department of Labour prior to the 
introduction of the two main legal instruments governing employment and 
industrial relations (viz the Employment and Industrial Relations Acts), have no 
direct bearing upon the issues to be described in this narrative. What is of 
significance is the role of the Labour Department in the implementation of the 
Industrial Relations Act. 
This Act emphasises clearly. the conciliation and investigative duties of 
Labour Department Officials (Sec 23 : 52 : 54 : 55 Industrial Relations Act) and 
in so far as the Act supersedes any other labour relations regulating instrument 
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(Sec 84 Industrial Relations Act 1980) it effectively establishes the umbrella 
position of government but provides for the ultimate arbitrator in the form of the 
Industrial Court, the president of which is a Judge of the I-Egh Court. He is 
assisted by a representative assessor from both the Swaziland Federation of Trade 
Unions and the Federation of Swaziland Employers' (Sec 4 Industrial Relations 
Act 1980). 
The Act defines a 'dispute' and establishes the procedure to be followed 
for both individual and collective disputes (Part VH 
- 
Industrial Relations Act 
1980) and authorises judgements and interpretations to be legally binding with 
penalties (including imprisonment) for infringements of court orders. (Sec 9 
Industrial Relations Act 1980). The Act legalises the ultimate sanction which may 
be applied by either the employer or the collective employee, through strike or 
lock-out (Secs 61 
- 
65 Industrial Relations Act 1980) but empowers the Nfinister 
of Labour to intervene at any stage during the dispute, in the national interest (Sec 
63 Industrial Relations Act 1980). 
A particularly contentious issue concerns the basis for trade union 
recognition by an employer (Sec: 36 Industrial Relations Act 1980). A union may 
make application to an employer for a count of union membership. Should a forty 
per cent count of all eligible employees result, then the employer must recognise 
the union as the sole collective bargaining agent for that employer or for the 
industry, where an industry wide union organisation and employers' organisation 
exists. It is the contention of unions that a favourable result should ensure 
immediate recognition; employers argue, (Sec 36(4) Industrial Relations Act 1980) 
that such recognition is meaningful only after a Recognition (or Memorandum) 
Agreement has been negotiated. 
Herein lies a major conflict situation. However, the umbrella provided by 
the Labour Department, as government's executive instrument, precludes the 
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Labour Department from exercising any directive to the conflicting parties. But, 
even if such a directive could be given, the Labour Department could 
automatically be seen as supporting/opposing the parties dependent upon a 
favourable or adverse decision. It is important to note that at this early stage in 
the union recognition process, the executive arm of government is prevented from 
making a practical contribution to resolving what is likely to be the very first 
major conflict situation. 
A second controversial issue concerns the 'Forty percent' legal requirement 
for union membership for a union to demand recognition. What is not clear, and 
again the Labour Department is unable to give direction, is whether or not the 
forty percent must be proved within each establishment within an industry, or 
simply within the industry as a whole. The practical effect of this uncertainty in 
the law is that the Swaziland Agricultural and Plantation Workers' Union, which 
claims to represent the majority of the workers within the agricultural sector in 
Swaziland, appears to be able to demand recognition by any employer within that 
industry, provided the union membership of forty percent in the industry has been 
obtained. Taken to the fullest extent it is possible for a union demand to be made 
on an industry basis, even though no union members exist in a given company 
within that industry. Illustrative of this was the refusal in a letter from the Sugar 
Manufacturing and Refining Industry Employers' Association on 14 July, 1987 to 
the union, to proceed with further discussions with the Swaziland Agricultural and 
Plantation Workers' Union, until the negotiating team put forward by the union 
was reconstituted. The largest constituted body of workers in Swaziland, (viz the 
twelve to fourteen thousand workers at the three main sugar estates), were 
represented by eight persons from activities other than from within the sugar 
sector. As indicated, the Labour Department was impotent in this situation. 
A somewhat similar aspect of this phenomena concerns those undertakings 
(Industrial Relations Act 1980 
- 
Definition) which may accord recognition to a 
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union. During 1983, the Swaziland Bank Employers' Association, as an agent of 
the Swaziland Financial Institutions, was prepared to accord recognition to the 
Swaziland Union of Financial Institutions. The union resisted the employers' 
interpretation of the recognition by an Employers Association, seeldng to gain 
recognition from individual employers. After a costly and protracted argument the 
matter was referred to the Industrial Court with the parties being represented by 
Counsel and Senior Counsel (SC/QC) from the South African Bar. 
The inevitable conclusion was that the union conceded that recognition 
should be by an Employers Association. The parties to the dispute then negotiated 
a Recognition Agreement, and in the event, the Industrial Court was required only 
to endorse that such agreement had been reached (FSE 1985 : 9). 
An apparently useful attempt to influence the industrial relations situation 
was the establishment by the Minister of Labour (1984) of a Tripartite Labour 
Conciliation Council (ILCC). The Council, initially intended to be chaired by the 
Commissioner of Labour himself, was composed of a representative of the 
Federation of Swaziland Employers' and a representative of the Swaziland 
Federation of Trade Unions. Its major purpose was to seek to resolve disputes 
objectively before they reached the Industrial Court, by examining issues and 
persuading employer and employee to accept settlement. This could be either a 
financial settlement or by indicating the possible adverse outcome of a dispute, a 
party could be persuaded not to proceed to the Industrial Court. It seemed that 
a positive influence had emanated from the Labour Department, although the 
Council itself had no legal powers. 
Other than at its first meeting, the chairmanship was delegated to, the 
Deputy Labour Commissioner and subsequently to more juýior members of the 
Department. The employers were represented by the Executive Director of the 
Federation of Swaziland Employers (FSE) or a senior executive of an employer. 
100 
The Swaziland Federation of Trade Unions nominated one of its officials 
- 
initially a full-time employee of an employer member of FSE, but subsequently 
appointed a full-time official of the union movement. 
Throughout its existence it was clear that the trade unions never supported 
the TLCC concept. On most occasions the union representative did not attend the 
fortnightly meetings and the proceedings of the council degenerated into a 
virtually meaningless activity, from which the employers eventually withdrew. At 
the beginning of 1990 it was the Department of Labour chairman and a revitalised 
union nominee, who sought to influence the issues in dispute. In practice, and 
inevitably, most issues reached the Industrial Court and the positive intent of the 
Minister for Labour and the Commissioner had been negated. 
As early as September 1986, the Executive Director of FSE reported to his 
members (FSE 1986 : 13-14) that: - 
"The future of the Council is in jeopardy. To work effectively the Council 
must preserve its tripartite character in accordance with the mandate of the 
Minister for Labour and the Public Service, who approved this creation. 
Employees would not unnaturally, view with suspicion measures taken 
towards the settlement of their claims if those measures were solely the bipartite 
product of Government (Department of Labour) and the employers (Federation). 
Increasingly the union representative does not attend. 
The capacity of the council to conciliate effectively is also undermined by 
the element of speculation which pervades the proceedings [as distinct from 
factual repord. 
Further, the absence of legal powers, has resulted in the subsequent 
repudiation by employees of agreed settlements through the TLCC in favour of a 
referral to the Industrial Court, in the anticipated belief that a greater financial 
sum will be awarded. Were the Industrial Court to permit the Council to be used 
for horse-trading, to the prejudice of those who negotiate in goodfaith, it would 
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fall into disrepute, and a potentially important industrial relations function lost 
to Swaziland. 
As indicated above, the employers withdrew from the Council (April 1988) 
through sheer disillusionment,. It ceased to perform any effective function. 
5.1.2 The Industrial Court 
Crucial to the ultimate outcome of any industrial conflict in Swaziland, 
either for an individual or for a collective organisation, is the functioning and 
powers of the Industrial Court. This body is a Court of Law in the. full legal 
sense and the Judge-President (a judge of the High Court) was ultimately 
responsible to the Chief Justice for the legal functioning of the Court. (Sec. 12 
- 
Industrial Relations Act) However, in 1990 this was changed without amending 
the Act, and although the President is still a High Court Judge, he now reports to 
the Labour Commissioner.. 
Two assessors, one each from employer and union nominees, assist the 
President in determining the issues involved in disputes. The outcome is 
invariably an order-of-the-Court with legal enforcement (See 7 (3) Industrial 
Relations Act) as in criminal or civil proceedings. The legal emphasis given to 
industrial relations issues has implications for the effective functioning of an 
industrial relations structure. Comment on this matter will be made in the final 
chapter. 
Logically arising from the legal stru6ture, the Judge President makes the 
final decision, in the event of disagreement by the members of the Court (Sec. 5 
(3) Industrial Relations Act). Any matter of law is appealable to the High Court 
and from there to the Court of Appeal. On the application of any interested party, 
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the I-ligh Court may also review the proceedings of the Industrial Court 'on 
grounds permissible at common law' (Sec. 5 (3) - Industrial Relations Act). 
Orders-of-the-Court may be made retroactive to such date as the Court 
deems just, but not to a date prior to the cornmencement of the Act (Sec. 8- 
Industrial Relations Act). 
To some extent, the legislators recognised the peculiar circumstances 
pertaining to industrial relations conflict. The court may require evidence to be 
given on oath or affirmation (Sec. 6 (2) (c) - Industrial Relations Act) but need 
not be bound by the rules of evidence or procedure which apply to civil 
proceedings and may disregard any 'technical irregularity' (not defined) which is 
not considered as impairing justice. 
The court President may also admit as prima facie evidence reports filed 
from the Labour Commissioner or other designated Labour Department officials. 
Representation of parties, by omission from the Act, enables any party to 
represent himself, thus obviating representation fees but Sec. 15 provides for 
representation by a legal practitioner or 'any other person authorised by such 
partyg. 
What does constitute perceived ma. or restrictions on the powers of the i 
Court, however, are: 
- 
the limitation to 'recommend' only and not to order' reinstatement 
of a dismissed employee in lieu of compensation (Sec. 13 (2) (b) Industrial 
Relations Act) 
Compensation awards shall not exceed a maximum of six months 
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wages. Both of these restrictions are in respect of employment/dismissal 
disputes rather than of concern to the union recognition process. It may 
be assumed, however, that before voluntary recognition of a union [Sec. 
36 (3) (4)] is accorded by a small employer, one consideration might wen 
be the maximum compensation award in the event of a subsequent dispute 
with the union leading to collective employee dismissals. 
In so far as the recognition process itself is concerned, what is interesting 
is that the court has no part to play, unless there is dispute between an employer 
and a union over failure to grant recognition (Sec. 36 (5) (6) and 36 (6) 
- 
Industrial Relations Act). 
No compulsion exists for a Recognition Agreement, (viz the 'Rules-of-the- 
Game') concluded without dispute to be referred to, or registered with, the 
Industrial Court. 
Subsequent to recognition however, any Collective Agreement (Terms and 
Conditions of Service) concluded, must be registered and becomes legally binding 
on the parties to the agreement (Part VI Secs. 43 - 47 - Industrial Relations Act). 
5.1.3 The Royal Swaziland Police 
As might be expected, the Industrial Relations Act does not apply to 
police. The inference is that the Police and the Defence Force and Prison Services 
are precluded from collectivising for representation in terms of the Act (Sec. 83). 
What is also significant is that, in terms of Sec. 78 limitation on right to 
arrest or detain, police officers (or indeed 'any other person') may not threaten to, 
or arrest or detain any person for 'actual or apprehended breach of the Act' unless 
such breach is also a violation of any law which provides for arrest, detention, 
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threat, or breaches or apprehended breaches of such law. Clearly, the legislators 
did not intend the police to become involved in peaceful industrial relations 
matters. Nevertheless, the Commissioner of Police, under powers invested in his 
office by the King's Proclamation of 1973 (Clause 12) is required to give consent 
or otherwise to meetings, gatherings etc, of a political nature. 
It is difficult to conceive of arrangements whereby a union can collectivise 
its members and pursue the recognition process without holding meetings of 
members. It might be proposed that by the nature of the event politics is a sine 
qua non of unionisation. However, the Swaziland Manufacturing and Allied 
Workers' Union challenged the interpretation of the Commissioner's powers 
(Industrial Court Case Number I- 1988). The dispute arose because of a refusal 
by the Commissioner of Police to permit a union meeting in the industrial town 
of Manzini. The Industrial Court considered the provision of the Police and 
Public Order Act and Sec. 73 of the Industrial Relations Act, in so far as no 
'public officer' may 'irnpede the exercise of rights conferred or recognised by this 
Act' (viz Industrial Relations Act). The Court concluded: 
- 
"I venture to state that trade unions can hold their meetings without 
applying to the Commissioner of Police, providing such meetings are not of a 
political nature". 
Clearly, the onus is on the police to prove political comment after the 
event. And this would surely depend upon the police and the Industrial Court's 
agreed or different interpretation of political comment. 
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5.2 COLLECTIVE EMPLOYEE/EMPLOYER 'ORGANISATION$ 
5.2.1 Works Councils (see Appendix 13) 
An institution prevalent throughout Southern Africa to which reference was 
made in Chapter 3 has been that of Works Councils. For many years larger 
employers accepted the need for some form of collective body, as a downwards 
communications channel between management and the labour force. It is doubtful 
whether they recognised the similarity with Eastern Bloc countries, however. 
Provision existed in the labour relations legislation of a number of Southern 
African countries including both South Africa and Swaziland. While this study 
is concerned with trade union recognition by employers it is pertinent to note the 
effect of works councils upon the recognition process. Swaziland's Industrial 
Relations Act 
- 
1980 
- 
Part VIII specifically recognises Swaziland's adherence to 
the I. L. O. conventions (U. N. 1968 : 495) concerning freedom of association and 
the right to organise. In pursuance of these obligations, it is compulsory for any 
business organisation employing more than twenty-five employees (Sec. 40) to 
have established a functioning works council, the constitution of which must be 
registered with the Labour Commissioner. Thus the point of impact, as it were, 
upon the process of trade union recognition, is that works councils have legal 
status. Where no other machinery exists for collective bargaining, for example, 
within a Joint Industrial Council or between a union/single employer with a 
recognition and collective agreement, then a works council can negotiate a 
collective agreement for wages and conditions of employment. 
The scope and functions of a works council should reflect the industrial 
relations ambience within which it functions. As indicated, where no Joint 
Industrial Council or recognised trade union functions then the works council can 
negotiate with the employer. The result is that unilateral agreements, in so far as 
an individual company is concerned, are established. 
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However, where a Joint Industrial Council and/or a recognised trade union 
exist, then a works council cannot negotiate; it becomes a consultative body only 
(Industrial Relations Act : Secs 40 
- 
42) on purely domestic issues. 
Works councils composition must reflect an equality of representation vis- 
a-vis employer and employees in terms of voting rights, but not necessarily in 
terms of equality in numbers. 
The implications for trade union recognition centre therefore upon the 
effective negotiating capability of a works council. Historically in Southern 
Africa, works councils have preceded tradeý unions and it would seem therefore, 
in the absence of contrary empirical evidence, that where a council is operating 
effectively, viz to the satisfaction of the workers it represents, it must be more 
difficult for a trade union to recruit members. In terms of membership numbers 
alone, a lack of members can adversely affect the sufficient percentage of 40% 
required for a trade union to demand recognition from an employer. This problem 
for trade unions could become more acute if a number of works councils within 
an industry grouped themselves and co-operated with an Employers' Association 
within a Joint Industrial Council. This was exactly the situation which existed in 
April 1988 within the Sugar Manufacturing and Refining Industry in Swaziland. 
The continuing but unsuccessful attempts by a union to obtain recognition from 
the Employers, over the previous 5 years, resulted in a power-vacuum. At the 
collective workers' request, a revived Joint Industrial Council, based upon works 
councils representation, had reached a Collective Agreement (April I st 1988) for 
the'industry and 3 further annual agreements had been agreed by -1991. 
The failure of the process of achieving recognition by the Swaziland 
Agricultural and Plantation Workers' Union forms the content of Part HI, Conflict 
over Recognition, and will be developed in greater detail. 
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It has already been established that the principles of freedom of association 
and the right to organise form the basis for Swaziland's labour relations 
legislation. These principles are embodied in the law as is the right to collectivise 
on an industry wide basis. Only if an employee or employer does not function 
within the specified industry covering the association or union, can they be 
prohibited from joining such organisation. Only one such union or association is 
permitted for a given industry, however. 
5.2.2 Definitions of Association 
For a specific industry, therefore, the concept of industry union is enforced, 
as distinct from a craft (trade) union or general union. Clearly the legislators 
aimed at preventing/limiting inter-organisation conflict through the avoidance of 
union fragmentation. 
Three types of associations may be formed to give purpose to the concept 
of collective bargaining; employers' associations, industry unions, staff 
associations, as stated, they are restricted to operating in one pertinent industry. 
Thus employers or employees are entitled (have the Tight) to form an 
organisation collectively in order to articulate, pursue and promote their collective 
interests. (see Appendicies 9 and 10). A constitution for such organisation must 
be submitted to and registered by the Labour Commissioner within three months 
of its formation (Sec. 17 - 20; Industrial Relations Act 1980). An employer or 
employee has the right not, to join such organisation. The definitions of these 
organisations are described as follows: (Industrial Relations Act 1980 : Sec. 2) 
'An Employers' Association is an association of employers which seeks 
to provide collective representation for employers in the negotiation and regulation 
of relations between employers and employees'. 
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'An industry union is a combination of employees other than staff, the 
principal purpose of which is the regulation of relations between employees and 
employers in a particular industry'. 
This definition indicates that industry unions should only accept as 
members non-stýff employees normally engaged in the industry for which it has 
been registered, because a union cannot negotiate on behalf of staff employees 
5.23 Staff 
-Anomaly 
In an industrially developing country, such as Swaziland the definition of 
staff has considerable import for the formation and development of trade unions. 
It is common knowledge that staff are the more highly educated and articulate 
members of the employee force. An emergent union would wish to have precisely 
those type of individuals as its organisers and leaders. 
'Staff' however is defined as an employee who: 
- 
a) 'has authority on behalf of the employer to employ, transfer, 
suspend, lay-off, recall, promote, dismiss, reward or discipline other 
employees or deal with their grievances, or to authorise or recommend 
such action, when the exercise thereof is not solely of a routine or clerical 
nature, but requires the use of independent judgement; 
b) participates in the making of general company policy; 
C) works in a capacity which requires him to have full knowledge of 
the finan. cial position of the employer, 
has free personal access to other confidential information 
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substantially affecting the conduct oi the business of the employer'. 
(Industrial Relations Act 
- 
Sec. 2) 
It behoves any employer or employers' association to specify, in any 
collective or recognition agreement o which they are party, those employees who 
are designated staff or non-staff. The provision in the law for the formation of 
'staff associations' (definition below) clearly established the opportunity for staff 
unionisation, but since the law made no real distinction for a cut-off level, either 
by salary or hierarchical position, it inadvertently posited the question of who, in 
a given organisation, is the employer? 
In 1983, both the then executive of the Swaziland Federation of Trade 
Unions and the Federation of Swaziland Employers agreed, as members of the 
Labour Advisory Board that there was need for a more precise definition of staff. 
The suggested amendment was still awaiting acceptance by government in 1992. 
In practice, the issue had not unduly jeopardised the day-to-day operation of 
industrial relations matters, but it was inevitable that at some stage in an attempt 
to unionise and to obtain recognition, a dispute would arise over the position of 
staff members who wanted to join a union. 
In the case of Beral Limited v Swaziland Manufacturing and Allied 
Workers' Union (I. C. Case No. 108 of 1987) the Court held that Section 2 of the 
Act required the 'aggregation' of all four parts of the definition of staff and that 
since this automatically excluded supervisors, then such employees were eligible 
for union membership. The Court observed: 
- 
'It seems to me that even a manager of an industry would become 
unionisable as the law now stands; this is in my view a serious defect and calls 
for immediate rectification.. Such rectification, as stated above, requires 
legislation'. 
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The significance of this anomaly may not be so apparent in an industrially 
developed country where such managerial unions exist. In a country where 
middle and higher level management comprises mainly expatriate staff, it could 
have serious consequences for the socio-economic and political stability of that 
country. 
A 'staff association' is defined :- 
Any combination of staff, the principal purpose of which is the regulation 
of relations between staff and employers either within one industry or with the 
employer by, whom they are employees as may be required by the constitution' 
(Industrial Relations Act 
-Sec. 2). 
A staff association may conclude a collective agreement with an employer.. 
However, in view of the Industrial Court judgement to which reference has 
been made above, a situation arose (May 1988) in which technically (legally) a 
staff association which might contain employees eligible for trade union 
membership, even if that staff association was already registered, could no longer 
function. A clear distinction is required to determine whether an employee may 
join a staff association or a union; he cannot join both. The outcome of the 
decision depends upon how fast government acts to regularise the situation in 
which in 1992 even the Chief Executive would not be excluded from membership 
of a Staff Association. To return to the earlier question who is the employer? It 
seems that in negotiations for staff salaries, managers must negotiate with 
themselves! 
5.2.4 joint Industrial Council 
In order for collective bargaining on an industry basis to occur there is 
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need for a forum within which negotiation can proceed; in Swaziland such a 
forum is a Joint Industrial Council. Joint Industrial Councils are comprised of 
equal representation by both employers and employees. The constitution must be 
referred to the Labour Commissioner, who having satisfied himself that such a 
council is desirable and practicable for the industry and that the constitution is 
suitable recommends to the NEnister that he establishes the Council via the 
Government Gazette. 
The situation in the Sugar Manufacturing and Refining Industry was that, 
on the employers' association initiative, in November 1983, such a Council was 
established (see Appendix 12). Its constitution was amended by joint 
worker/employer agreement in February 1988 and formal meetings were conducted 
under an independent Chairman (initially Professor R. V. Sutton - Professor 
Extraordinaire 
- 
Organisation Behaviour and Industrial Relations 
- 
University of 
South Africa) and subsequently a prominent Swazi, ex-civil servant, Mr Francis 
Mbelu. 
5.2.5 Union Meetings 
In so far as all of the foregoing organisations and associations exist for the 
purpose of regulating the relationships between employer and employee, it is 
relevant to note the legal situation for employee meetings on employer premises 
and also entitlements for both parties to use the ultimate sanction of strikes and 
lock-outs. 
There are nine Sections of the Act which detail the circumstances and 
conduct in which strikes and lock-outs may occur. - (Industrial Relations Act 1980 
- 
Sections 59 
- 
67) First, some comment following on the Industrial Court 
judgement in the case of the Swaziland Manufacturing and Allied Workers' Union 
v Commissioner of Police, as it affects union meetings on employers' premises. 
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While the political content of unionisation is an express concern for the 
Police Commissioner, no such consideration is inherent in that part of the 
Industrial Relations Act (Sec. 74) 
- 
pertaining to a union's right to seek access to 
an employer's premises. The employer has discretion in the matter but access 
cannot reasonably be withheld. The Court's assumption that union meetings are 
not inherently political indicates that employers have no responsibility to 
determine whether any particular meeting has a political content. 
Nevertheless, the Act provides that an employer need grant permission for 
access to union officials engaged on lawful activities. A recommendation from 
the Federation of Swaziland Employers to its members (F. S. E. 10 
- 
Apra 1988 
- 
4), asks that the lawful activities be defined by the union. An applicant union 
should be requested to provide a formal agenda for the meeting and a copy should 
be sent together with the employer's assent to the local Police Station 
Commander. It would therefore become the Police Commander's responsibility 
to ensure union observance of the law. 
5.2.6 StrikWLock-outs/Picketing 
The ultimate action of strike or lock-out arises from an unresolved dispute 
between employer(s) and workers collectively. 
Little purpose would be served here to simply record the legal procedure 
as stated in the Act. However it is important to the main subject of this study 
(union recognition) tq recognise the checks that exist in Swaziland on the exercise 
of rights arising from the principles of freedom of association and the right to 
organise. 
The Industrial Court may rule on the nature of the dispute (viz a dispute 
of right or a dispute of interest) on application by either party or by the Labour 
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Commissioner. Thereafter a dispute of right may be referred to the Court by 
either party to the dispute or the Labour Commissioner for 'determination' (Sec. 
58 (2 
- 
3) 
- 
Industrial Relations Act). In the event that the dispute remains 
unresolved either party may take action by way of lock-out or strike (Sec. 59 (1) 
-Industrial Relations Act). 
The procedure means that either party has direct access to the Court 
concerning determination of the nature of a dispute, without recourse to the 
Labour Commissioner. However a dispute of interest requires that both parties 
agree that it be referred to the Court, otherwise if one party only could refer the 
matter, it would effectively deprive that party of the right to strike/lock-out. 
After reference to the Labour Commissioner, (Sec. 59 (2) 
- 
Industrial 
Relations Act), strike action may not commence until fourteen days after the 
I dispute has been so reported and after the further fourteen days from when the 
Labour Commissioner has declared the dispute as unresolved. The assumption is 
that the Labour Commissioner will have endeavoured to conciliate during this 
period. Thereafter strike action may continue indefinitely although in the 
economic situation of developing countries, it is doubtful whether a Swaziland 
trade union could financially support a long strike. 
Section 77 (1-2) Industrial Relations Act expressly prohibits action to 
overthrow the Government, or to show violent resistance to it or designed to bring 
about acts of violence. 
Peaceful picketing is permitted (Sec. 79 (1) Industrial Relations Act) except 
if: 
- 
a) it is intended, or may reasonably be expected, to lead to or support 
an unlawful strike; 
6 114 
it involves violence or threats of violence, physical obstruction or 
restraint of persons or property, breach of the peace or the persistent 
foHowing about or persistent harassing of a person. 
A major problem in Southern Africa, including Swaziland, is the detection 
and apprehension of members of organisations who use intimidation (including 
death threats and death itself and threat of witchcraft) to ensure solidarity. 
, 
Derogatory, erroneous or deliberately misleading statements are unlawful 
as are acts directed at a dwelling house, unless it is also a place of business. In 
addition picketing is unlawful if it seeks to prejudice or influence any decision 
which has yet to be decided by the Industrial Court or if it seeks to influence 
individuals either to join or not join any organisation. Strikes and picketing are 
unlawful in any organisation defined as an essential service (eg Hospitals, 
electricity, water supplies 
- 
but not private security services). 
5.3 CONCLUSION 
An attempt has been made in this part of the study to show the formal 
points at which an interface occurs between the three actors and the formal 
structural and legal constraints upon their actions. It will have been noted that, 
although Swaziland is politically and socio-economically a 'third-world' country, 
its industrial relations framework and legislation, while maintaining the carry-over 
from earlier days (viz Works Councils), has nevertheless now become a reflection 
of the country's increasing industrialisation. 
The question arises as to the extent to which such formal modernisation 
was a reflection of the reality of the environment within which the (SAPWU) 
unions sought to gain employers' recognition. 
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Earlier reference in this chapter to the dispute concerning recognition of 
the Swaziland Union of Financial Institutions which was referred to the Industrial 
Court, illustrated the only occasion up to mid-1992, other than the dispute 
concerning the sugar milling and refining industry, when the court was required 
to interpret legislation. Ibis latter dispute over union recognition is the major 
conflict analysed in this study. 
Throughout the ten years of its existence to 1992 the Court's primary 
concem was that of a legislative tribunal. Pronouncing upon individual rights 
pertaining to unfair dismissal from employment, it did, from time to time, direct 
both plaintiff and defendant in legal procedure and in following the rules 
prescribed in the labour legislation. However the Court frequently overlooked 
minor technical infringements of procedure which it did not consider would result 
in a miscarriage of justice; it was entitled to do so (Sec. 16 (1) 
- 
Industrial 
Relations Act No 4 of 1980) 
Perhaps the major significance of this chapter has been that of describing 
what is a sophisticated legal structure for regulating industrial relations within a 
comparatively non-industrialised society. 
Some of the impetus however stemmed from Swaziland's earlier (1962 and 
1973) experience (Chapter 3) which pointed to a need to regulate industrial 
relations and also to the IILO Conventions which Swaziland was required to ratify. 
(1973) 
The fact was that the ELO sent experts to draft the employment legislation 
with a view to modernisation. Not unexpectedly, therefore, such legislation 
reflects an approach more suited to industrialisation rather than embodying 
traditional values of a basically subsistence economy. 
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In the opinion of the author, the Industrial Relations Act 1980 (and 
Employment Act 1980) drafted by Mr KD Harrap of the ILO (FSE 1980 iii) 
subscribes to a system approach in which 'the industrial relations system is held 
together by an ideology or common set of ideas and beliefs' 
... 
and 'def: ines the 
role and place of each actor... and the ideas which each actor holds towards the 
place and function of others in the system' (Jackson M 1977 : 19 commenting 
on Dunlop J- Industrial Relations Systems c 1958). 
This study next examines whether or not such an approach was consistent 
with reality and assisted or retarded the management of conflict and the 
recognition of SAPWU by -the SSMRI WA. The analysis of the conflict over 
recognition is undertaken in Part III. 
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PART 111- THE CONFLICT OVER RECOGNITION 
(A Case Study) 
CHAPTER 6- THE SUGAR INDUSTRY IN SWAZILAND 
It may be observed that all states have unique characteristics. What might 
be stated of Swaziland is that during a decade (from 1982 to 1992) of social and 
political violence and massive changes in states around her, this tiny country of 
less than one million people continued to be both politically, socially and 
economically stable. The minor attempt to usurp political power in 1983 was 
short-lived and an apparently bloodless event. 
This stable situation continued in what was/is still a semi-feudal state 
(Chapter 3) 
There were indications however, in September/October 1991, during an 
open canvassing of popular opinion about the Tinkundla system of parliamentary 
election that there was considerable dissatisfaction with the system. Opinion was 
that it should be an open, not a secret ballot for the election of chieftain nominees 
for the Electoral College. That body in secret nominates Members of Parliament 
from a secret fist. Charges were that the Libandla (Central Committee members) 
which replaced the Liqoqo (Council of State) in 1989 as advisers to the King, 
were faceless, sinister and intimidatory figures who were the real government of 
the country. It was suggested that a more democratic style of government might 
emerge eventually. (See Appendix 2) 
During the period of this research project, however, Swaziland was overtly 
stable politically, with a gradually improving economy. That economy was 
dominated by the sugar industry. It is pertinent therefore to note the industry's 
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economic and social impact on Swaziland before giving attention to the major 
issue 
- 
the conflict over union recognition. 
- 
Agriculture and forestry are predominant industries in Swaziland. 
Statistics' provided by the Government Department of Economic Planning and 
Statistics (1988: 140) show that in 1980 these two industries provided for 75% of 
Swaziland's exports, 43% of GDP and 50% of paid employment. Figures 
established at the same date indicate (GS 1987/88 : 144) that sugar production 
and processing provided for 46% of the total value of exports and approximately 
eighteen thousand people or 14% of the population depended upon the sugar 
industry for employment. In effect, estimated total paid employees in all industry 
was 90 000 (GS 1988 : 145). 
- 
6.1 MANUFACTURING 
The manufacture of sugar first commenced in Swaziland in 1958 by 
Ubombo Ranches (now a partly owned subsidiary of the London 
- 
based Lonrho 
Group). Together with the Commonwealth Development Corporation's operations 
at Mhlume two modem Mills came into production in 1960 with quotas of 36 000 
tonnes (Simunye Sugar Estate Annual Report 1981 : 18) 
Since 1981 a new third Sugar Mill at Simunye, additional to the older two 
at Mhlume and Big Bend, has created employment for some three thousand, five 
hundred persons. Sugar tonnage exported has risen from 379 000 Tons (1982) to 
440 000 Tons (1987). (G. S. 1988 : 144). 
In terms of the Lome Convention, Swaziland's annual supply quota to the 
EEC is 120 000 Tons, but the increase in production has considerably reduced the 
security element obtained from that quota (54 percent in 1979 to 32 percent in 
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1982 (GS 1988 : p144). Swaziland's former status as a small producer afforded 
some protection in terms of the hardship clause of the International Sugar 
Agreement, but this has also changed and she is now classified as a medium-size 
sugar producer. 
This changed situation has meant that the Swaziland economy in total, and, 
some 24 percent of the formal sector labour force (GS 1987/88 : 80-81) or 14% 
of the country's population, are directly affected by increasingly volatile sugar 
markets (SASJ 
- 
1988 : 2). However, Swaziland has one major advantage, 
compared with its South African neighbour in so far as production of sugar is 
concerned. Obviously, some soil variation occurs in Swaziland, but climatically 
the Swaziland sugar growing areas are not subject to the 'adverse climatic, 
topographic, soil and rainfall distribution' (SASJ 1988 : 15) as South Africa. 
The cane itself is transported by road to the dme Sugar Mills 
-Big Bend 
(east-central) and Mhlume and Simunye (north-east), where it is processed into 
raw sugar. It is then moved in bulk, by road and rail, for onward transportation 
to the Swaziland Sugar Terminal at Maputo for overseas shipment, mainly to the 
EEC, United Kingdom, Canada and some lesser amounts to the United States in 
terms of the International Sugar Agreement quota system,. 
6.2 GOVERNMENT INTERESTS 
Clearly, the dependence of the whole Swaziland economy and, by 
inference, its socio-political stability requires major government involvement. 
The Swazi Nation is now a major shareholder in the sugar industry. While 
purporting to serve the national interest, it is generally considered to serve the 
requirements and interests of the Royal family through the participation of the 
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Tibiyo Taka Ngwane Fund. Tibiyo has a 40 percent interest in Ubombo Ranches 
Limited, the processing company which grows approximately 46 percent of the 
cane it processes in its Mill. The remainder of the cane is provided by 25 smaller 
growers of which Tibiyo is the largest contributing 14.5% of cane. (G. S. 1987/88 
: 80 
- 
81). 
In the north east Tibiyo has a 50 percent interest in the CDC Mhlume 
(Swaziland) Suar Company Limited, which grows 37.5% of the cane it processes, 
the rest being provided by some 280 small growers, of which 270 are smal1holders 
at Vuvulane Irrigated Farms. (G. S. 1987/88 : 80 
- 
81). 
The new third Sugar Mill at Simunye operated by Royal Swaziland Sugar 
Corporation Limited, is a joint venture in which Tibiyo has a 67% interest; the 
remainder of equity being shared by CDC, German Development Company (DEG) 
and International Finance Corporation (IFC) as the other main partners. Simunye, 
the largest sugar estate, produces approximately 160,000 tons raw sugar. All of 
this is Processed from cane grown at Simunye except for a small amount received 
from only one private grower (Tambankulu Estates). 
Most of the sugar production therefore is obtained from a small number 
of large, modem capital-intensive estates, owned by joint venture as already stated 0 
with foreign investors and the Swaziland Government and the Swaziland National 
Trust Fund, known as Tibiyo Takangwane. In addition there are a few medium- 
sized producers together with the 270 smallholders mainly concentrated at 
Vuvulane in the north-east under an original Commonwealth Development 
Corporation Scheme. 
Swaziland's vulnerability is hig g , hlighted by its terminal rail-link from 
Mlaula to Maputo (some 35 kms). During 1985/90, the railway over this distance 
in Mozambique was, disrupted for some 50% of the year, through Renamo 0 
121 
guerilla activity against the Frelimo Government and through operating 
inefficiencies both by railway and port personnel in Mozambique. This situation 
resulted in the industry erecting a further storage facility at Simunye (57 000 
tonnes). (Simunye Sugar Estate 
- 
Annual Report : 1987 :1- 4) 
63 DISTRIBUTION AND PROCEEDS 
All of Swaziland's sugar export/marketing is handled by the one Swaziland 
Sugar Association, of which the 3 mills are members and which between them 
employ some 86% of the industry's Iabour. All of Swaziland's sugar (1987 
production of Raw Sugar was 440 000 tonnes), with the exception of some 20 000 
tons refined to white sugar for domestic consumption, was exported via this 
consortium of mills and producers (growers) established as the Swaziland Sugar 
Association. (SSA Report 1987 : 4) 
Gross proceeds from the sales of produce for 1987, were Sugar 
- 
E226 027 
710, Molasses E9 391600 
- 
totalling E235 419 310 (SSA report 1987 : p4). On 
this amount, a Sugar Export Levy was paid to the Swaziland Governmentý of E4 
966 325. This levy is calculated on the net export sales proceeds of sugar sold 
and shipped during the year after the deduction of a base price, which is that 
distributed to the miHs and growers, proportionate to the amount of raw sugar 
produced from the cane processed. The base export price for 1987 was E490 
p/tonne. What is significant is that the levy is a direct additional cash payment 
to Swaziland's government revenue over and above the revenue derived from 
dividends paid to Tibiyo Taka Ngwane and taxes paid by the industry and by the 
employees. 
Production of sugar is physically restricted (because of climate, soil) to the 
north-east and east-central of the country bordering Mozambique. As one of the 
world's least-cost producers, Swaziland's sugar industry is aided by good climatic 
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conditions and high yields are derived from the cane. Cane is gown throughout 
the year, under irrigation, and is normally harvested over a 33/38 weeks cycle, 
traditionally necessitating the employment of additional labour as cane-cutters, 
tractor and crane drivers and similar. 
6.4 GEOGRAPHIC DATA 
All three major sugar estates cover an extensive area of Swaziland's 
'lowveld' 
- 
the newest, at Simunye, growing 90 percent of the cane it processes 
in its mill from some 9 000 hectares of land. Somewhat larger than the other two 
estates, it covers an area of approximately 20 miles x 20 miles (400 sq miles), but 
its infrastructure is similar to that of the other two estates, with one major 
exception. ' 
At Simunye its labour force (+- 3 500) plus families are concentrated in 
two townships approximately 15 miles apart. The author estimates a total 
population of between 18 000 - 20 000 people, the third largest concentration of 
inhabitants after Mbabane, the capital, and Manzini, the mid-veld developing 
industrial centre. Both Mhlume and Ubombo Ranches (Big Bend) populations are 
largely decentralised, with employees and their families living directly in the area 
in which they work. 
It is with this labour component that the study is concerned. Collectively, 
the 3 mills, together with their ongoing and original production/marketing 
orientated Millers' Association, formed an Employers' Association in November 
1982 to deal with labour matters. 
6.5 CONCLUSION 
As already indicated in Chapter 3 (The Swaziland Society), the companies 
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provide virtually the entire infrastructure of the country, in the areas in which they 
are located, both physically and with services (schools, medical, recreation, social, 
church, police (security force). Some shopping facilities are maintained by outside 
interests. Perhaps a reasonable historical analogy might be that these companies 
are the 20th century equivalent of 'John Company, -the British East India 
Company (16th/19th century) 
- 
in so far as operation, if not ownership, is 
concerned. A more modem analogy might be that of company towns in the 
United States of America, especially those owned and operated by the extractive 
industry (e. g Anaconda Copper US, Montana). 
It follows therefore, that Swaziland is economically, socially and politically 
highly vulnerable to any financial, material or manpower changes within the 
international and local sugar industry. Comment will be made at a later stage 
about the phenomenon that as recently as December 1991 the country's major 
strategic industry had not been subjected to the industrial unrest such as beset 
South Affican. strategic industries; as the motor industry because of its high 
international publicity profile and the mining industry as the major income- 
eamer/producer. 
It is against the overall background described in Part H of this study that 
the industrial conflict over union recognition within the Swaziland Sugar 
Manufacturing and Refining Industry will be studied and analysed. 
i 
irootnote: 
-, 
In this chapter the statistics do not always corroborate with others 
reported in this research. 
This is because varying sources have been used even within government 
departments and dates of reports do not always coincide with each 
other. 
The aim has been to give a general indication of the economic status 
of the sugar industry vis-a-vis Swaziland's national economy, rather 
than to ensure complete statistical accuracy. 
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CHAPTER 7 UNION RECOGNITION 
- 
PRELIMINARY ISSUES 
7.1 OPENING MOVES 
7.1.1 The Establishment of the Union 
There was, in existence as early as September 1963 a Mhlume Sugar 
Workers Union' the executive of which sought discussion with management 
representatives of the Mhlume (Swaziland) Sugar Company Limited, with a view 
to recognition. The then President of that union, became the Commissioner of 
Labour, in June 1991, an appointed civil servant. The union continued to seek 
recognition even during the national strike (Swd Sugar Workers Union : 1963 - 
Sept 
- 
Letter) but without success (Mhlume (Swd) Sugar Co Ltd : 1963 
- 
Oct 
- 
Letter). 
Following this national strike in early 1963 when the striking workers 
'defied the Royal directive 
....... 
an act which was viewed as an end of trade 
unionism in Swaziland 
....... 
by the General Secretary of the Swaziland Federation 
of Trade Unions, (See appendix 4: 15) the Registrar of Trade Unions effected a 
mass'de-registration of unions (Chapter 2). Action was taken by the King, with 
assistance from the British Government and British Army to maintain law and 
order. The subsequent need to re-estabHsh government control, resulted in 
increasing suspicion of trade unionism by resident European (Swazi) nationals and 
by traditionalists within the Swazi socio-political hierarchy. 
Nevertheless, as a new member of the International Labour Organisation 
in 1975, the government ratified various ELO conventions. This required a new 
Employment and Labour Relations dispensation locally, and the re-activation of 
125 
the Swaziland Federation of Trade Unions. Union re-emergence was slow to start 
and only after assistance from the ILO and from various fraternal associates such 
as the Organisation of African Trade Union Unity 
- 
Nairobi, the Commonwealth 
Trade Union Council, the African 
- 
American Labour Centre, the International 
Confederation of Free Trade Unions and others, did Swaziland unions become 
active again from about mid 198 1. The first major action was that one such union, 
the Swaziland Agriculture and Plantation Workers' Union was registered by the 
Commissioner of Labour in May 1983. The objects of the Union are listed as 
Rule 3 (see Appendix 9. ) 
7.1.2 Employers' Association and Joint Industrial Council 
The second action of major consequence was that effected by the three 
sugar milling companies. During 1981, the then General Managers of the major 
sugar processing companies noting the effects of the new labour laws to 
commence from July 1982, jointly agreed to form an Employers' Association. 
This was defined in the Industrial Relations Bill, which had been given the Royal 
Assent in September 1980. A draft constitution was submitted to the Labour 
Commissioner. Following suggested amendments by the Commissioner and 
comments by the Executive Director of the Federation of Swaziland Employers', 
a Constitution was registered by the Commissioner of Labour effective 29 
December 1982 (See Appendix 10). Verbal notification of this had been received 
in July 1982 and the Sugar Nfillers Association executives (29 July 1982) at once 
instructed their personnel executives, to proceed with drafting a constitution for 
a Joint Industrial Council. This was to deal with industrial workers, as distinct 
from the cane-growing (agricultural) work-force which was to be dealt with as a 
separate issue. This was occasioned by the close co-operation which existed 
between independent cane growers (an essentially agricultural activity) and the 
sugar millers. Two of the three mills were (and continue to be) heavily dependent 
upon cane-growers for their sugar cane supplies. The third mill grows its own 
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between independent cane growers (an essentially agricultural activity) and the 
sugar millers. Two of the three mills were (and continue to be) heavily dependent 
upon cane-growers for their sugar cane supplies. The third mill grows its own 
cane at Simunye. It was thought by the employers that, because legislation 
provided for an Industry Union/Staff Association (See Sec. 20 
- 
Industrial 
Relations Act 1980), it would be comparatively easy to exclude agricultural 
workers (viz field workers) from any collective representation jointly with the 
industrial workers at the sugar mills. 
Drafting a J. LC. Constitution. 
On the 19 August 1982, the personnel executives of the three sugar mills, 
met at Simunye. They particularly considered Part IV Sections 38 and 39 of the 
Industrial Relations Act concerning the formation of the Joint Industrial Council. 
in terms of instructions received by them from the Swaziland Sugar Millers' 
Association (viz from their own chief executives), they were required to define an 
4employee', in the draft constitution for a Joint Industrial Council. Such definition 
would need to exclude all those employees not presently covered by the existing 
Wages Order for the Sugar Manufacturing and Refining Industry. The purpose 
for this provision was that in the subsequent event of workers unionisation or 
works councils type collective action, it might be possible to influence that 
collectivisation, so that negotiations with agricultural workers at the three main 
sugar estates occurred separately from other workers. 11is could ensure results 
more closely in line with those of the independent cane growers, whose operations 
were covered in terms of the Agricultural Industry Wages Orders. For national 
and individual employer economic reasons, the wages, terms and conditions of 
service within agriculture (See Appendix 3) have been somewhat less favourable 
from those which obtain in industrial 
- 
type operations. 
Given the superior conditions of the sugar manufacturing and refining 
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industry the fear was that such conditions, if applied to SSMRI agricultural 
employees, could be used by the agricultural (specifically the 'cane growers') 
employees outside of the SSMRI, to lever upwards their own wages and 
conditions, to the detriment of the smaller cane growers. This was of great 
importance. It was primarily this concern which had earlier caused the 
independent cane growers to reject the option of joining with the sugar millers, in 
a combined Growers and Millers Employers' Association (but see Section 3 
below). 
It will be recalled that the personnel executives' mandate was confined to 
a Joint Industrial Council constitution for 'Industrial' type employees only. A 
reminder here, is necessary to elaborate. 
There was in existence two applicable government sponsored Wages 
Council Orders; one for the Agricultural Industry and another Wages Order 
applicable only to 'industrial' type work within the sugar mills themselves as 
distinct from 'fields' (agriculture) work. In practice, as already indicated, the 
sugar milling industry paid well beyond the minimum legislated rates. At that 
time (1982), the sugar industry adhered to the minimum rates for industrial work 
as set down in the Wages Order, but paid slightly less for agricultural work, but 
still well in excess of the minimums specified in the Wages Order for the 
agricultural industry in general. 
The significance of the distinction was the motivating factor underlying the 
general managers' instructions to establish a Joint Industrial Council for industrial 
workers only. The personnel executives rejected their principals' directive. Sec 
38 (Industrial Relations Act 
-1980) provided for a Joint Industrial Council 'for that 
industry Sec 39 (a) Industrial Relations Act 
- 
1980 specifically noted 'the class 
or classes of employee to be covered by the council'. It was the opinion of the 
personnel executives that because the industrial workers comprised no more than 
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one-third of all of the work-force on the three sugar estates (including mills), it 
was extremely unlikely that either the Labour Commissioner (Sec 38 (1) Industrial 
Relations Act) br the Nfinister (Sec 38 (2) 
- 
Industrial Relations Act) would accept 
a Joint Industrial Council for a minority of the total work-force. That view was 
upheld by the Executive Director (Mr Peter Dodds) of the Federation of Swaziland 
Employers, in response to a telephone call from the personnel executives during 
the meeting. A further meeting was arran ged by the personnel executives, jointly 
with the Executive Director, F. S. E. for Thursday morning 26 August 1982. 
7.1.2.2 Union Request for Employer's Assistance 
On 24 August a letter was received by each of the three personnel 
executives from a works council representative from Ubombo Ranches Limited. 
This letter referred to correspondence during July 1982 in which workers' 
representatives had requested permission and assistance to facilitate the formation 
of trade unions. Such assistance, nationally, had been requested in speeches by 
the Deputy Prime Minister and the Labour Commissioner and the majority of 
F. S. E. Council members had given support to the requests. The 24 August letter 
from the worker representative stated that representatives of the Swaziland 
Federation of Trade Unions had been advising on a constitution for an industry 
union. An interim committee had been established and further assistance was 
requested with transport and meetings facilities for an employees' interim 
committee meeting at Simunye on 4 September 1982. In the event, this meeting 
was cancelled because of the death and subsequent funeral on that day, of His 
Majesty King Sobhuza 11. 
7.1.2.3 I. R. Specialist Review 
The meeting of the personnel executives of the 3 sugar mills and the 
Executive Director of the F. S. E. took place at manzini on Thursday 26 August 
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1982, as an-anged. 
Discussion on the important issues was as follows: 
- 
The letter from employee representatives received 24 August 1982 
was considered. From the letter it was clear that employees in the sugar 
industry, assisted and advised by officers from the Federation of Swaziland 
Trade Unions were seeking to establish a union which could embrace all 
workers employed both by millers and by growers throughout the 
Swaziland sugar industry. 
f- It was agreed that if the proposed union could obtain 40% or more 
paid up members of the total employees in the sugar industry they would 
have to be granted recognition by employers as the exclusive collective 
employee representative for the industry. Employers would then have to 
form an Employers Association embracing both millers and growers to 
deal with this union. Employees from some of the larger cane grower 
companies 
- 
(Tambankulu Estates and Big Bend Sugar Estate) were on the 
Steering Committee of the proposed union. It was agreed that copies of 
the Steering Committee letter should be sent to the General Managers of 
these companies. 
The Executive Director of FSE understood that the SFTU was 
advising unions that the monthly subscription for members should be 
E2.50. He seriously doubted if 40% of employees who would be prepared 
to pay this amount could be obtained in the foreseeable future. 
The FSE Executive Director had discussed the question of trade 
union representation with recent visiting overseas trade unionists and it 
appeared that they agreed with him that suitable potential trade union 
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officials were not presently available in Swaziland and that employer 
negotiation with grass roots works council representation should first be 
developed. From this might eventually emerge unions and union 
representation. If employers presented a JIC Constitution to the Labour 
Department which recommended worker representation based on the 
present works councils, he was sure that this would be very acceptable. 
This would have to be done quickly, however, if employers were to 
forestall the employee moves to develop an all-embracing union based 
upon cane-growing and milling as one industry. 
The C. E. 0's instructions to confine the JIC to Industrial Daily 
Rated Employees only was then discussed. In the opinion of the Executive 
Director, F. S. E. this would be unacceptable to the Labour Commissioner 
and would also provoke employee opposition. In terms of the Act, the 
Labour Commissioner was obliged to discuss any pr . oposed JIC 
. 
Constitution with employee representatives. 
A proposal for the cane growers to form an employers association 
and presenting a JIC Constitution which would apply to all employees in 
the cane growing industry, was made. It was thought that if this was 
produced by the Cane Growers Association, it could probably forestall the 
formation of a combined industry union. At the same time this JIC could 
also include agricultural employees of the 3 milling companies 
- 
thus 
maintaining the separation of agricultural and industrial type employees. 
It was concluded that this would receive very little support however 
and might be opposed by the cane growers themselves because of the 
discrepancy in wages (even for agricultural employees) and conditions of 
service, between them and the sugar millers. In the foreseeable f6ture 
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there was not likely to be a problem of maintaining the existing concept 
of differential wage scales between agricultural and industdal daily rated 
employees all of whom could be included in one JIC for all employees of 
the 3 milling companies. 
The definition of a JIC was then studied. It was seen that a JIC 
must apply to all employees in that Industry other than 'Staff', as defined 
ý. by the Act. There could be merit in claiming that in terms of the 
definitions of 'Industry' and 'Industry Union' contained in the Act, 
i-I employees of millers and employees of cane growers were not in the same 
'particular industry' and could not then be part of the same industry union. 
The possibility of doing nothing about introducing a JIC at that 
stage and merely proceeding with the existing Wages Council was 
considered. It was agreed that this was highly inadvisable. In forming a 
union employees were already vying to wrest the initiative from employers 
and should they be able to do so employers might find themselves at a 
very serious disadvantage. 
The matter could best be resolved at a meeting to be held as soon 
as possible between the General Managers, the 3 Personnel Managers and 
the Executive Director of the FSE. It was recommended that the 
Executive Director of the Cane Growers Association be requested to attend 
where the problems which were looming ahead could be discussed with 
him and a possible joint strategy planned. 
The question of the representation of employers in any action in 
which they might be involved in the Industrial Court was also discussed. 
The Executive Director FSE confirmed that it was the intention of the FSE 
to represent employers and that this was part of their membership benefit. 
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He said that this was nonnal practice in other parts of Africa and that he 
had a great deal of experience of this nature whilst he was employed by 
the Federation of Kenya Employers. 
Following this meeting, the Ubombo Ranches representative of the Union 
Interim Committee was notified (27 August 1982) that the requested 4 September ' 
workers' representatives meeting had been agreed, numbering seven people. As 
indicated, this meeting did not actually take place owing to the King's death. 
7.1.2.4 C. E. O. 's Joint Decisions on Works Councils/Joint Industrial 
Council Constitutions. 
The General Managers, Personnel Executives and the Executive Director 
FSE convened on Thursday 2 September 1982, to review the situation. Worker 
representation was considered with two major concerns in mind: - 
Sugar MiUers' Association directive to pursue Joint Industrial 
Council for hourly paid industrial workers only. 
Attempts by workers to, organise union representation for entire 
industry including cane growers. 
It was again emphasised to the General Managers that it was unlikely that 
registration would be confmned for a JIC which was representative of such a 
small number of workers, (viz industrial-type workers only). Problems would 
arise, however, in terms of wages differentials for various categories, and in 
particular that of agriculture vis-a-vis industrial. It was concluded that the 
operating differences between the large millers and the smaller cane growers and 
the disparity between what cane growers paid and what mills paid, even for the 
same type of agricultural labour, would produce problems which would make it 
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undesirable to contemplate a joint organisation of millers/cane growers. 
It was decided therefore that: 
- 
Millers' (viz refining and manufacturing) should pursue a4- tier 
JIC Constitution representative of the differing negotiable 4 categories of 
employees. 
Categories: 
: 
-Daily Paid - Industrial 
: 
-Daily Paid - Agricultural 
: 
-Hourly Paid - Skilled & semi-skilled Artisan 
: 
-Monthly Paid - (non-supervisory) staff 
Draft Constitution for JIC be prepared and circulated to the 
Management of the Sugar Millers for comment (See Appx. 12). 
Personnel executives to co-ordinate for the 3 mills existing 
individual Works Council Constitutions and wages/salaries structure Oob 
evaluation) in accordance with the widely recognised Paterson Job 
Evaluation System. 
Personnel executives. should informally communicate employer 
views on industrial relations to own organisation representatives on interim 
I ", union committee. 
C. E. 0's should liaise with cane-growers and persuade them to 
organise in parallel with, but separate from, sugar millers. 
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It was noted that the: 
Reasons for pay differential of agricultural workers 
(working for millers) vis-a-vis industrial workers were: 
- 
a Lack of diversification of job content 
0 Intensive labour requirement more costly in economic terms. 
0 Reason for higher wages for agricultural workers working for the 
millers v their cane grower counterparts was that economy of scale 
enabled more opportunity for reduced costs. 
On Wednesday 22 September 1982 the personnel executives discussed a 
draft proposed Works Council Constitution which had been prepared (See Appx. 
13). 
The Executive Director FSE was 'unhappy' about two aspects and advised 
that unless these were sorted out, there was little chance of the proposals being 
acceptable to the Labour Commissioner. These were that: 
provision should be made for negotiating wages and conditions of service 
and 
(ii) for settling disputes. 
If the intention of the Sugar Manufacturing and Refining Industry (SSMRI) 
Employers Association was to exclude such machinery from the proposed works 
councils, some other facility would have to be provided where such matters could 
be dealt with. It seemed clear that this would have to be a JIC and that in such 
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case the works councils and the JIC would have to be introduced simultaneously 
or as close together as possible. It was noted that the Industrial Relations Act 
required works council constitutions to be submitted to the Labour Commissioner 
by all employers of twenty five or more employees by 31 December 1982. 
It was agreed to proceed with the proposed draft Works Council 
Constitution based on the same four tier system of Branch Councils as proposed 
for the Joint Industrial Council Constitution, but also providing the means for 
settling disputes. Provision should also be 
-made to ensure that employee 
representatives were elected by the respective works councils. A JIC Constitution 
along these lines should be prepared based on the SSMRI Employers Association 
draft previously discussed with Executive Director FSE and incorporating the 
alterations and amendments suggested by him. 
The time span involved seemed to indicate that the Works Council 
Constitution and the JIC Constitution would probably be ready for submission to 
the Labour Commissioner by late November/early December 1982. This would 
probably mean that wage negotiations for industrial daily rated employees for 
1983 would still take place at the government appointed Wages Council. It would 
also probably mean that wage increases for salaried, hourly and agricultural daily 
rated employees for 1983 would again be simply awarded by management without 
recourse to the Agricultural Industry Wages Order, because pay rates were already 
in excess of legislated minimums. It seemed clear however that this would almost 
definitely not be the case for 1984 and that increases for all 4 groups would 
probably be the subject of negotiation via the Branch Councils and the JIC. 
Because of the obvious concern nationaHy with the process of labour 
relations within the country's largest industry, it was deemed advisable by the 
Chairman of the Sugar Millers' Association, as the parent body of the SSMRI 
Employers' Association to send a progress report, to the Labour Commissioner 
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(See Appx. 14). Ibe main purpose of the communication was to indicate to 
government that the sugar industry (millers) were attempting to adapt to the new 
industrial, legislation. By formulating a structure which could provide transitional 
facilities for the operationalisation of worker demands, in line with the legislation, 
it was believed by the main employer group that it would be possible to eliminate 
any potential for active worker militancy and thus avoid disruption of the 
operations of the country's largest industry. 
On 22 December 1982, the Employers' Association sent to the Labour 
Commissioner, in accordance with the relevant sections of the Industrial Relations 
Act No 4- 1980: 
- 
Works Councils Constitutions for the 3 Sugar Milling Companies 
viz a standardised version for each Company (Sec 40 - Industrial Relations 
Act) (See Appx. 13). 
I 
A formal request for registration of a Joint Industrial Council (Sec 
38 Industrial Relations Act) together with a copy of the proposed 
constitution (see Appx. 12). 
A bound copy of the Constitution for the Employers 'Association 
(Sec 17 
-1 and 3- Industrial Relations Act) (See Appx. 10). 
Notification of registration of all three constitutions by the Labour 
Commissioner was received by letter via the Federation of Swaziland Employers' 
on 10 January 1983. Just prior to this registration, a request was made by a 
Secretary for the Interim Committee of the workers organisation located at 
Ubombo Ranches Limited to hold a further joint meeting with members of that 
committee. That meeting to be held at Simunye on Saturday 15 January 1983 was 
in lieu of the cancelled meeting of 4 September 1982. A further request was 
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IIý, made for the release from work of all members of the Interim Committee on 30 
January 1983. This was to be held in Manzini jointly with Executive Members 
of the Swaziland Federation of Trade Unions to decide upon a course of action 
for the formation of a collective workers organisation. The employers agreed to 
both meetings and to assist as far as possible with the provision of transport. 
7.13 Summary of Chapter 7(l) 
By beginning of 1983, both of the major actors had, therefore, established 
their respective overall approaches to the new legislation, the necessary formal 
machinery and to their relationship vis-a-vis each other. At this stage the 
relationship was cautious but with no conscious attempt by the employers to 
develop a strategy for labour relations, nor to define as an industry any particular 
approach to trade unions. 
What was significant was that apart from informally indicating the 
employers views on industrial relations to individual worker representatives, no 
attempt was made by employers to discover the workers' own views on the matter 
nor to involve them in developing an agreed industrial relations structure. 
Independently the workers sought to organise. Employers had complied with the 
law, developed their own defensive association to deal with the perceived future 
threats from trade unions. They failed to recognise, contrary to their own 
professional advisers comment, that industrial relations is a major source of 
potential socio-economic and political conflict. As such, it requires a rationally 
conceived long-term strategy as distinct from an emotionally based short-term 
reaction. 
Subsequent actions and reactions will be described in the next section 
(7.2). 
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7.2 EMPLOYERS' STRATEGY 
7.2.1 Employer's Approach 
At the beginning of 1983 it seemed clear that the relationship which 
existed between the emerging union and the employers was a cordial arms-length 
situation and as indicated in the preceding section, the employers' were even 
prepared to assist the union in providing transport and facilitating meetings. But 
it would also be objective comment to state that the, employers' did so with 
unease. A major concern was that, similar to what had occurred in Zambia and 
other African countries, the union was pursuing a national membership approach 
to embrace all agricultural workers and would claim that agriculture as such was 
an industry in its own right, including, 'forestry, pineapples, cattle and other 
operations, including sugar cane growing and milling. 
It has already been shown in this chapter that the disparity in wages 
between cane growing businesses and the sugar millers was such that any national 
and in this case omnibus union posed a potential threat if strike action were ever 
to occur. This threat was not only to the sugar revenues, but also to Swaziland 
as a whole, in so far as most industry was agriculture related. An omnibus union 
is defined as a union not specifically representative of a single economic activity. 
This concern was codified simultaneously with the sugar millers' own concern, in 
a letter 11 February, 1983, from the Executive Director - FSE to the sugar millers. 
JES major comment reflected concern with the employers' stance in the event of 
demand for recognition from the union under Section 36 of the Industrial 
Relations Act. 
Essentially two courses of action were available: 
grant recognition to the Union but try to perpetuate the existing (viz 
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newly registered) Joint Industrial Council which was confined to the 
activities of the three companies. 
reject the demand for recognition under Section 36(5)(b) and lodge 
with the Industrial Court arguments for refusing to deal with this union. 
There were reasonable grounds for holding that if this union also embraced 
industrial manufacturing (viz milling) then an omnibus union embracing 
all agriculture must fail to satisfy the definition of an industry union. The 
sugar manufacturing companies were linked by a common economic 
activity, (the manufacture of sugar) and obtained the principal source of 
income from the manufactured product. The bulk of capital investment 
was in premises, equipment and machinery for manufacturing and 
processing. The production (growing) of cane (as the only agricultural 
pursuit) was, in all respects, subordinate to manufacturing. 
Of immediate concern and what caused the need to review the employers' 
approach was the fact that traditionally, wages reviews had occurred annually 
during March, (effective 1 April) under the old Wages Council system. 
, 
Coincident with the emergence of the union was this wages review, which served 
to emphasise the differential in wages paid by the cane growers and sugar millers 
to which reference has been made. For 1983, because of the then comparatively 
low international sugar price and a rate of exchange of slightly more than E2 
(Rand 2) =UK pound E 1, the published justification was for only a 5% across-the- 
board increase in wages and salaries. The union development was seen as a 
particularly undesirable situation at that time, where adverse reaction to the low 
increase could be expected. 
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7.2.2 The Labour Commissioner's Viewpoint 
A viewpoint prevalent among employers during this period, more 
accurately described as a hope, was that the Government, as represented by the 
Labour Commissioner, could provide guidance as to a future course of action. 
Not for the first time and certainly not for the last this was an unfulfilled hope. 
However, instructed by their chief executive, the personnel executives of the Sugar 
Millers Employers' Association sought a meeting with the Labour Commissioner 
on Thursday 17 March 1983, in Mbabane. 
The fbHowing points were put to him: 
- 
The SSMRI Employers' Association had submitted a JIC 
constitution to the Labour Commissioner for registration in terms of the 
Industrial Relations Act. This JIC Constitution had been accepted and 
registered and all that was now required was for the Deputy Prime 
Nfinister to officially establish the JIC by notice in the Government 
Gazette. t 
The Employers' Association felt that immediate steps were now 
urgently necessary to establish the machinery required for the JIC to 
commence functioning. The most important steps to be taken initially 
were the appointment of a Chairman and Deputy Chairman. 
The Employers' Association had already made an initial approach 
to Mr Roy Damerell', previously a Labour Advisor to CDC Head Office 
in London and who was now retired. It was also desirable that the Deputy 
Chairman be. a person resident in Swaziland, preferably a Swazi citizen. 
1 A number of candidates were being considered, a choice would be made 
shortly and the Labour Commissioner's comments on the candidate would 
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be invited prior to any firm action being taken. 
It was vital to the future of the JIC that the Chairman and Deputy 
Chairman be accepted by the employees as being completely independent. 
In view of this, the employers proposed that they invite Mr Damerell out 
to Swaziland within the next 8 to 12 weeks. The visit would be in the 
nature of a familiarisation trip but an initial inaugural meeting of each of 
the 4 Standing Committees of the JIC should be called where the 
Chairman and Deputy Chairman should be introduced by the Labour 
Commissioner. At these inaugural meetings the employees should be 
notified that whilst the JIC Constitution required that the running expenses 
of the Council be met jointly by employers and employees, the employers 
were aware that employees had no funds at their disposal at that time. 
Because of this the employers were prepared to pay certain costs, including 
the salaries and travelling expenses of the Chairman and Vice Chairman, 
until further notice. 
The SSMRI Employers' Association was very worried about the 
Agricultural and Plantation Workers' Union which was developing and 
which had already applied for registration or would soon do so. 
Employers felt that the establishment of this union was contrary to 
the provisions of the Industrial Relations act. It was not based upon the 
sugar manufacturing and refining industry or even upon the sugar industry 
in total, but appeared to be a horizontal, omnibus type union which was 
in danger of developing into a national union. 
Employers were strongly of the opinion that not only was this 
contrary to the law but that it would be detrimental to the sugar industry 
and also to industry in Swaziland as a whole. The SSMRI Employers' 
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Association would find it very difficult if not impossible to co-operate with 
such a union. Employers did not wish to start their new industrial 
relations association with their employees on the wrong foot and were 
reluctant to go to the extent at this stage of making formal objections to 
the union. It was for this reason that they sought the Labour 
Commissioner's views on this matter. 
The Labour Commissioner was quite obviously extremely reluctant to 
become as involved in these matters as employers recommended or requested. He 
declined to accept responsibility for introducing the Chairman and Deputy 
Chairman to each Standing Committee of the JIC. He was of the opinion that this 
would give rise to these officers being looked upon as government appointees and 
that government would then be held responsible for their actions. 
The Commissioner accepted that there was an equal danger that these 
officers might be regarded as having been appointed by employers but as far as 
he was concerned, this was the lesser of the two evils. He agreed however to be 
present at the inaugural meetings of each Standing Committee of the JIC where 
the Chairman and Deputy Chairman would be introduced by employers. He felt 
that his mere presence would assure employees that everything was correct and 
above board. He would also be prepared to speak on the subject. He further 
recommended that an employer and an employee representative from each of the 
Standing Committees should then accompany the Chairman and Deputy Chairman 
to a meeting in Mbabane where they could be formally introduced to the Deputy 
prime Minister. 
The Commissioner appeared extremely reluctant to commit himself on the 
Agricultural and Plantation Workers' Union. He was only prepared to recommend 
that employers should request the Executive Director of the FSE, to set up a 
meeting with the Secretary General of the SFIU, and that employers' fears, 
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objections and any alternate proposals which they might have regarding the 
proposed union, should be aired at such meeting. 
However he admitted that he agreed that the Constitution of the proposed 
union might prove to be contrary to the requirements of the law and that 
government was very worried about the matter and would be very relieved if the 
problem could be sorted out in the manner he had recommended. 
7.2.3 Unilateral Employer's Action 
A further discussion on 25 May, between the personnel executives 
considered the now confmned registration by the Labour Commissioner of the 
Agricultural and Plantation Workers Trade Union. It was now a recognised 
employee organisation. The Labour Commissioner had indicated that the 
Secretary General of the Swaziland Federation of Trade Unions (SFIU) was 
confident that he would soon have over 40% of the SSMRI labour force as 
registered members. Information at Mhlume was that over 400 Daily Rated 
Employees (viz approx 30%) had already joined the Mhlume Branch of SAPVVU. 
It was reported that the establishment of the JIC of the SSMRI had been 
published in Swaziland Government Gazette Number 215 which had been issued 
early in April 1983. 
The candidature of R Damerell as Chairman of the SSMRI JIC was 
discussed. It was agreed that the Swaziland Sugar Miners Association (SSMA) 
should be requested to appoint him as soon as possible. As he was not too robust, 
it was envisaged that after he had set the JIC on its feet he Would probably hold 
the job for 2 years and would then hand over as Chairman to his Deputy 
Chairman. Mr. Damerell should make an initial trip to Swaziland in about 
july/August 1983 to be introduced to the DPM and Labour Commissioner and to 
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all 4 standing Committees of the JIC. His next visit would then be in the first 
quarter of 1984 when the first Collective Agreements would be negotiated in each 
of the Standing Committees of the JIC. The question of a local Deputy Chairman 
was discussed, who would eventually take over as Chairman on a permanent basis. 
This matter was urgent. 
SAPWU was then considered. It was agreed that contact with the 
Secretary General of the SFIU should be made through the Executive Director of 
the FSE, for commencement of tripartite discussions on the JIC for the SSMRI. 
This would be preferable to the SFIU wresting the initiative from employers and 
confronting them in public with demands which might not be acceptable. 
The relevant sections of the Industrial Relations Act were studied and it 
appeared that if the employees of any particular company did not wish to join 
SAPWU, they could still be represented on the JIC by representatives nominated 
by that particular company works council. 
Union organisers were particularly active during June, July and August of 
1983 and throughout the rest of the year. This included action at one of the 
largest of the independent cane growers' operations. This company together with 
other independent cane growers and the sugar millers, anticipating workers 
enquiries, had formulated a series of common answers (Fig 7.1). Collectively, 
these answers were indicative of both the cane growers' approach to unionisation, 
at that time, and the apparent differences amongst the two groupings and 
individual companies (e. g. Mhlume and Simunye) on some of the same issues. 
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Fig. 7.1 
DOCUMENT CIRCULATED TO SUGAR INDUSTRY PERSONNEL 
MANAGERS 
August 1983 
Probable Questions and Answers When Talking to Unions 
Anticipated Union Questions Employers' Responses 
Can we talk to your Works Council 
members? 
Can we address your workers? 
Can we hold a Mass Rally? 
Will you provide transport to bring the 
Works Council members to a central point 
to meet with us? 
Can we use the Community 
Hall/Stadium/other facilities? 
I Conse nsus 
- 
Yes 
Consensus 
- 
Yes (SIS Proviso 
- 
provided 
that you have been through the worker 
leadership) 
Consensus 
- 
Yes with police permission and 
out of working hours. 
Tambankulu, SIS, and Simunye 
- 
Yes 
Mhlume 
- 
No 
Mhlume and Simunye 
- 
Yes at no charge. 
Tambankulu and SIS 
- 
Yes at no charge 
initially to be reviewed later. 
146 
WM you give Works Council members 
transport to attend meetings at other venues 
in the country? 
WW you give workers time off to attend 
meetings or rallies? 
Will you provide transport to convey 
workers to a central point on your estate to 
attend rallies? 
Will you allow Works Council members to 
attend regular meetings on Union business 
Consensus 
- 
Yes for maining purposes only, 
not to attend mass rallies. 
Consensus 
- 
No 
Consensus 
- 
No 
Consensus 
- 
No 
during working hours on full pay? 
Will you negotiate with us? Consensus 
- 
Yes, when you meet the legal 
requirements for recognition. 
WM you be prepared to coRect Union dues Consensus 
- 
Yes, at 5% commission. 
from the members and pay them to us? 
Will you pay the Shop Stewards? Consensus 
- 
Yes, as full time employees the 
Shop Stewards will be allowed to operate 
for specified times during working hours as 
negotiated in a Recognition Agreement. 
Union promotional activity was supported by International Labour 
Organisation educational seminars during this period; for example, the ILO/SIDA 
African Labour Relations Project Tripartite Seminar on Labour Relations 
- 
Mbabane 
- 
8-19 August, 22-26 August 1983. Employers continued to co-operate 
in releasing employees to attend, but it was apparent that the same employees 
were required each time for such seminars and union meetings. There had also 
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been a request for these employees, to pay a courtesy visit to the Prime Minister, 
Prince-Bheldmpi Dhlamini' as part of a Swaziland Federation of Trade Unions 
delegation. 
The employers now began to be less flexible and accommodating, which 
emphasised their cautious approach (see Chapter 4) and still reflected in the 
survey five years later. Letters to the Federation of Swaziland Employers 
requested that the Federation acquaint the Swaziland Federation of Trade Unions 
with their views, namely, that the union was apparently collecting membership 
fees, and should now provide for its own expenses. While unpaid leave would be 
granted to employees required to attend union business, transport, accommodation 
and similar should now be provided from union funds. While in general the co- 
operative state was maintained it was evident that the relationship began to 
deteriorate. At a later stage, contradictory opinions about co-operation with 
employers occurred among unionists, themselves. Such opinions began to be 
evident however at this time, arising from an anti-employer stance by one Mr 
Jamieson Dlamini, who later became chairman of the union. 
7.2.4 An Industrial Relations Assessment 
There was a widening of the gap between employer and union activists and 
a less than common purpose among the three sugar milling companies and the 
cane growers on a total labour relations philosophy. This situation caused the 
author, who was at that time Personnel Executive' of the Royal Swaziland SuLyar 
Corporation (Simunye Sugar Estate) as Secretary of the Employers Association to 
prepare a position paper for consideration by the Association (See Appendix 15 
- 
June 1983). It was hoped that it would focus attention on what he perceived, to 
be major and critical issues for long-term employer/union relationships. The paper 
was prompted by what seemed a less than practical sugar miller/cane grower 
management perspective on trade union development in Swaziland and on 
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government direction. 
This perspective6was that fustly trade unions would" go-away', at best 
they would struggle to become operative and viable. Secondly, Government could 
be expected ultimately to ban trade unions or at least to ensure that they would 
find it difficult to become operative in spite of legislation. At this stage, while not 
overtly frustrating unionisation, there was apparent a strong anti-union 
undercurrent by some employers which equated unions with Communism and 
extreme left-wing militancy. 
The professional personnel executives sought to follow a somewhat 
indeterminate and less than unified policy from their principals and at the same 
time ensure that their respective employer organisations complied with the new 
labour legislation. Inevitably they were the scapegoats and blamed by all three 
actors, whenever a perceived adverse situation or decision became evident. 
What had happened since 1982, when the employers had taken the early 
initiative in forming an Employers' Association and establishing a Joint Industrial 
Council, was that the trade unions (and this included SAPWU) were being 
publicly seen by the local workers as an alternative vehicle of expression to 
management dominated structures. In so doing the unions were beginning to 
determine the 'rules-of-the-game'. Other than reacting to worker requests for 
union meetings, management had not made any co-operative approach to 
discussion with the unions. The position paper reviewed the widening gap 
between SAPWU and the employers. An industrial relations strategy paper was 
also prepared. These documents are reproduced in full. in Appendices 15116. 
These papers were never considered as a collective employers study, nor was a 
formal strategy ever adopted. The reasons will be apparent, from the following 
conclusion rationale and summary. 
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7.3 CONCLUSION 
By beginning of 1983, both of the major actors had therefore, established 
their respective overall approaches to the new legislation, the necessary formal 
machinery and to their relationship vis-a-vis each other. At that stage the 
relationship was cautious but with no conscious attempt by the employers to 
develop a strategy for labour relations nor to define as an industry any particular 
approach to trade unions. 
What was significant was that apart from informally indicating the 
employers' views on industrial relations to individual worker representatives, no 
attempt was made by employers to discover the workers own views on the matter 
nor to involve them in developing an agreed industrial relations structure. 
Independently the workers sought to organise. Employers had complied with the 
law, developed their own defensive association to deal with the perceived future 
threats from trade unions. They failed to recognise, contrary to their own 
professional advisers' comment, that industrial relations is a major source of 
potential socio-dconomic and political conflict. As such it requires a rationally 
conceived long-term strategy as distinct from an emotionally based short-term 
reaction. 
It will be clear from a study of the papers (See Appendices 15116) that the 
industrial relations professionals (viz the personnel executives and the Executive 
Director of the FSE) were concerned at what they considered to be a developing 
confrontational stance by employers towards unions. 
In 1983 industrial relations practitioners in Southern Africa as evidenced 
by the interaction of the author with others in his professional sphere, believed 
that an effective union led by educated executives rather than poorly led relatively 
uneducated works councils representatives, would result in a more meaningful 
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environment for coRective bargaining. 
It is interesting to observe however, that by 1992 in the Swaziland Sugar 
Manufacturing and Refining Industry, the works council representatives who were 
members of the Joint Industrial Council, had become much more skilful in their 
roles. Much training of these people had occurred through attendance at ELO 
sponsored industrial relations seminars and events and through regular contact 
with their management counterparts and SAPWU. 
In 1983 in Swaziland, in contrast to their professional advisers, however, 
few if any, employers recognised the socio-political and specific industrial 
implications of worker collective representation. Professional advisers were not 
only concerned with guiding their employers and management colleagues through 
a rapidly changing socio-political environment resulting from the 'winds of 
change', but also by persuasion, example and sometimes sheer aggressiveness, to 
educate their superiors and colleagues. There was a need to change from 
autocratic paternalism to a participative management style. 
The papers developed by the Secretary of SSMRI Employers' Association 
were intended to promote through discussion by employers two major actions. 
First, through an appreciation of the existing union/employer situation, to 
force a more objective and less emotional view of the fact that unionisation was 
not a phenomena to be feared. A positive attempt by employers to establish some 
rapport with union leaders and at the same time maintaining some degree of 
status-quo while influencing the direction of affairs, might of itself, create an 
awareness and at least partial understanding of the respective standpoints of the 
parties involved. Labour legislation was new. A willingness by the employers 
to talk 'with' rather than 'talk to' union executive members could have assisted 
in promoting a more practical realistic and less ideologically based approach to 
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social and political change. Swaziland was, and is a sovereign independent small 
state. It did not have to reflect the major ideological stances emanating from 
other African states. 
Secondly, an objective approach by the employers, which was what the 
professional industrial relations executives sought, could have assisted in 
establishing a union/employer forum. This could have led to joint sub-committees 
for investigating, reporting and recommending solutions to issues of welfare, 
housing, safety, job evaluation and grading. There could have been positive 
moves towards establishing a morally and practically acceptable living wage for 
the industry and indirectly influencing the social development of Swaziland. Such 
action might have reduced the issues of direct conflict between the parties by 
concentrating their joint efforts on mutually identifiable needs. Conflict, inherent 
in industrial relations situations, was accepted by the professional industrial 
relations executives. Attempt at conflict reduction was not part of a direct unitary 
approach, nor through an idealist's belief in 'one big happy family'. The aim was 
to establish as far as possible and to institutionalise a process for industrial 
relations which through a rational consideration of facts could minimise those 
issues of direct conflict. Given the traditional autocratic paternalist management 
style and an awareness of the often violent socio-political conflict which was 
current in sub-Sahara Africa (and even closer in South Africa), employer 
perceptions and attitudes caused them to concentrate on attempting to maintain the 
full status-quo, maximising profits and allowing economic forces rather than socio- 
political involvement to dictate the pace of the socio-econornic development. 
Moreover, some employers still hoped that government would proscribe trade 
unions. Continuous conflict appeared inevitable. 
This chapter has reviewed the respective union and employer approaches 
leading to conflict over the Union Recognition issue. Details of this specific 
conflict issues are studied in the following two chapters. 
. 
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ENDNOTES 
Comment in the foregoing chapters has been based upon data from varying sources, but specifically in 
Chapter 4 there was some limited co-operation from some trade union officials. Part III of the work 
(particularly chapters 7- 10), however, is derived mainly from correspondence and records of proceedings 
between the Swaziland Agricultural and Plantation Workers'Union (SAPWU) and the Sugar Manufacturing 
and Refining Industry Employers' Association of Swaziland (SSMRI F, /A). It also includes data from 
internal Employers' Association memoranda, relevant to the trade union recog . nition process. In these 
circumstances, while it may be possible, from time to time, to illuminate the employers' actions and 
responses with reasons, no such facility existed with regard to the trade union. This was because the author 
of this project was actively involved as an employer representative in the on-going relationship with the 
union. It must be clear therefore, that access to union thinking was severely restricted in specific matters 
and this narrative is essentially an employers perception of events; more precisely, perhaps a perception of 
sconflict management'. 
2. Pan III (specifically Chapters 7,8,9,10) covers the period 1982 
- 
1992 
- 
from the initiation of employers' 
collective action to the mid 1992 relationship between SAPWU and the SSmRj E/A. 
Mr Damerell died in the United Kingdom in early 1988 
4., ibis person was subsequently convicted of High Treason after some 12 months detention by a special 
tribunal presided over by the Chief Justice and sentenced to 15 years imprisonment, in 1987. A further 
, tribunal of the country's Elders' persuaded the King to pardon all of those convicted on this charge in June 
1988. 
During this early developing industrial relations situation, it became known to this executive, that certain 
other expatriate and European Management had reported him to Government as a Union sympathiser. The 
executive was under surveillance by the Royal Swaziland Police- Special Branch, for several months. 
It was suspected by personnel executives in 1983, that Swaziland trade unions would struggle for a long 
time to gain employer recognition. It was not until 1992 that SAPWU achieved this aim. But neither did 
they 'go-away' and Government did not give any direction nor did it amend labour legislation. 
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CHAPTER 8- CONFLICT APPROACH 
INTRODUCTION 
Reference is made in this and the Mowing chapter to some specific 
concerns as they relate to employer and union representatives' attitudes and 
actions reflected in the industrialrelations 1988 environment survey reported in 
chapter 4. Although that survey was initiated some four years after the first union 
request for recognition, the attitudes and values and the environment revealed, 
persisted throughout the period 1982-92 during research for this thesis. This is 
important for understanding the actions and reactions of the employers' managers 
and union representatives. The diarised account recorded in this and the following 
chapter, of employer (and intra-employer) and union (and intra-union) interaction 
should be read against the environmental background shown to exist by the 
survey. Thus for example, employers reaction to apparent union militancy or 
some unionist's pursuit of conflict generating tactics, were not single one-off 
situations, but were on-going manifestations of underlying ideological and 
values/attitudinal differences. 
At the extremes these were autocratic, paternalistic colonialist management 
styles of capitalist enterprise, in Swaziland during the 1980's and union leaders 
newly embraced democratic socialist approach to industrial relations promoted by 
the I. L. O. architects of Swaziland's labour legislation. 
Chapters 8,9 and 10 follow the continuing conflict between the employers 
(in association) and the union, as it proceeded from meeting to meeting, month by 
month, year by year. Inevitably given the ideological differences between the 
participants there was constant repetition of viewpoints and approaches as issues 
were identified. Considerable detail of the various meeting's which occured during 
the first and second attempts at union recognition is reported, but the third round 
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of conflict discussions, although there were extensive time-gaps, from March 1986 
to November 1989, tended to be repetitions of the two earlier- attempts. Detailed 
reporting of this round has therefore been curtailed. The primary purpose in Part 
I and II has been the development of a scenario descriptive of the total industrial 
relations environment for Swaziland during the period reviewed. 
Discussion in chapter 1. ntered upon conflict and values. Chapters 8,9 
and 10 report upon the results in practice of the influence of values of the 
participants upon the on-going conflict situation. 
Fig. 8.1 at the end of this chapter is a schedule of major meetings with an 
attendance record, note of the major discussion topics and conclusions reached. 
Other meetings with and between interested parties and the employers' 
representatives also took place during this period. Reference will show that there 
are some lengthy gaps in the sequence of events; these were Pffinarily caused by 
the internal affairs of SAPWU, the details of which were not available to the 
employers nor the author. 
It wiR be seen that the apparent major issues focused upon: 
the procedure, overall for recognition. 
the formation and constitution of the Joint Industrial Council 
A number of specific contentious matters can also be identified for each 
major issue and these will be examined. But first some comment upon the 
perception of employers and employees; particularly and directly relevant to the 
concept of collective bargaining as the ultimate aim and the result of union 
recognition. The need to obtain recognition by employers is central to the 
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activities of unions. 
The overaH aim of any business enterprise may be said to be the 
maintenance of profitability in order that shareholders receive an adequate return- 
on-investment and employees an equitable financial reward for services rendered. 
Given this statement, it would seem that both employers and employees have a 
III common interest 
in maintaining the economic viability of the enterprises; a unitary 
frame of reference (Jackson MP, 1977 : 28). Why then the conflict situations 
which continue to exist in those countries which permit the operation of collective 
worker activities for the purposes of collective bargaining? 
In the journal of the British Transport and General Workers' Union for 
October 1963, the then General Secretary, Frank Cousins wrote 'If we do not fulfil 
the purposes for which members join unions, to protect and raise their real 
standard of living, then the unions will wither and finally die' (Pinckott B and 
Cook C- 1982: 195). Employers and employees rarely share the same perception 
of what is equitable or what is an adequate return on investment. It can be argued 
within the context of industdal relations that the potential for conflict arises from 
two major but differing perceptions: 
the Perceptions of employees as to what constitutes an equitable 
'real standard of living' 
the perception of shareholders and thus employers (not always 
coincident with each other's views) of what is acceptable, to them, as an 
adequate return on investment. 
It is interesting to note that universally, attitudes towards the operations of 
business and trade result in the use of the term 'equitable' when applied to 
standards of living but rarely, if ever, when applied to return on investment. It is 
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beyond the scope of this thesis to analyse the psychological and socio-economic 
and political implications of that statement. What has been established, however, 
is that from the onset of an industrial relations interaction there is an all pervading 
difference in the perceptions of the parties involved, (viz union/employers) 
concerning an acceptable standard for the assessment of business operations or the 
'measured' good of a business enterprise. 
These differences become more complex as they are seen to impact upon 
the wider socio-economic and political society. At the level of specific industries 
or individual undertakings however they are essentially reflected in the parties 
approach, first to the acceptance of a union as the workers' agent and second to 
the collective bargaining situation as the method for agreeing that workers obtain 
an acceptable share of the results of the measured goal. 
A conflict situation has been defined as 'Any situation in which two or 
more social entities or parties (however defined or structured) perceive that they 
possess mutual incompatible goals' (Mitchell CR 1981 : 17). In essence the 
situation of concern to unions and employers is a conflict situation involving 
limited resources; viz the amount of money available for adjusting the equitable 
level necessary to maintain Cousins' 'real standard of living. It can be accepted 
that if the major objective of trade unions is to attain this standard of living, then 
unions must be in a situation in which they can acceptably negotiate/bargain with 
employers. For Swaziland as for many other countries, this involves the need to 
obtain recognition as bargaining agents from employers. 
Once that recognition has been achieved, a legally endorsed relationship 
exists. This recognition, however, lies within the domain of 'social values afid 
social structure' (Mitchell : 1981 : 17). A mis-match in this domain also produces 
a situation of incompatible goals - essentially the potential for conflict. But 
societies establish 'social mech"ms for avoiding overt violence... ' (Mitchell 
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: 1981 : 17). In the case studied a 'Union Recognition Agreement' followed by 
a negotiated 'Collective Agreement' for wages and conditions for employment. 
This and the Mowing two Chapters (9 and 10), report upon the specific 
major issues at the core of the conflict over union recognition within the 
Swaziland Sugar Manufacturing and Refining Industry. These issues were always 
in dispute and were never totally resolved. Comment will be made upon these 
. and other specifics which from a management perspective delayed and prevented 
the recognition by the employers of the Swaziland Agricultural and Plantation 
Workers' Union during the period 1983 to raid-1992. 
In the local Swaziland industrial context conflict involves 
misunderstanding, misrepresentation and personal in-fighting. This was the norm 
in collective worker representation activities from the start of the industrial 
legislation's effective implementation in 1982. It was particularly noticeable 
during the attempts to obtain employer recognition. While specific issues have 
been separated in this text, for study purposes, it will be understood that in 
practice a great deal of overlapping occurred. 
8.2 RECOGNITION OF THE UNION - FIRST ATTEMPT 
8.2.1 'Technical' Rejection by the employers 
The Swaziland Agricultural and Plantation Workers' Union pursued union 
meetings at both Mhlume and Simunye with employers, approval during 1983-84. 
At Mhlume requests for meetings for certain departments however could only be 
considered once the various departments commenced work at the start of the 
harvesting season; field services and mechanical harvesting after 20 February and 
conventional harvesting, viz manual harvesting, after 16 April. Meetings were 
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permitted for other departments during January 1984. 
The Commissioner of police (RSP letter of 13 January 1984) addressed 
Mr Jamieson Dlamini at Mhlume and also approved the meetings but advised that 
discussions of a political nature are not allowed and, police officers will be present 
during your meetings. The survey in chapter 4 reports the concern by some 
government officials and employers at union political involvement. 
A report of a meeting (TOS 
- 
21 January 1984) stated that a union office 
was to be established at Simunye which would facilitate the resolution of worker 
grievances via the Swaziland Federation of Trade Unions which body '-will then 
see that some agreement is reached with the employers' failing which cases would 
be referred to the Industrial Court and legal costs would be incurred. The 
inference was that costs would be borne by the union and not the employer. The 
emphasis upon agreement with employers was also reflected in the 1988 survey. 
Three actors, union, employers and government, clearly believed in minimum 
involvement of the industrial court and only then as a last step if agreement could 
not be reached. 
The union office had still not been established by February 1992 although 
a branch committee existed; there are'no legal costs involved in appearing before 
the industrial court, unless legal representation is specifically sought. Ile 
foregoing meetings with misunderstanding and misinterpretations appear to have 
been preliminaries to the establishment of branch committees and subsequent 
formal requests for recognition. 
Arising from the January 1984 union meetings, letters were sent to the 
employers from designated branch secretaries at Ubombo, Ranches and Mhlume 
(SAPWU 
-9 February 1984 and 27 February 1984). These notified the names and 
offices of elected branch officials, the number of employee members of the union 
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and sought formal recognition in terms of Sec 36 of the Industrial relations Act 
No. 4 of 1980. After consultation with the Executive Director of the Federation 
of Swaziland Employers, the personnel managers [of Ubombo Ranches] replied 
(5 March 1984) and of Mhlume (1 March 1984)] declining recognition because 
at that stage no executive comiýnittee of the Swaziland Agricultural and Plantation 
Workers' Union had been elected. It should be noted that the 1988 survey 
showed that even then, some four years after this first attempt at union 
recognition, employers still did not believe in the effective administration of union 
affairs. 
The February 1984 demand for recognition neither conformed to the 
Industrial Relations Act nor to the union's own constitution. The Executive 
Director of the Employers' Federation consulted with both the Labour 
Commissioner and the General Secretary of the Swaziland Federation of Trade 
Unions on this issue. Both agreed that the branches of SAPWU had acted 
unconstitutionally. This information was conveyed by the Director in his 
correspondence with the Personnel Manager of Ubombo Ranches (FSE letier 
- 
14 
February 1984). Thus a legalistic approach, exploiting a 'technical' contravention 
of the Act, was adopted by the employers to the first attempt by the union to gain 
recognition, as a means to block union activity. This action emphasised the 
persistently cautious approach by employers throughout the long period of 
negotiation. 
On 17 March 1984, Simunye security officers were present at a trade union 
meeting at Simunye; the meeting lasted almost 6 hours. At that meeting stewards 
were elected for Simunye, by some 357 members who attended. The Simunye 
total eligible employee complement at the time was +/- 3 200. No request for 
recognition similar to that for the other two companies however was directed to 
Simunye at that time, but this appeared to be more of an oversight by the union 
rather than a deliberate decision. 
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It may be assumed that the consultation between the Employers' 
Federation, Labour Commissioner and SFIU, earlier in February, may have 
generated activity by the SFIU to spur SAPWU to regularise its committee 
structure. An inaugural conference on 1 April 1984 organised by SFI`U and the 
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), succeeded in 
establishing a constitutionally correct Executive Committee for SAPWU. In a 
letter (SFrU 
-3 April 1984) from the SFrU General-Secretary to the Executive 
Director of the FSE, details of the Committee were given and it was indicated that 
'The newly elected National Committee will soon be communicating direct with 
their employers in all union matters, including recognition'. And at the same time 
it was 'recommended' that the Joint Industrial Council should be suspended to 
'pave the way for union collective bargaining'. This communication was released 
to the press (TOS 
-4 April 1984). The issues and allegations concerning the 
UIC" are discussed in more detail-later in this chapter. 
8.2.2 Independent Auditor Controversy 
Dated 16 April 1984, all three sugar estates received individual requests 
for recognition and replied to the union stating that the matter would be referred 
to the Sugar -Manufacturing and Refining Industry Employers' Association 
(SSMRI letter 
- 
25 April 1984). A meeting of the Swaziland Sugar Millers' 
Association the parent body of the SSMRI WA was convened in Mbabane on 26 
April 1984 (see Appendix 18). That meeting included in attendance the personnel 
executives of the three estates. The Secretary of the Employers' Association was 
instructed to respond to the union individual recognition requests by suggesting 
the appointment of independent auditors (Coopers and Lybrand Associates 
- 
Chartered Accountants) to monitor union membership among employees within 
the industry; with suggested terms of reference for the auditor and a membership 
count date as 1 May 1984. The independent auditor proposal was rejected by the 
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union (SAPWU letter 14 May 1984) and a claim for immediate recognition was 
made and a counter proposal that referees be appointed from the two Federations 
viz SFTU and FSE, to verify the count (Section 8.5.3 below). 
Simultaneously with the foregoing there was also a rejection of the JIC for 
wages negotiations by representatives of the union and by the categories of both 
of the daily paid employees. 
8.2.3 Verification 
8.23.1 Process Dispute 
It had become clear to the personnel executive of the Royal Swaziland 
Sugar Corporation (Simunye), following discussions with his colleagues at the 
other estates, that the union rejection of independent auditors for the membership 
count could stalemate all negotiations and the recognition process. In his capacity 
as Secretary of the SSMRI Employers' Association, he therefore convened an 
informal meeting between the Association and the national executive of SAPVM 
in an attempt to maintain dialogue (SSMRI Minutes 
-16 May 1984). It should be 
noted that from management only Simunye and Mhlume representatives attended 
- 
not from Ubombo Ranches; for the union, only the Chairman and Assistant 
National secretary attended. The absence Of Ubombo Ranches management 
suggested a lack of interest in maintaining the dialogue, by that company 
-a 
difference in'approach among employers. (These differences are considered in Ch 
10). 
It was also now becoming clear that two distinct factions were emerging 
within the union (refer Ch 10). A somewhat militant group emphasising the 
contentious approach of some unionists (see chapter 4 survey report) was led by 
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the Chairman and the Assistant General secretary, both employed by Mhlume. 
This group opposed the more negotiating orientated group, - led by the General 
Secretary (Mr J Sithole) who was also by now the Secretary General of the 
Swaziland Federation of Trade Unions. He was employed by Usutu Pulp 
Company Ltd but had adherents at Ubombo Ranches. Simunye employees 
however tended towards a neutral stance, at this time. 
The SSMRI E/A secretary said he had requested this informal meeting to 
discuss the SSMRI E/A reply (SSMRI letter 30 April 1984) to SAPWUIs 
applications for recognition at Simunye, Mhlume and Ubombo, and also 
SAPWU's subsequent reply (SAPVVU letter 14 May 1984). The employers could 
not accept SAPWU's suggestion that the verification of SAPWU membership be 
done by one person nominated by FSE and one person nominated by SFrU. This 
could easily result in dispute and SSMRI F, /A did not wish to start their 
fI relationship with the union with a dispute. It was a much more orderly and 
acceptable solution to have the verification done by an independent firm of 
auditors. Their independent report would then have to be acceptable to SSMRI 
E/A, SAPWU, the Labour Commissioner and to any other interested body. The 
employers' representatives asked if it was the expense of employing an auditor or 
the concept of the completely independent verification of SAPWU membership 
at each company which was causing concern to SAPWU. There was no clear 
reply to this question. 
Employers' representatives emphasised that employers had an obligation 
to all their employees to make absolutely sure that more than the legal 40% of 
employees wanted the union. A great deal of trouble would ensue if the union 
was recognised and then the majority of employees came and complained that 
their negotiating rights had been given away without their approval and that they 
had never joined the union. 
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Independent verification should also establish which categories of 
employees were members of SAPWU. It was quite possible that certain groups 
of employees, i. e. monthly paid or sIdUed, might not have wished to join 
SAPWU. If, however, expense was the problem then employers might agree to 
meet all the costs. 
Union representatives then conferred in SiSwati and a remark was made 
that this confirmed their suspicion that employers were intent on dividing and 
segregating SAPWU. 
I 
SAPVVU executive had called a meeting of the full national executive at 
Manzini on Friday 18 May 1984. The SSMRI E/A proposal would be discussed 
there. The executive undertook to notify the secretary of SSMRI E/A by 
telephone of their decision. 
The Secretary of the SSMRI E/A said that as his association wished to 
clear up the question of SAPWU membership verification as soon as possible, he 
would recommend to all members of SSMRI F, /A that they try by all means 
possible to release the union representatives for the SAPWU Manzini meeting as 
requested. In future however, the employers attitude would probably be that 
SAPWU National Executive Committee matters would not be allowed to interfere 
with the operations of individual companies. There were no conclusions 
pertaining to the auditing of the membership count pending the outcome of the 
meeting of the union's national executive on 18 May. 
At the union executive meeting (18 May 1984) the concept of an 
independent audit of union members continued to be rejectqd by that executive, 
the members reiterating the proposal for joint referees. This decision was 
conveyed to the SSMRI E/A Secretary by telephone. SSMRI E/A management 
representatives responded that they were not able to amend their proposal that the 
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verification be carried out by an independent firm of auditors. They were still 
firmly of the opinion that this was in the best interests of both parties and was the 
best way in which to lessen any chance of a dispute over the result. They did 
agree however that equal number of employee nominees and employer nominees 
could take part in the process as observers or even to guide or assist the auditors 
where necessary. 
If this proposal was acceptable, a meeting between the SSMRI E/A and 
SAPWU should be held as soon as possible to set out the procedures which would 
be adopted in the verification process. 
, 
The SAPWU Chairman who communicated with the Secretary of SSMRI 
E/A said he would have to discuss the matter with his committee and that he 
would notify SAPWUs reply in due course. This feature of union/negotiating and 
decision making via caucus or report-back, is often seen by employers as 
indicative of the need in Southern Africa for employee Group decision-making to 
avoid individual blame if the results of any decision are adverse. It might equally 
be argued that it arises from a local tradition of consensual decision making rather 
than delegated or hierarchical. 
8.2.3.2 Union Response 
While this series of discussions and meetings had been maintained the 
Chairman of SAPWU and his supporters had been pursuing their own particular 
tactics vis-a-vis the employers. This militant group rejected negotiation and 
contrary to the general view of all three actors believed that the legal action of the 
court was necessary to resolve employers' union differences. With no verbal 
indication to the employers, on 29 May 1984, a Replication was submitted to the 
Industrial Court. This action was against the proposed registration of the interim 
agreements which had been concluded by the employers' representatives with 
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works council representative members of the JIC, for hourly and monthly paid 
employees, as distinct from the union orientated daily paid workers. The 
representatives of the affected employees were notified and the monthly paid 
signatories initiated their willingness to appear in court and, confirm their 
agreement. Information was received however, that hourly-paid employees could 
renege. 
In pursuance of the Replication order, the Chairman and his adherents filed 
a report of a dispute to the Commissioner of Labour against all three sugar 
manufacturing and refining companies, citing each company individually for 
failure to recognise the union (Sec 36(5) Industrial Relations Act 1980) and for 
'illegally' referring the union to an employers' association, which association also 
'illegally' suggested the auditing of the union's books. 
In an attempt to remove the dispute from the legal arena the Employers' 
Association Secretary initiated an informal meeting with the Secretary and some 
executive members of the union. The purpose for the meeting was given as an 
attempt to: 
progress the procedure for union recognition; 
obtain clarification of the 40% union membership criteria; 
ensure the withdrawal of the declared dispute over recognition; 
obtain union reaction to the need to pay the current year's wages increase 
to daily paid workers. 
At the meeting held during early June 1984, the union representatives 
stated that they were in a position to show a receipt book of paid-up members, 
including employee pay-roll number, the following conclusions were reached: 
- 
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Both union and employers' representatives attending the meeting agreed: 
- 
Counting should be performed by a representative of the 
Employers' Federation and a representative of the Federation of Trade 
Unions; a partial concession by the employer representatives. (see Sec 3.1 
of this chapter). 
(H) Names were proposed for a referee in the event of a dispute over 
counting. The employers suggested Prof Magagula of the University of 
Swaziland or the headmaster of Salesian 11igh School; the Union 
representatives would consider these but would submit names of their own, 
if necessary. 
Recognition would be based on a 40% across the board 
membership for each of the three mills. 
OV) The declared dispute would be withdrawn from the Labour 
Commissioner now that the recognition issue was to be progressed. 
(v) The union representatives stated that their negotiating team (as 
decided by themselves) would wish to negotiate in future on behalf of all 
four categories of employees, but there appeared to be cognisance of the 
fact that separate negotiations for each category could be necessary. 
No indication was given by the union representatives of their response to 
the question: 
- 
"What are we to do about the wage increase for daily paid for this year? ", 
other than, to say they would consider their answer and inform employers 
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accordingly. 
SSMRI Employers' representatives agreed to facilitate the release of union 
executive members from work to attend a union meeting, to discuss the 
arrangements mutually agreed by them and the union representatives. Mhlume 
management expressed concern at the fact that four of their employees would be 
required. However, in order to move forward and support the recognition 
situation, Mhlume management finally agreed. 
Employer representatives made it clear to the union representatives that it 
was impracticable to call a union executive meeting every time some matter 
required decision. The union executives should consider nominating two or three 
people who would discuss and decide for the union in informal meetings with 
management, particularly since the executive involved other companies and the 
sugar millers were concerned only with matters pertaining to the mills. The need 
for urgency was stressed. This point appeared to meet with acceptance. The 
union representatives agreed to contact the employers Monday/Tuesday 25/26 June 
1984 on the question of referees and their response to the daily paid wage increase 
issue. 
But on 22 June the union executive notified the Employers' Association 
that the dispute would not be withdrawn because employers were still proceeding 
with the negotiations with skilled workers i. e. artisans (SAPWU letter June 1984). 
A unilateral decision by the management of Ubombo Ranches Limited to 
prohibit union meetings because 'confusion could arise vis-a-vis works councils' 
and another union/employer meeting (SSMRI minutes - 26 June 1984) resulted in 
a further union decision to proceed with the dispute. The employers collectively 
decided to approach the Labour Commissioner. It was expected that he would 
intervene because of the unsatisfactory situation and the negative results of 
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protracted discussions (SSMRI E/A 
- 
letter 27 June 1984 
- 
Appx 19). The letter 
referred to the issue of recognition, JIC negotiation, auditing of union membership, 
consequent delay in union recognition and the union executive insistence as 
influenced by the chairman to refer every minor issue to the Industrial Court for 
resolution; the present impasse poses grave problems for the sugar industry 
and for Swaziland'. Employers' views had not changed and were substantially the 
same concerning the economic impact of union power in the 1988 survey (see sec 
4.5. Chapter 4). 
8.2.3.3 Conciliation I 
Towards the end of July, the Labour Commissioner called separate and 
jointly, meetings of the two parties involved. He urged that the parties should 
reconpider their respective positions in an attempt to progress their recognition 
negotiations. 
During a tour of the Ubombo Ranches estate at Big Bend, co-incident with 
the Labour Commissioner's attempts to conciliate, the Minister for Labour and 
Public Service, Mr M Matsebula, referred to union sponsored non-negotiation with 
employers on wages reviews because the union had not yet attained recognition 
by the employers. 
The Swazi Observer 
- 
(19 July 1984) reported that in an apparent reference 
to the Members of the executive committee of the union, whom the minister had 
recently met, 
-Mr Matsebula said 'the union is suspect and the government is 
naturally disturbed. One wonders if the union is working for the good of its 
members or its own political gain'. And in a reference to the meeting he had held 
with both the union and the Swaziland Federation of Trade Unions, the Labour 
Commissioner, Mr Ralph Bhembe, himself an ex-trade union secretary, indicated 
that the unions and workers were 'still learning' and should ask for advice from 
'r, 
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his department whenever in doubt. He condemned the union leaders for rejecting 
the Joint Industrial Council QIQ 'which has representatives from both 
management and workers'. ' Go back to your federation 
..... 
consult with members 
of your executive and come to an agreement to end the deadlock with your 
employers'. (TOS 
- 
19 July 1984). 
But the rift within the union executive was widening; (see Ch 10 Sec 1). 
Pre-empting government comment by some two weeks the Secretary of the. 
Employers' Association for the Sugar Manufacturing and Refining Industry had 
circulated to his members, a surnmary of the options then seen as available to the 
employers, entitled: - 
"Considerations in Present Industrial Relations Situation" (Appx 20) 
The options were perceived as: 
A 'laissez-faire' approach; leave the situation, unsatisfactory as it 
was, to develop. If the employers were seeking to delay recognition as 
long as possible then doing nothing might serve to prolong the delay. 
Oi) Pay an immediate (end of June) increase to workers. This would 
stifle any developing unrest over absence of a pay award and could buy 
time for further delaying recognition, and reducing union influence. 
Force negotiations via the existing Joint Industrial Council but this might 
be seen as, exploiting differences between pro-Union and pro-Joint 
Industrial Council workers viz management becoming involved in workers 
versus worker dispute. 
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Simplify the recognition procedure; it might enhance OV) 
management's credibility with the workforce but inaccuracies could creep 
into the counting of union membership and a speedy recognition take place 
contrary to the cautious approach which employers had so far maintained. 
Following this summarised presentation, the employers decided to make 
an immediate unilateral pay award to all employees. No further action was taken 
by either the employers or the union, pending the outcome of the dispute to be 
considered by the Industrial Court. This dispute was before the Court in late 
October (1984). 
8.23.4 Industrial Court Proceedings 
At the Industdal Relations Court hearings in October, Sipho Motsa, a full- 
, 
time retained member of the Federation of Trade Unions, argued for the union that 
it was a legally constituted and registered trade union. Because application for 
recognition had been made to individual employers, the union should therefore be 
'recognised forthwith'. Count of membership followed recognition. 
The secretary for the Employers' Association, (S SMRI E/A 
-P Fox) argued 
that, the process towards recognition was already in operation; the actual 40% 
criteria needed to be assessed; this could only be established by a count of union 
membership. Subject to a satisfactory count it was then necessary to establish the 
&rules of the game' through the negotiation of a Recognition Agreement. ' Only 
when the full process had been concluded, could recognition be formally accorded. 
The Court ordered that the parties should proceed with the process already 
begun (Industdal Court Order 
- 
18 October 1984). The case, as such, was 
adjourned sine die. 
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8.2.3.5 Recognition Agreement 
- 
Informal 
Further meetings (see Fig. 8.1) then occurred between the employers and 
union representatives and an informal agreement (SSMRI E. A letter 
-3 December 
1984 
- 
Appx 21) was achieved. Its most important terms were: 
- 
(i) Reference in any proceedings to the already implemented wages 
award for 1984 would be removed; 
(ii) Disputes and complaints against employers would be withdrawn; 
OR) A simplified union membership counting process would commence 
at all three companies in early 1985. 
It was expected that progress towards recognition would eventually be 
concluded early in 1985, such that a full Collective Agreement would be 
established for the 1985 wages review. That was the expectation 
- 
the reality 
would be different; the optimism never materialised. 
8.2.3.6 ý 'Count' - and the Employers' Response 
During January 1985 the counting of union membership commenced and 
the checking of union registers was a joint operation by the personnel executives 
and local union officials at each of the three estates (see Appendix 22). This 
action was a considerably more flexible approach by the employers to that 
originally proposed in 1984 in terms of an independent audit which was rejected 
by the union. 
Relevant to the results of this count was action taken by the employers 
representatives one year previously (January 1984). The personnel executives of 
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the sugar estates had made a courtesy visit to the Minister of Labour and Public 
Service. The aim had been to keep him informed of the industrial relations 
situation in the industry and to use the opportunity to express concern at what they 
perceived as the lack of meaningful progress towards recognition of the union. 
The Minister, during a tour of the estates and during the meeting, indicated that 
perhaps some amendments to the relevant legislation were necessary. He invited 
the executives to submit recommendations. In May 1984, these recommendations 
were submitted, with a copy to the Federation of Swaziland Employers for 
incorporation in the employers submission via the Labour Advisory Board. 
The chief executives of the three major sugar estates, although ftequently 
advised by the personnel executives against an optimistic view of government 
attention to amending the legislation in the fust instance and certainly not in 
I favour of employers, if it did take action, nevertheless persisted in the view that 
relations with the union should be on a cautious basis pending =endments. The 
amendments to the legislation were still 'pending' - February 1992. 
The employers reaction to the membership count was that on 10 January 
1985, the personnel executives jointly assessed the union count which had already 
taken place at Simunye and Mhlume and the procedure to be followed for the 
forthcoming April lst annual wages/salary review. 
Because of one of the amendment recommendations submitted to the 
Minister (i. e. that a 51% majority membership of employees should be a 
requirement for union recognition) the question arose as to whether or not the 
count should be recognised. The following options were considered: 
Obtain the Labour Commissioner's advice 
Union recognition to proceed on the existing basis of the law viz 
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40% membership requirement of total eligible employees 
ditto 
- 
but advise union that a recount would be necessary in the 
event the legislation was amended to the 51% requirement 
Refuse acceptance of count pending amending legislation; 
- 
ditto 
- 
but employers to seek discussion with Minister of Labour for 
guidance 
ditto 
- 
but joint employer/union approach to Minister for guidance 
The personnel executive of Ubombo Ranches Ltd had in any event a 
meeting with the Mnister the following day. It was resolved that he should seek 
the Nfinister's guidance. It became apparent from the meeting with the Nfinister 
that no clear indication was to be given from government. 
Nevertheless, following the results of the union membership count, (Appx 
22) the employers decided, on 27 February, to take action rejecting union 
recognition and to consult with works councils on the options available for the 
April wages review. The union executive was notified (SSMRI E/A 
- 
letter 27 
February 1985), that because of 'possible amendments to labour legislation' and 
because the Labour Advisory Board had been convened to advise the Minister 
sconcerning such proposals', 'the Sugar Manufacturing and Refining Industry 
Employers' Association consider that it would be inappropriate at this time to 
enter into discussion with your union regarding recognition. It was also 
indicated that it was the intention to deal through works councils and JIC on the 
wages review issues. This was a contributing factor to the invoking of court 
procedures by SAPWU. Once again the employers' principal executives were 
hoping, contrary to the advice of the Secretary of the Employers' Association 
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(SSMRI), that government would act in their interests in approving their 
somewhat restrictive amendments on the power of the trade union. Government, 
after obtaining proposals from the Labour Advisory Board, modified by the 
employers' recommendations and by joint consideration by employer and SFIT-J 
LAB members, still did not respond! Employers continued to believe, based on 
rumours circulating in the capital, Mbabane, that government would eventually 
ban or severely restrict the activities of trade unions 
- 
which was essentially what 
appeared to be Ubombo Ranches and Mhlume requirement at that time, perceiving 
union activists as agents of extremist left-wing ideology. Employers' responses 
reported in the 1988 survey (see Chapter 4) indicated that their concern at possible 
union political power had changed little since the first attempt (1984) by the union 
to gain recognition. 
Formal recognition was sought on the basis of the membership count, in 
writing, by the union from Simunye and Mhlume individually in a letter dated 26 
February (but not received by the employers for several days). The employers' 
action jointly through their association had preempted receipt of th e Union 
requests for recognition by their letter of 27 February. While rejecting 
recognition on the issue of proposed pending amendments to legislation, the 
employers had noted to themselves, an additional and even more contentious 
reason for rejection i. e. that the Industry, as a total, showed less than the legal 
standard of 40% (32,77%) (Appx 22) overall throughout the industry, as distinct 
from the numbers for individuals categories and individual employers. 
The first attempt at recognition had failed. 
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ENDNOTES 
It is of interest to note that the South African Administrator of SWA\Namibia made the same comment, in 
retrospect, concerning the. fact that a constitution ('rules of the game') should have been agreed before 
SWAPO recognition of political power in the independence general election. ('Natal Witness' - 12 March 
1990). The theme of general principles for a constitution as a prerequisite for multi-party discussions on 
a transitional government, was of paramount concern iii South Ahica in February 1993. 
Agree the 'rules' before establishing the extent of the power-base! 
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CHAPTER 9 AGREEMENT AND DISAGREEMENT 
9.1 RECOGNITION AGREEMENT 
- 
SECOND ATTEMPT 
9.1.1 Preliminary Discussion 
A series of informal meetings took place in an attempt to maintain 
contact between the Employers' Association and SAPWU, following the 
rejection of recognition by the employers on 27 February. A joint Employers' 
Association/SAPWU executive meeting was convened on 2 April in Mbabane. 
A second count of union membership jointly monitored by management 
and union officials had also been carried out at Ubombo Ranches; this 
improved upon the first and revealed an overall 51,99% membership. Ile 
employers, cognisant of workers' feelings decided to reopen discussions, but 
still to proceed with caution. Employers, while not wishing to recognise 
SAPWU did not want to be seen as anti-union; they hoped that eventually 
government would ban unions and 'take the blame'. 
The first stage which was agreed between the parties on 30 November 
1984 had been completed. The union count had been done in all three 
companies. The second stage as explained by employer representatives was 
to talk to each other about a recognition agreement. Ilis process would take 
some time as each party would be expected to prepare and submit a draft 
which would need to be agreed by both parties. Once draft agreements had 
been exchanged, further discussions between the two parties could then 
continue. The union officials had been very much concerned about 
. accomplishing step one which dealt with the union count. Neither party was 
ready to present a draft agreement immediately. Ile employers suggested that 
a future date be agreed upon on which to discuss and consider the draft 
agreements and suggested that a further meeting be held in the middle of May, 
1985. Documentation should be exchanged before the next meeting. 
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After an adjournment the opinion of the union officials was that the 
count had been completed and it had been found that the union had got the 
necessary membership in all three mills. The union should now receive a 
letter from employers granting recognition in all three companies. Only after 
this should recognition agreements be discussed. The employers verbally 
disagreed stating that there was a need to establish the terms and conditions 
of the recognition agreement before recognition could be granted. The union 
officials stated that their understanding of the Industrial Relations Act was that 
a letter should be written confmming that the union had achieved the necessary 
membership. A letter confirming the count, in fact had been written but had 
nothing to do with the Recognition Agreement, itself (SSMRI F, /A letter - 
February 1985). 
The employers' representatives stated that recognition could only be granted 
together with the recognition agreement. They explained that a recognition 
agreement is a comprehensive document which contains the rules for the 
relationship between both parties. Employers could not grant recognition with 
no rules and these should be contained in an agreed document. While 
believing that judicial involvement should be limited (see Chapter 4 1988 
survey results), the employers were insisting as early as 1985 that the 'rules 
of the game' be clearly established before collective bargaining could be 
seriously accepted as an on-going feature of industrial relations. 
It was finally agreed that the union would submit a draft agreement 
together with a letter applying for recognition. SAPWU national executive 
asked that theunion be given an opportunity to meet on 10 April, 1985 in 
order to amend their document and submit it by the next week. Employers 
would finalise their own draft document for -discussion at the next meeting in 
mid May, 1985. 
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9.1.2 The Agreement Discussions 
9.1.2.1 10 May 1985 
The employers representative opened the meeting in mid-May by 
proposing that the draft recognition agreement which SAPWU had supplied to 
SSMRI E/A on 16 April 1985 should be discussed. It was an important first 
step in the recognition process. They had carefuUy studied the document and 
had the foHowing reservations about it: 
(i) It was not detailed enough. It could therefore be open to 
disputes on interpretation. It was also silent on a number of important 
issues: 
- 
It did not distinguish between company-based and industry- 
based negotiations and discussions. It made no provision for informal 
contacts. In many ways it ignored important provisions in the 
Industrial Relations Act. 
It required negotiations to be conducted without any properly 
established framework (i. e. the JIQ. 
(iii) The proposed grievance procedure did not provide for industry- 
based resolution of problems. 
OV) Clauses which were not acceptable to SSMRI F, /A, were those 
which required the employers to accept grievances against management 
appointments and to disclose possible confidential information. 
SSMRI E/A representatives had prepared their own draft recognition 
agreement which contained many of the points contained in the SAPWU 
proposed agreement but which also provided solutions to the points already 
noted. SAPWU members were recommended to take it away, study it 
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carefully and discuss it amongst themselves. SSMRI WA representatives said 
that this was a more precise and detailed document than the union draft. 
Employer representatives stated that a lengthy process of negotiations 
was necessary. Before the final recognition agreement was signed, there 
would probably need to be a further recount of SAPVVIU membership at each 
company because of the time period since the original count. It was requested 
that SAPWU officials be given time off the following Friday, 17 May 1985, 
so that they could meet to discuss the SSMRI E/A document. Assistance with 
transport was also sought by the union. This request was discussed. SSMRI 
E/A representatives pointed out that it was universally accepted that union 
officials were expected to conduct union business in their own time and that 
they were also expected to use their own funds and their own transport when 
doing so. SAPWU representatives pointed out the difficulties of meeting over 
weekends because of transport and communication problems in Swaziland and 
because some of their members were employed on continuous shift and others 
were required to turn out for weekend maintenance duties. 
Eventually employer epresentatives agreed that they would provide a 
meeting place for SAPWU NEC to meet at Simunye but that individual 
members would have to apply to their own heads of department at work to 
be released on leave or unpaid leave. SAPWU would have to make their own 
arrangements for transport. The companies concerned might be able to hire 
them transport if necessary. SAPWU NEC would have to seek the required 
police permission to hold the meeting. 
SSMR E/A representatives pointed out that their proposed recognition 
agreement would provide for matters of this nature once the agreement had 
been signed. It was agreed that SAPWU NEC would notify SSMRI WA when 
the union representatives were ready to proceed with further discussions. 
The employer representatives had two further points for discussion. 
(i) Pressing problems still existed over 1985 wage increases for the 
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majority of employees in the three sugar milling companies. 
Employers wished to keep SAPWU informed that discussions were 
proceeding with industry-based branch works councils and JIC. These 
would continue until the matter had been resolved. 
(ii) Disturbing reports had been received, about statements which 
were alleged to have been made by certain SAPWU officials at recent 
industry-based meetings of the branch works councils. Whilst 
employers could not, or did not wish to try to dictate to SAPVVrU what 
their officials said and did, the matter was causing concern and could 
well damage further relationships. Employees were openly discussing 
allegations that certain SAPWU officials were threatening employees, 
who were not SAPWU members or who refused to agree with SAPVvrU 
ideas, that they would lose their jobs after SAPVvrU had been 
recognised. If these allegations were correct it was not in the interests 
of further good relations between SSMRI E/A and SAPWU nor was it 
in the interests of good industrial relations at the sugar milling 
companies involved. It was realised. that the two parties would have 
their differences. Employers were proceeding with discussions on 
recognition in good faith and sincerely hoped that they could continue 
to do so but if employees were being threatened as was alleged further 
negotiations could be seriously jeopardised. 
J Diamini (Chairman of SAPWU) said he would reply as he could see 
this referred to SAPWU officials at Mhlume. The Commissioner of Police had 
called him to Mbabane. He had assured the Commissioner of Police that there 
would be no strikes or threats or intimidation. He had assured him that it was 
his business as Chairman of SAPWU to ensure peace in the industry. He had 
subsequently also told this to the chief executive of Mhlume. He then went 
on to say that the allegations were completely untrue and unfounded. Persons 
who made such allegations were merely seeldng to curry favour with their own 
employeTs. The employers within the SSMRI E/A differed with regard to their 
attitude to SAPWU. Certain employers got pleasure when people reported lies 
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about SAPWU to therm 
At Mhlume the employers hated him personally and liked to hear 'bad 
allegations' against him This is why they believed these allegations. He said 
that he had never made any threats against any employee. He remembered 
well the advice that His Majesty the King had given- to employers and 
employees after the strikes and troubles at Big Bend in 1963. He was grateful 
that employers representatives had mentioned this matter in the presence of his 
colleagues. They could now go back and assure employees that SAPWU does 
not threaten employees. He said he was glad that this matter had been brought 
into the open. 
The employer representatives tated that it was good that an opportunity 
had been taken by both sides to 'clear the air'. No. further cor=ents were 
made nor conclusions reached at the meeting. 
9.1.2.2 22 August 1985 
A further meeting took place between the union and the employers on 
22 August 1985 to pursue the recognition agreement. 
The meeting clarified certain matters pertaining to the recognition 
agreement and to the proposed amendments to the constitution of the Joint 
Industrial Council particularly to that concerning those types of workers to be 
excluded from union membership, e. g. security force. A revised recognition 
agreement (see Appendix 23) was to be sent to SAPWU for the union to study 
and a request for a further meeting when convenient. The Employers 
Association notified the union in September that the further draft recognition 
agreement proposals would be sent when the employers had received legal 
advice (see Appendix 24). It was not apparent whether the union was also 
obtaining legal opinion. 
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Agreement was given by Simunye management to a request by union 
representatives for a rally meeting to be held at Simunye in order to pursue the 
establishment of a union branch. Draft copies of the proposed recognition 
agreement were sent to the General-Secretary SAPWU on 18 October 1985 
and another meeting was proposed for November. At this stage, there was 
reason to believe that considerable progress had been made towards 
establishing an acceptable recognition agreement. 
9.1.2.3 20 November 1985 
The next meeting took place in Mbabane on 20 November. At this 
meeting J Dlamini (to whom reference has been previously made) was present 
as were also two Special Branch police officers. Presumably to report on any 
possible political comment. After a delayed start, it was established that 
neither party had informed the police that a meeting had been convened; 
neither party had thought it necessary because it was a private not a public 
meeang. 
The General Secretary of SAPYvrU (J Sithole) confirmed that the 
executive members present were the authorised representatives of the union 
and could conduct business on behalf of the union. The SSMRI Employers' 
Associad6n representatives stated the purpose of the meeting to be discussion 
of the Employers' Draft Recognition Agreement' and Annexures. The union 
representatives charged, however, that: - 
(i) the draft Recognition Agreement available from the employers 
differed from that presented at the previous meeting; 
00 the employers had deliberately delayed recognition, by claiming 
absence of employer executives and by reference to lawyers; 
(iii) after the count had been finalised, the union should have been 
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accorded recognition and the Agreement negotiated afterwards; 
(iv) employers had not studied nor replied to the earlier union draft 
proposals. The union representatives were of the opinion that further 
discussions would be of no use and that the matter should be referred 
to the Industrial Court. 
The employer representatives concluded, privately, that the presence 
and influence of the Chairman of SAPWU, J Dlamini, caused the situation to 
deteriorate. 
In response to the employers' question as to whether or not the union 
were now refusing to discuss the employers' draft agreement, it was stated that 
the union should be recognised immediately and thereafter discussions on an 
agreement should take place. Employers' representatives pointed out that 
recognition was meaningless until the terms and conditions of recognition had 
been formally agreed. The union representatives stated that the pace of 
discussions was too slow and this was the fault of the employers, who had 
engaged in delaying tactics and had not amended the union draft as agreed. 
Employers' representatives replied that the best way to avoid delay was to 
pursue discussion on the draft employers' agreement which was based on 
previous discussions. 
The charge that the employers had not studied the union draft, was 
refuted. During discussion at the 22 August joint meeting, SAPWU objections 
to various clauses had been carefully noted and these had been incorporated 
in the employers' draft, where acceptable to employers. It had also been 
agreed on 22 August that the next meeting was for the purpose of considering 
the employers' amended draft. Further negotiation was now required to 
eliminate the matters of disagreement. Exclusions from union-membership 
were then raised by the union representatives who claimed that certain 
individuals who could be defined as 'staff' and whom they had included in the 
original count were now to be excluded. Ilis would affect the union 
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percentage, and also deprive the union of the leadership element necessary for 
its development. Employers' representatives stated that a reduction through 
exclusions would mean a reduction in eligible total labour complements. The 
one cancelled the other and it was considered that as exclusions could be 
contained in an annexure, progress could be made if discussion on the main 
agreement could be started. 
The union representatives stated that the prerequisites for a recount of 
union membership, before the signing of a recognition agreement was not 
acceptable to the union. Employers referred to the '3 month clause' and said 
I that because of the long period which had elapsed since the last count, it was 
essential to establish the present level of union membership. Ibe union 
officials contended that the required level of membership had already been 
I. established and repeated the viewpoint that recognition should have been 
granted at that time. Employers' representatives maintained that the simple 
fact that discussions were in progress meant that de facto recognition had been 
accorded; de jure could not be established until the agreement had been signed 
and a letter confirming the membership count at each company had been sent 
to SAPVM by SSMRI E/A. The negotiation on the Recognition Agreement 
itself had already taken II months; the reply by SAPWU representatives was 
that this type of delay was not a good way to commence the desired 
relationship between the two parties. 
After two adjournments for caucus discussion, the union representatives 
clearly stated that they saw no point in further discussion and that the matter 
would now be referred to the Industrial Court. SSMRI E/A representatives 
voiced regret at the union decision to refer to the Industrial Coum After a 
further adjournment at the union's request, the union representatives 
reaffirmed their decision to refer to the Industrial Court. And a second attempt 
to obtain recognition had failed! 
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9.1.2.4 Mediation 
On 10 December at the Labour Dept in Mbabane, the Labour 
Commissioner himself attempted to resolve the impasse which had arisen. 
There was charge and counter-charge, particularly concerning what employers 
perceived as the disruptive influence at the last joint meeting on 20 November, 
of the SAPWU Chairman. The Labour Commissioner finally obtained 
agreement that the union would respond in writing to an employers' letter of 
27 November, which followed the 20 November meeting (see Appexdix 25), 
which challenged the union legality. The union would confirm acceptance 
that: 
- 
negotiators would in future have a mandate to negotiate; 
the union executive would examine its constitution and ascertain 
whether it could be modified to satisfy the employers' reservations 
concerning sugar industry representation (viz Industry definition); a 
matter which the employers had considered and had obtained South 
African legal opinion upon it in May 1984 (see Appendix 24). 
a recount of union membership would take place before a 
recognition agreement was actually signed; 
the union would be prepared to negotiate in a spirit of 
reasonableness. 
The employer representatives confirmed that on receipt of a reply to 
their letter, the chief executives would decide whether or not to reopen 
negotiations towards the settling of a recognition agreement. This letter was 
sent by the Union on 27 December 1985 (see Appendix 26). (see also 
Appendix 27). 
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9.2 JOINT INDUSTRIAL COUNCIL 
From March 1983 discussion during the entire period of 
employer/union meetings (viz. almost 9 years) focused upon the JIC as a major 
contentious factor. At Simunye, management representatives spent one day 
during March 1983 explaining the proposed formation of the Joint Industrial 
Council and the required constitution to a combined meeting of all 63 works 
council representatives. It was emphasised many times by management 
representatives that whether works council representatives or trade union 
representatives acted on behalf of their colleagues, any negotiation would need 
to be on a formal basis within a formally constituted forum. That forum, by 
whatever name it was known, would effectively be a Joint Industrial Council. 
3 years later it was doubted that a similar consultation had taken place with 
works council representatives at Ubombo Ranches Limited. That is to say that 
either deliberately or by default, management there had failed to consult with 
workers 
-a prerequisite if the Council was to become effective. 
In spite of the fact that at Simunye and Mhlume such consultative 
meetings certainly did take place, the trade union officials continued to claim 
that no such consultations occurred and that the Joint Industrial Council 
- 
AJICI 
- 
was an employer body which was aimed at replacing a trade union and to 
frustrate the formation of a trade union. 
During the last month of 1983 a trade union meeting was held at 
Simunye, with the employers' permission on company premises. At that 
meeting the allegations against the employers were again voiced. Reference 
to a report (TOS 
-6 December 1983) shows that there was dissatisfaction over 
the appointment of the management financed Chairman who, because 4he. is 
not fully conversant with our problems 
.... 
cannot successfully [negotiate] any 
of our demands'. This was a misunderstanding and/or misrepresentation of the 
role of the Chairman, to illustrate the ineffectiveness and/or to discredit the 
establishment of a Joint Industrial Council. 
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Allegations were made that employees were threatened by management 
if they joined the Union, rather than support the Joint Industrial Council 
concept. No such allegation was ever pursued through the grievance 
procedures to the Industrial Court at any one of the three estates. An 
allegation was also made that the company at Simunye had imposed a further 
condition in addition to the legally required 40% of all employees as union 
members, to support the legal demand for recognition. This further condition 
[misunderstood or misrepresented] was seen as forcing a three months waiting 
period before any amendments to the JIC Constitution could be considered. 
This issue seems to have arisen from the fact that legally the 40% membership 
for recognition should be maintained. An employer can apply to the Court for 
withdrawal of recognition if the number of union members is less than 40% 
of the categorised labour force for three consecutive months (See 36(7) 
Industrial Relations Act). 
Objections were again raised by the Union (SAPWU 
- 
Letter 22 June 
1984) to the pursuance by employers with certain categories of workers within 
the JIC of negotiations for wages increases. It was understood that 'no 
negotiations 
.... 
will be carried on while the recognition matter is not through'. 
Negotiation within the Joint Industrial Council was rejected; 'all negotiation 
should be with the union, which should be recognised'. 
And a report in the press (TOS 25 June 1984) quoted remarks made at 
a union National Executive Meeting. Employers did not want to recognise the 
union. They had engaged in divide and rule tactics by seeking to promote a 
four worker category Joint Industrial Council and were playing for time. 
Reference was made to the Joint Industrial Council as an employer promoted 
body (SSMRI 
- 
Minutes 26 June 1984) during a joint employer/union meeting. 
The proposed appointment of an independent arbitrator, in the event of dispute 
was also rejected by the Union, as a further attempt by employers to maintain 
the council concept of an independent chairman. 
The union could not accept the proposal 'because there was no 
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provision for such an appointment in terms of the Industrial Relations Act'. 
The Act, however, does not prevent such an appointment. While the Code of 
Practice as such, is not mandatory, Sec 25 of the Code 
- 
(Industrial Relations 
Act) does provide for voluntary agreement based on mutual trust; it was that 
form of agreement which the employers (cynically) sought in the proposed 
appointment of an arbitrator. 
Almost one year later union rejection of the Joint Industrial Council 
was again a subject of disagreement (SSMRI Minutes - meeting 2 April 1985). 
While discussing the process of wages negotiations, employer representatives 
emphasised that the only forum for negotiations on wages, conditions of 
service and industry regulated attempts to resolve disputes was a Joint 
Industrial Council (JIC) Employers were aware that there had always been 
some opposition to the existing JIC and its constitution. 7bere was need for 
reaching agreement on a new constitution before any wages negotiations could 
take place but only after union recognition. The union chairman restated that 
his executive would never accept the existing JIC and they would propose their 
own negotiating constitution because the union had never been consulted on 
I the establishment of the JIC. 
As explained in Chapters 5 (see 2.4 Collective Organisations) and 
Chapter 7 (Section 1.2), employers had initiated a Joint Industrial Council to 
forward the implementation of the newly introduced industrial relations 
legislation. Initially based upon the existing works council structure, the 
constitution provided for amendment and adaptation in the event of 
unionisation. The JIC constitution was registered by the Labour Commissioner 
on 10 January 1983, almost five months before the union was registered. 
Tactical use of the existence of legal machinery by the employers -was 
certainly envisaged in dealing with the union, but the introduction of a Joint 
Industrial Council was a logical development, in itself. At no time did the 
union executive accept this argument. The forum for negotiation had still to 
be decided in mid 
- 
1993. 
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Employers were concerned that individual employer recognition would 
suggest negotiation on an individual basis. The employers' association would 
become defunct as a negotiation body; the union would have, to a great extent, 
destroyed the employers' solidarity. It follows that there would be no reason 
for the existence of a Joint Industrial Council as a negotiating forum. Unions 
could engage in leapfrogging strategies designed to establish a competitive 
situation between employers in wages bargaining. 
SAPVVrU strategy of attacldng the employers to force recognition 
involved the tactical discrediting of the Joint Industrial Council. Specifically 
those tactics may be surnmarised as allegations that: 
there was no consultation with union officials as distinct from 
works council representatives. Union officials claimed the exclusive 
right to represent workers. 
the structure of the JIC was specifically designed to promote 
divide and rule tactics by employers. 
an independent chairman could not/would not understand the 
problems of workers in the industry. 
there was no provision made in a JIC constitution for union 
participation in the deliberations and proceedings of such a council. 
These allegations have been separated for study purposes, as specific 
to the JIC, but it should be understood that frequent reference was made to 
them during the discussions between union and employer representatives 
concerning the recognition issue. 
9.3 DISPUTE SUMMARY 
- 
1984-1985. 
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After two attempts to gain recognition from the employers, the SAPW"U 
Executive had been unsuccessful. Although the Labour Commissioner in 
person had become involved in efforts to resolve the dispute and there was an 
ultimate referral of the dispute by union officials to the Industrial Court, at the 
end of 1985 no recognition agreement had been endorsed. 
The main matters of dispute remained, namely that the Recognition 
Process was jeopardised by the following sub-issues: - 
JIC- an employer promoted forum, perceived by union 
representatives as designed to replace the union, prevent union activity 
and part of divide and rule tactics to frustrate the solidarity of worker 
collectivisation, 
I 
Unconstitutional action by SAPWU, initially, through 
recognition demands from Branch instead of Executive Committee via 
the Union General Secretary. 
Verification of membership 'count' 
- 
rejection by SAPWU 
representatives of an FSE involvement in verification. 
Employers concern at the small number of sugar industry ' 
representatives in the SAPWU negotiating team. 
Independent Audit. Union rejection because such auditor(s) 
were not members of the industry and such an audit was unnecessary 
if both parties acted in good faith. 
Recognition on demand. Rejected by employers; the rules-of- 
the-game (Recognition Agreement) needed to be negotiated before 
according recognition. 
Union representatives were of the opinion that once registered 
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by the Labour Commissioner, a union could demand recognition before 
any further procedural action. 
Definition of Industry (see Appx 28) and consequently the 
legality of an industry union. Employers were of the opinion, rejected 
by union representatives, that the existing legislation was deficient in 
its broad definition of industry and thus enabled SAPWU to claim 
representation for other activities in addition to sugar manufacturing 
and refining. 
It should be noted however, that 1985 closed with both sides, once 
again, prepared to talk. The union continued with the employers' permission, 
to conduct educational training sessions for its officials on the employers' 
estates. There was no undertaldng by either to refrain from pursuing legal 
action against the other however and the recognition dispute remained. 
9.4 JOINT DISCUSSION 
- 
(THIRD ROUND 
- 
MARCH 1986 
- 
NOVEMBER 
1989) 
Between 7 March 1986 and 14 July 1987 eight further meetings 
occurred. Major specifics discussed were the employers' insistence on the 
change of the union constitution to reflect a sugar industry union 
- 
ultimately 
resolved through a clause in the Recognition Agreement itself endorsing the 
point, but without the need to alter the constitution. Employers were accused 
of attempting to fragment the union movement (SSMRI/SAPWU Minutes 
- 
19 
March 1986). The union rejected an attempt by employers to insist on secret 
ballots at union meetings as interference in union affairs (Minutes 
SSMRI. SAPWU 
- 
18 April 1986). The discussions became deadlocked over 
the legality of the union; (see Appendices. 24/28). Talks were revived through 
informal discussions between the respective parties' secretaries and the issue 
was shelved in order not to further delay the process of recognition. Concern 
was expressed by both management and union representatives over picketing, 
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exclusion of essential services employees, in particular security personnel, 
negotiable as distinct from non-negotiable matters (e. g. medical, safety, 
training) and union representatives continued to reject the Joint Industdal 
Council., 
However, between mid-1986 and December of that year, the 
disagreement within the union manifested itself further. In November, the 
SFIU suspended the union (SAPWU) for non-payment of dues (SFrU letter 
- 
17 November 1986). While SAPW`U continued to function, attempts io 
remove the militant Chairman, Mr J Dlamini, finally succeeded in May 1987. 
On 14 July 1987 (SSMRI minutes) the Secretary-General of the union, Mr J 
Sithole, with a small negotiating team and the employers' representatives, 
finalised. a Recognition Agreement based on the employers' revised draft 
(Appendix 23) subject to the re-establishment of effective union branch 
committees at Mhlume and Simunye and a recount of union members. 
On 3 November 1987, at the verbal request of existing works councils, 
the Joint Industrial Council was revived and 1988,1989,1990 and 1991 
Wages Reviews were subsequently successfully negotiated. 
No further formal communication was received by the employers from 
the union until August 1988, when notification was given of attempts to 
comply with the undertaldngs given in July 1987. Again, no further 
communication was made until November 1989. 
In November 1989, SAPWU instituted a dispute against Ubombo 
Ranches for failure to recognise the Union. 11is dispute rejected initially (for 
a technical documentation infringement), by the Industrial Court, was reported 
again in January 199 1. This case was finally heard and judgement given at the 
beginning of May 1992. 
In the meantime the JIC continued to function and negotiations for 
annual wages reviews pursued. It is of note, however, that the Labour 
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Commissioner, in a rare attempt to give direction to the parties, rebuked the 
employers as early as 1986 (Labour Commissioner letter 10 July 1986) for 
their failure to recognise SAPWU. The employers rejected the argument on 
the grounds that the process of recognition sought to resolve outstanding issues 
(SSMRI 
- 
letter 30 July 1986). Once these issues were finalised, recognition 
would be established. 
From November 1989 until November 1991 no formal employer/union 
contact occurred. 
9.5 STRIKE ACTION 
- 
RSSC 
- 
SIMUNYE STRIKE REPORT 
9.5.1 Strike Summary 
(i) On 28 November 1991 the Royal Swaziland Sugar Corporation 
Simunye Estate received a new application from the Swaziland 
Agriculture and Plantations Workers' Union requesting Simunye to 
recognise this union as an exclusive collective bargaining body 
representing 01 employees excluding Staff as defined by the Industrial 
Relations Act of 1980. The SSMRI Employers' Association, on behalf 
of RSSC Simunye, invited the union executive to a meeting. The 
union did not respond to the association, but declared a dispute to the 
Labour Commissioner on the grounds that the employer (as distinct 
from the SSMRI Employers' Association) had failed to respond to the 
union. On 25 April 1992 the Union served the Corporation at Simunye 
with notice of a strike which was to commence on 12 May 1992. 
(ii) At a conciliation meeting on 27 April 1992 it was agreed by 
both parties (the Union and Employer) that Simunye would respond 
after the Industrial Court judgement of the case concerning union 
recognition between Ubombo, Ranches and Swaziland Agriculture and 
Plantations Workers' Union which had been pending since January 
1991. This was to have been done on 5 May 1992. 
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a, 
The court judgement in this case gave guidelines on the issues 
of recognition and stated that an application for union recognition must 
specify exactly those categories of employees which a union wished to 
represent. Simunye management asked SAPVM to submit a new 
application detailing the categories it wanted to represent; the original 
application did not specify any categories. The union did so on 6 May 
1992 and specified the following categories of employee. 
- 
Agricultural Daily Paid 
- 
Industrial Hourly Paid 
- 
Hourly Paid Artisans 
- 
Seasonal Workers 
Monthly Paid excluding "staff' 
Casuals 
The two parties entered into negotiations on 11 May 1992 and 
the company granted SAPWU recognition in principle, on condition 
that it obtained 'an overall 40% paid-up membership in respect of the 
categories of the employees specified in the amended application of 6 
May 1992 (40% is stipulated by the Industrial Relations Act as the 
minimum required for a union to demand recognition). Ile initial 
strike notice (25 April 1992) was then verbally withdrawn by the 
union. Both the Union executive and the Corporation management 
started the count of membership together on 12 May 1992 and 
completed it at 1300 hours on 13 May 1992. The count revealed that 
the union had only 35.4% paid-up membership for the categories it 
claimed to represent as at end of February 1992. As a result of the 
35.4% count the Corporation management withdrew recognition which 
was granted in principle on 11 May 1992. Ile Union representatives 
then demanded that 'seasonal workers' be excluded from the count and 
again demanded recognition. 
(iv) At this stage, 13 May 1992 at about 17.30 hours, it was agreed 
to resume negotiations at 08.30 hours on 14 May 1992 when an answer 
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to the above demand would be given by management. While he did 
not disclose the fact to the union representatives the management 
negotiator (the author) had previously recommended to management 
that recognition should be granted on the basis of 331/3. He did not 
have an authorization to grant this but felt sure that overnight he could 
persuade Simunye management to agree. 
At the same time the Union served the company with verbal 
notice as a continuation of the original strike notice of 25 April, to 
commence noon on 14 May 1992 if management's response was 
negative. However during the evening of 13 May 1992, at 2300 hours, 
the Union served the General Manager with yet another continuation 
notice of strike to commence at 0600 hours on 14 May 1992. This 
notice was contrary to the verbal agreement reached by both parties at 
17.30 hours 
- 
13 May. A strike of virtually all employees did then 
actually commence at 0600 hours on 14 May 1992. Even though the 
strike was in progress (14 May 1992) the Company management 
responded to the Union and expressed its desire to continue 
negotiations provided the Union executive cancelled the strike and 
submitted a new application detailing the amended categories of 
employees the Union really sought to represent. 
The strike extended from 0600 hours 14 May until 1800 hours 
19 May. 
(V) By the fifth day intelligence reports indicated that a highly 
volatile and potentially violent situation was developing among striking 
workers. - It was essential if danger was to be avoided that the strike 
should be terminated. The strike termination was secured through 
private prayer and a proposal by the author (at that time employed as 
I. R. Consultant/management negotiator) that because it was important 
for future relations for both parties to maintain their credibility then: 
- 
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the strike notice should be withdrawn simultaneously 
with the commencement of a recount of union membership, 
extracting seasonal workers. 
In practice, only a count of seasonal workers was done, as at 19 
May, thus excluding a sufficient number to adjust totals so that the 
membership number of the legal 40% was achieved. A double check 
ensured 'fully paid-up' membership for categories included in the count 
- 
in many cases several months in advance. 
(vi) Although the strike occurred before a full contingency plan was 
available, management: 
maintained contact with the union via the management 
negotiator. 
conducted an information/briefing session each morning. 
Those attending were: 
- 
General Manager, IR Staff, Communications Officer, 
Divisional and Departmental Managers as available. 
maintained contact with each other, particularly the 
General Manager, IR Consultant and Divisional/Departmental 
Managers and Communications Officer. 
regularly issued management briefs on the situation via 
radio, press, television and on the first day an air-drop on the 
company townships of a management explanatory pamphlet. 
The IR Consultant (management negotiator), General Manager 
and Communications officer (a Swazi national) received telephone 
death threats at home frequently and two other mangers received one 
phone caH each towards the end and after the strike. Telephones of 
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those affected were 'unplugged' during the late night hours. Written 
abusive, anonymous letters and telephone death threats were received 
at work by the Communications Officer. 
Intelligence sources reported a heavy degree of intimidation 
during the strike period for seasonal workers to join the Union. 
Although excluded from the strike notice (and the amended 
membership count), seasonal workers did participate in the strike. 
Verbal abuse and indirect intimidation was also directed at those very 
few Swazi nationals employed who did report for wo& Essential 
services continued to operate during the strike, as required by law. 
There was no actual violence. At management's request the 
Royal Swaziland Police, while on standby in forcq, kept at a distance 
with a low profile and operated plain clothes patrols except for a 
uniformed officer during the night both at the IR consultant and 
General Manager's houses. A mobile patrol toured the manager 
housing areas during the night, about every two hours. 
Although Labour Department officials were present from the start of 
the strike, one clearly identified with the Union; the other more senior, 
who attended meetings from the fifth day, made little or no 
contribution to mediation and served only to endorse the final count. 
9.5.2 Strike Analysis 
(i) The author of this thesis, as Industrial Relations Consultant, had 
anticipated the 'new' request for union recognition some months before 
it was received. Given that categorization of employees was clear, he 
was sure that the required 40% membership would be achieved. But 
recommended recognition be granted on the basis of 331A, if that was 
the level of union membership. 
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He identified potential problems as indicators and triggers of 
strike action as the productivity improvement programme currently 
being pursued in the company, and designation of junior management 
as 'staff' during negotiations for a recognition agreement. Both items 
were seen as potential strike issues following on a recognition count 
- 
it was NOT anticipated that a strike would occur over recognition 
itself, because management was receptive to unionisation provided the 
required membership was adequate. 
(ii) Consideration of an 'Industrial Action Contingency Plan' as part 
of overall Industrial Relations strategy was already in preparation by 
the company managers. The miscalculation of the timing of a strike 
meant that the company's plan was NOT ready and thus a reactive 
approach to events as they occurred became necessary. 
The author had informed management that he was aware that 
the union was seeking to increase its power-base at Simunye and also 
wished to enhance the public profile of the Union Executive via the 
strike action prior to the ]LO Conference in Geneva in June 1992. The 
certainty of a strike had been anticipated 
- 
the timing was misjudged. 
It was seen as a strategic strike by management, in so far as the Union 
Executive wished to publicly demonstrate its worker control and power. 
This was confirmed to the author by a member of the Union Executive 
after the strike. This person stated that the Union Executive in 1992 
first sought recognition from RSSC Simunye. It was seen as having 
a progressive and liberal management which would grant recognition 
immediately or would quickly 'cave-in' under threat of a strike. Either 
situation would have scored a plus, for the Union Executive. 
In the event, the executive did not expect that Simunye 
management would accept a strike situation at the commencement of 
the sugar harvesting season, if at all, and thus underestimated the 
pegotiating strength of will of the IR consultant and the management. 
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The following important considerations arose: 
- 
Public Relations 
- 
it was necessary to have available a 
PR specialist with access to press, radio, TV contacts. In fact 
Simunye already had a Communications Officer whose 
appointment was more than justified by the actions taken to 
keep the public informed. 
Communications 
-a major problem was to get 
management's perspective across. An 'air-drop' of pamphlets 
was done on the township but the use of posted letters was not 
practicable in rural circumstances. A loud-hailer - or more than 
one might have been used. 
Attempts were made by union activists to inveigle 
management into addressing mass meetings. In the 
circumstances it would have been totally useless. Management 
would have been vilified and it was highly dangerous to 
managers' personal safety. 
The local estate security force was of little use in either 
communicating or disseminating information. The information 
network established by the author during the mid 198Qs had 
become non-existent, with the change to local (Swazi) 
management at the end of 1989. Regular daily information 
meetings were held among senior managers. 
(iv) Negotiations with the union. For the first 3 days of the 
strike, negotiation was left to the IR Consultant and his 
assistants. This action resulted in a dangerous situation for 
these officials and their families, as being isolated as the 
enemies of the union and work-force. 
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The IR Consultant was targeted. It should be 
remembered that violence was common-place in Southern 
Africa at this time. 
A second issue was the possible erosion of the line 
management power-base, when work resumed. 
This second situation was corrected during the last two 
days of the strike, by including a senior manager in the 
management negotiation team. 
(v) Payment during strike 'No work 
- 
no pay' was strictly 
enforced and as far as was possible this was regularly 
announced. Attempts were made by union representatives to 
negotiate payment as part of the strike settlement but they were 
unsuccessful. By adhering to the no work 
- 
no pay tactic, 
management ensured that the costs of loss of sugar production, 
due to the strike, were largely off-set by the savings from 
labour-costs (wages). 
Rations were issued, but a management decision was 
taken to discontinue if the strike extended into the seventh day. 
Two reasons determined this action: 
- 
a) Humanitarian 
- 
worker families were resident at 
I 
Simunye. 
b) Administrative procedures would take time to 
change. 
Simultaneously with the Simunye strike situation, SAPWU 
Executive again sought recognition from the management of Ubombo, 
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Ranches Ltd following the industrial court judgement referred to in 
Para. 3.1.2 above. This company management, cognisant of the 
possibility of a strike, quickly organised a count of union membership. 
As was expected by IR observers, an extremely high membership was 
recorded (95% of the work force). Recognition of the union was 
accepted. Shortly afterwards, recognition was also accorded by 
Mhlume Sugar Company Ltd. 
The Union Executive then proceeded with negotiations for 
individual company recognition and collective ageements. An issue 
which had worried the employers as far back as the beginning of 1983 
and which was considered in comment upon the Joint Industrial 
Council (see this chapter sec. 4). As at mid 
- 
1993 not one agreement 
had been finalised. 
9.6 RECOMMENDATIONS OF GENERAL MEREST TO EMPLOYERS 
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
- 
STRIKE CONSIDERATIONS 
Appoint a Strike Action Team (SAT) to implement a strike 
contingency plan arising from a properly conceived industrial relations 
strategy. Ensure that a labour lawyer oi IR consultant is quickly 
available. It is necessary to distinguish between legal and illegal 
actions by workforce and management. At Simunye, the union's 
actions were recognised as legal by the IR consultant and confirmation 
was obtained from the company's attorneys. 
(ii) Appoint a management negotiating team for on-going 
union/management relationships, where a union has, or is about to be 
recognised. This team could be two or three people from SAT. 
(iii) Do not rely on verbal agreements with a union particularly 
during a strike 
- 
get any agreed action in writing and signed. 
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(iV) Develop, as part of a Corporate Strategic Plan, for all aspects 
of long-term viability, a Human Resources Strategy, and avoid the 
common idealist (viz. 'unitarist') approach to industrial relations; that 
of 'why can't we all be one big happy family because we all work for 
the same company'! 
(V) Recognise that industrial relations conflict <-> power <-> 
manipulation. What is required is a specific strategy developed for a 
specific organisation to minimise, conflict-generating situations and 
maximise (for management) power manipulation. It is also necessary 
to ensure management development and training in the tactical s1dlls 
necessary to implement strategy. 
9.7 CONCLUSION 
Government sought to modernise labour legislation in Swaziland by 
enacting IJ,. O. drafted law operative from mid - 1982. The first attempt to 
obtain recognition from employers as the collective bargaining agent for 
workers in Swaziland's major industry was made by union representatives of 
SAPWU in March 1984. Ten years after the legislation became available and 
eight years after the first attempt, the union executive finally succeeded. An 
outcome which was inevitable from the start. 
Chapters 8 and 9 have recorded the constant argument and counter 
argument over major issues, which occurred between the major protagonists. 
The question may be asked as to why it took so long to formally establish a 
relationship which is essential to the continuing orderly processing of conflict 
generating issues between employers and workers. This and other relevant 
issues pertaining to industrial conflict situations are explored in the concluding 
chapter. 
Division and conflict, however, were not only between union and 
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employers, but also intra-union and intra-employers. Both aspects are 
considered in the next chapter. 
ENDNOTES 
See letter 
- 
Executive Director 
- 
FSE to SSMRI E\A (4 November 1985 
- 
commenting on the Draft 
- 
Appx 6) 
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CHAPTER 10 CONTINUING DIVISION AND CONFLICT 
10.1 INTER-UNION CONFLICT 
It is important for an understanding of what follows to have studied the 
Union's own version of Swaziland 
-trade union development and to have 
recognised Union commitment to the paramount concept of unity (see 
Appendix 4). Disagreement in caucus is inevitable from time to time. 
Disunity in public negates the basic philosophy of trade unionism. 
The revival of the trade union movement in Swaziland, following the 
King's suspension of the Westminster type constitution (1973), was slow to 
develop. It will be recalled from Part H that effective labour legislation to 
promote trade unions was not promulgated until 1980 and did not become 
operative until the latter part of 1982. Nevertheless, the protracted negotiations 
between the Sugar Manufacturing and Refining Industry Employers' 
Association and the Swaziland Agricultural and Plantation Workers' Union 
commenced as early as 1983. The apparent speed with which the Union 
established itself so soon after the legal right to do so augured well for an 
effective relationship with employers. This did not happen. 
During 1984 and 1985 the employers became aware via their own 
intelligence activities and also via common knowledge that differences between 
the Chairman of the Union and the General Secretary were affecting 
negotiations. The employers did not know which' union officials had a 
mandate to negotiate. On 27 November 1985 (SSMRI Letter) clarification was 
sought. The Union confirmed (SAPWU Letter) a month later that the National 
Executive committee would negotiate in total and had a mandate from the 
union members to pursue the recognition issue to the Industrial Court, if 
necessary. In January 1986 the Union decided (SAPWU letter) that its full 
national executive was too large a body for negotiating and reduced its 
negotiators to four people. The Vice-Chairman and General Secretary were 
included in the team: the Chairman was not. While the General Secretary of 
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the Union was out of Swaziland on union business the Chairman initiated the 
establishment of a branch committee at the Simunye Sugar Estate (July 1986) 
to which were elected his brother and a number of his own adherents 
(SAPWU letter). In November 1986 the union (SAPWU) was suspended from 
the Swaziland Federation of Trade, Unions for failure to pay subscriptions 
(SFTU letter)t. By January 1987 the intra-union disagreement had become 
public. The Chairman, MIr J Dlamini, complained in an interview that union 
members were 'losing hope' that the recognition would ever be obtained. 
...... the problems are within the union itself. and the employers have 
effectively utilised the union's internal problems.... ' (Swaziland Herald: 
January 9: 1987) 
The problems were with the leaders of the union who were not 'honest 
enough' to gain the confidence and support of the members and some of 
whom 'misuse funds and others do not behave well'. Mr Dlamini also 
condemned a joint statement of intent issued by the Swaziland Federation of 
Trade Unions and signed by its Secretary-General and the Federation of 
Employers, claiming that the Trade Union Federation had no mandate to agree 
to such action. 
The seriousness of union disunity caused the Labour Commissioner to 
question both the administration and electoral procedures of trade unions and 
in particular the Agricultural, and Plantation Workers Union (Labour 
Commissioner minutes :3 March 1987). He noted that among the national 
executive of the union recently re-elected, were two people, one of whom was 
Mr J. Dlamini, the Chairman, who were no longer employed in the industry. 
He rejected the union's contention that this was legal and was 'disappointcd' 
that the union had said it would contest the issue, if necessary, in the Industrial 
Court. The union General-Secretary agreed that the Commissioner was 
correct. 
Refeffing to annual returns to his depariment by unions, the 
Commissioner was of the opinion that 'Unions were maldng a mockery of the 
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law' and he had instructed the Senior Labour Officer to seek deregistration, 
through the Industrial Court of those unions which failed to comply. The 
Agricultural and Plantation Workers' Union was thus affected by the 
Commissioner's directive. 
Continuing to maintain his position as Chairman of the union, Mr 
Dlamini responded to an official request to the union, by the employers 
(SSMRI 9 Feb 1987) seeldng clarification, once again, of the names of the 
union officials who could negotiate with employers, by naming himself as 
'Chairman-General' and indicating the names of his close adherents as 
executive members at the three sugar estates (SAPWU 16 March 1987). This 
information was refuted by Mr Sithole, the Secretary-General as 'it has and 
had no blessing of execuiive'. (letter SAPWU 21 March 1987). Mr Sithole 
however confirmed all of the names one week later (SAPW letter 27 March 
1987). This letter was not on the official union letterhead and the Employers' 
Association suspected that the Secretary-General's signature might not be 
genuine. 
At the end of 1987, with the employers still unaware of who were 
official union leaders and still concerned at the internal union strife, the 
'illegal' chairman accused the Labour Commissioner of conniving with 
management at the sugar estates to frustrate union recognition (Swazi Observer 
- 
19 December 1987). Mr Bhembe (Labour Commissioner) in a press 
statement (TOS 30 March 1988) castigated Dlamini for his incompctqncc and 
intimidatory actions during the period 1983-87; if he had been intelligent 
enough, he would have realised that the task was far beyond reach of his 
intellectual capacity' and would have given way 'to those capable'. Mr 
Bhembe was clearly of the opinion that it was mainly Mr Dlamini's 
ineffectiveness and the internal union disagreements, which had prevented the 
Swaziland Agricultural and Plantation -Workers' Union from obtaining 
recognition from the Sugar Manufacturing and Refining Industry Employers 
Association. 
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In August 1987 (TOS August 28), the Labour Commissioner had 
already warned all union executives and rank and file members to refrain 
from the practice of engaging in a scramble for power. Changes should be 
sought through constitutional means; intimidatory tactics should never be used. 
During 1988, Mr Dlamini was removed from his appointment by the union. 
SAPWU had still not been recognised by SSMRI by January 1992 and had 
still not complied with a 1987 Industrial Court Order to report satisfactorily 
on its financial affairs. The Court had however, taken no action to enforce the 
order. 
An independent industrial relations observer in Swaziland in February 
1988 pointed out that the unsatisfactory answers given to questions on union 
administration and the misuse of union monies 'did nothing to promote 
confidence in the concept of trade unionism; workers could become 
disenchanted; trade unions are a relatively new concept in Swaziland; they 
cannot afford these sort of goings-on before they have firmly established 
themselves'. (TOS, 19 February 1988). 
10.2 INTER-EMPLOYER CONFLICT 
Throughout the protracted negotiations between the employers and the 
union, there had been considerable disagreement both within the management 
hierarchy of the individual companies and between the companies themselves 
over the approach to the recognition of trade unions. At the end of 1985, 
employer representatives were resigned to a lengthy attempt to persuade union 
officials that an agreement specific to the Sugar Manufacturing and Refining 
Industry itself was desirable. The employers' principals, mainly concerned 
with employer unity, were prone to follow the lead of Ubombo Ranches Ltd 
management which perceived unions as disruptive in essence and the longer 
recognition could be delayed the more chance that lobbying might result in 
unions being banned. Failing this, prolonged discussions might cause 
disaffection among union members and the union disintegrate for lack of 
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support! 
From the workers' viewpoint, there were certainly verbal indications 
of dissatisfaction with the lack of union success in obtaining recognition but 
it did not manifest itself as anti-SAPWU at that stage. It had not yet assumed 
sufficient shape for a wish to negotiate outside of union ranks. 71at came two 
years later. During this period further joint discussions took place specific to 
the recognition agreement itself and to the attempt to establish a union 
exclusively for the industry. 
It will have become apparent from the preceding chapter that even 
allowing for the degree of unity shown by employers when meeting with the 
union, differences existed within the Employers' Association relating to union 
recognition and to employer/collective employee relationships. Ilese 
differences described in this chapter arose from a fundamental difference in 
philosophy. Some consideration of the theories is appropriate at this point. 
10.2.1 Philosophy 
Industrial Relations may be viewed as a variable in the socio political 
system, e. g. as a dynamic component of a political conflict system or as a 
'broad area of contemporary study in industrial sociology. the nature of 
conflict and bargaining procedures and the growth of trade unions'. The 
approaches of the classical theorists (Marx, Weber and Durkheim) focus upon 
the impact of 'industrial structures and processes' in the development and 
form of society in total (Parker 1975 : 17). 
Marx saw the crucial issues as centering upon the ownership of the 
means of production. The differentiation of societal classes according to 
property ownership giving rise to the opportunity for the exploitation of the 
lesser advantaged by the more advantaged and resu 
, 
Iting in perpetual conflict 
which could only be resolved through revolution. 
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Weber interpreted society on a somewhat wider basis. Interest groups 
developed for other reasons in addition to property ownership. He also saw 
industrial society as more than typifying 'the history of all societies' (Parker 
et al 1975 : 16). Capitalism, the basis for an industrial society was a different 
society from those of the past. The uniqueness of capitalism lies in the 
development of ; science-rational thought and in bureaucracy 
- 
rational 
organisational; which could lead to loss of personal freedom and to 
disenchantinent. 
Durkheim's analysis considered that as society (population) increase in 
numbers and density then the sources of consensus are important. These 
sources are legal and moral frameworks and differing reference groups 
resulting in anomie and societal disorganisation because of an abnormal form 
of the division of labour. 
In establishing an organisation industrial relations philosophy, there is 
need to recognise the concerns of these classicists and consider what Bums 
(Parker 1975 : 17) outlines as: 
- 
(i) The impact on professional and black-coated workers of 
bureaucratization. 
(ii) The complexity of the work place as a socio-technical system. 
(iii) The contrast between the mainly informal work groups and 
managpment. 
(iv) Trade Unions and the nature of conflict and bargaining 
procedures. 
(v) The impact of industrMsation on the individual. 
Such concems are important in a developed industrial society but in a 
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developing society items (ii) to (v) are particularly important and require in- 
depthstudy of their impact. Noting that 'The power context is set early 
.... 
in 
economic.. development 
...... 
and is much influenced by the industrýsing 
elite', it becomes clear that 'an industrial relations system creates an ideology 
(philosophy) or a commonly shared body of ideas and beliefs regarding the 
interaction and roles of the actors..... ' (Dunlop John 1958 : 383). And it is 
within this area of inter-management, inter-company interaction that 
difficulties are experienced. It is essential that collective employer (and 
employee) organisations are clear what that 'commonly shared body of ideas 
and beliefs' really is. Are their individual 'ideas and beliefs' commonly 
shared? 
10.2.2 SSMRI E. A. Approach 
In the case of Simunye there was the need to ensure that industrial 
relations philosophy was consistent with and supportive of the corporate aim 
as outlined in the corporation's annually reviewed and produced corporate 
plan. 
'the image of the undertalcing is maintained as a progressive and caring 
employer 
.... 
' and in line with the corporate objective for industrial relations: 
'To achieve stable industrial relations within the Corporation by: 
pursuing a policy of constructive negotiation for labour relations 
within the Corporation, industry and national industrial relations 
structures; 
upgrading the industrial relations skills of staff'. 
Simplistically (but practically) the theorists, concepts pose alternative 
assessments of what labour relations is all about. Bums synthesis of classicist 
thought suggests two major concerns: 
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the impact of industrialisation widi its attendant bureaucracy 
and hierarchical organisation structures; 
I 
the nature of conflict, formal versus informal groups and the 
dichotomy between collective employer and employee perceptions. 
(Parker 1975 : 17) 
Both concerns exist within a technical/social dichotomy itself 
- 
the 
socio-technical sub-system 
The point for discussion is that the whole industrial/labour relations 
system is one of constant contradictions viz: 
- 
Oreanisation v Individual freedom, Gw 
Regimented Groups v Personal Choice Groups 
Relatively 
- 
affluent v Relatively less affluent group perceptions 
Numerate logic v Emotional needs satisfaction. 
Technical requirement v Social demands 
These contradictions become acute in developing countries where there 
is expatriate employer management and indigenous worker-collectives. The 
difficulty for the maintenance of stable industrial relations is that of developing 
continuing collaborative processes and that establishes the first rMjor 
consideration for industrial relations in Swaziland. Were the employers 
prepared to coUaborate with the union, which is not the same as accepting 
compromise when forced to do so. 17hat inevitably leads to a fighting retreat 
and that is what they had been doing as an employers association in all of their 
dealings with the work force. They were 'forced' to accept- 
worker collective representation 
negotiation and collective bargaining 
industrial relations legislation 
an Industrial Court, and 
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increasingly more onerous wages demands. 
As employers they did not consciously and willingly develop their own 
collaborative situation between the technical requirements of business and the 
human desire for personal choice. In difficult situations they used the tools of 
technocracy to defend themselves against the demands of popular democracy. 
In industrial relations terminology, the employers followed a unitarist 
rather than a pluralist approach, still thinIdng that employers/managers hould 
make all the decisions and make continuing last-ditch stands to defend this 
position rather than a more positive collaborative style. 
If Simunye was to be in accord with its corporate aims and objectives 
it needed to develop meaningful participative management. Conflict is 
inherent in the industrial relations sub-system. The need is to minimise and 
deal collaboratively with conflict situations. 
10.23 The Practical Issues 
Since December 1982 and the formation of a Joint Industrial Council 
a series of issues illustrated the basic differences in industrial relations 
philosophy among the employers. The first major difference was in terms of 
the Constitution for the Joint Industrial Council. It was the Simunye 
management viewpoint that the real purpose of a Joint Industrial Council was 
to regulate the industrial relations within an industry itselL Thus to avoid as 
much as possible the need to involve government officials and recourse to 
legal machinery and the Industrial Court, to resolve individual and collective 
disputes. Those who work within an industry are best able to understand the 
problems and peculiarities of that industry. Although the definition of a Joint 
Industrial Council (Industrial Relations Act (1980) of Swaziland) refers to 
negotiation of wages and conditions of service, the Code of Practice which is 
an Appendix to the Act (Sec, 42 (e)) refers to 'independent conciliation' if 
necessary to resolve a dispute. 
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Ubombo Ranches Linýdted management, in particular and Mhlume 
management, only to a slightly lesser extent, believed (and still did in 1992) 
that joint employer and employee representatives from two of the companies 
should not be permitted to recommend action to resolve an individual 
disciplinary dispute from the third company once the Chief Executive of that 
company had made a decision. In 1982 Simunye management reluctantly 
agreed to this condition in order to promote the formation of the Joint 
Industrial Council. Ile belief of Simunye executive was that, given an 
effective council, then in the event that a dispute was reported to the Labour 
Commissioner and reached the Industrial Court as unresolved, it would 
automatically be referred back by the court to the Joint Industrial Council 
because it had not already been actioned by that body (Industrial Relations Act 
Sec 52 (c)). 
Much of this was again emphasised by the Simunye personnel 
executive in an aide-memoir to his own Chief Executive, in June 1985. At 
that stage it had become apparent that if a union recognition agreement was 
to be finalised then some amendments would become necessary to the existing 
employer formulated and promoted Joint Industrial Council Constitution. in 
practice, Simunye management subscribed to the interpretation of an industrial 
council's functions, not only for negotiating wages and conditions of service 
but also institutionalizing a body for regulating all labour/management affairs. 
Management of the other two member companies reluctantly accepted the legal 
requirement for wages and conditions of service negotiation but adhered only 
to the discussion concept for other labour relations matters. This represented 
a fundamental difference in labour relations philosophy. This difference had 
continuously emerged since 1982 such that the co-operative attempt by the 
Employers Association to maintain dialogue with a union had frequently been 
jeopardised. 
In January 1983, in discussions with the Labour Commissioner, 
-Ubombo Ranches management insisted upon 
-the legal requirements and 
interpretation for a sugar industry union as compared with the national 
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Ubombo Ranches Limited management, in particular and Mhlume 
management, only to a slightly lesser extent, believed (and still did in 1992) 
that joint employer and employee representatives from two of the companies 
should not be permitted to recommend action to resolve an individual 
disciplinary dispute from the third company once the Chief Executive of that 
company had made a decision. In 1982 Simunye management reluctantly 
agreed to this condition in order to promote the formation of the Joint 
Industrial Council. 
- 
The belief of Simunye executive was that, given an 
effective council, then in the event that a dispute was reported to the Labour 
Commissioner and reached the Industrial Court as unresolved, it would 
automatically be referred back by the court to the Joint Industrial Council 
because it had not already been actioned by that body (Industrial Relations Act 
Sec 52 (c)). 
Much of this was again emphasised by the Simunye personnel 
executive in an aide-memoir to his own Chief Executive, in June 1985. At 
that stage it had become apparent that if a union recognition agreement was 
to be finalised then some amendments would become necessary to the existing 
employer formulated and promoted Joint Industrial Council Constitution. In 
practice, Simunye management subscribed to the interpretation of an industrial 
council's functions, not only for negotiating wages and conditions of service 
but also institutionalizing a body for regulating all labour/management affairs. 
Management of the other two member companies reluctantly accepted the legal 
requirement for wages and conditions of service negotiation but adhered only 
to the discussion concept for other labour relations matters. This represented 
a fundamental difference in labour relations philosophy. This difference had 
continuously emerged since 1982 such that the co-operative attempt by the 
Employers Association to maintain dialogue with a union had frequently been 
jeopardised. 
In January 1983, in discussions with the Labour Commissioner, 
-Ubombo Ranches management insisted upon 
-the legal requirements and 
interpretation for a sugar industry union as compared with the national 
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Agricultural and Plantation Workers' Union. At that time also the same 
management, (claiming high-level confidential information) urged a policy of 
blocking unions because 'they were about to be banned anyway'. During the 
early part of 1983, there appeared to. be little attempt at Ubombo Ranches to 
communicate with the work force concerning the need for, and formation of 
a Joint Industrial Council. 
In response to a union questionnaire on whether employers would 
provide transport on the estates for workers to attend a mass union meeting, 
Mhlume management refused to assist. And in June 1983 discussions within 
the Employers' Association revealed that there still existed among senior 
managers at Mhlume and Ubombo Ranches Limited, a belief that unions would 
be banned or they would collapse and that in any event they were led by 
Communist orientated and militant officials. While the personnel executive at 
Simunye in his capacity as Secretary of the Employers' Association urged the 
need to maintain union/management dialogue, a position paper on this subject 
was never considered by the Association. This indicated a lack of interest (by 
two of the 3 member companies) in any collaboration with the union. 
Certainly at policy and interpretation levels, Simunye management actively 
issued instructions to facilitate the release from work of union officials, to 
attend meetings, but there was insistence at both other companies on the 
formal need for departmental managers' permission, which was frequently 
refused by anti-union line managers. In any attempt to formalise a union 
recognition agreement he Ubombo Ranches management insisted upon the use 
of the term 'Union Representatives' in place of the universally accepted 'Shop 
Steward'. That term implied 'traditional' unions' which were not required in 
Swaziland! 
In June 1984, a request at Ubombo Ranches Limited for union 
meetings on the company estate was refused, for the somewhat transparent 
excuse, that because the union had not yet been recognised, such meetings 
would cause confusion among workers vis-a-vis the existing works councils 
role. A cautious approach was again urged in October of the same year 
221 
towards union relationships because there was the possibility, (according to 
Ubombo Ranches intelligence) that pending legislative changes could result in 
the banning of trade unions. This comment was followed in January 1985 by 
a meeting (at Ubombo Ranches management request) between the personnel 
executive of that company and the Labour Commissioner. The purpose was 
never revealed to the other members of the Employers' Association. A month 
later, at the insistence of Ubombo Ranches management a union demand for 
recognition was rejected because of pending legislative changes rather than for 
the obvious reason that the union had not met the legal requirement to demand 
recognition by achieving the 40% employee membership. 
It was Ubornbo, Ranches Limited management which wished to pursue 
the attempt to establish the 'illegality' of the union because of the questionable 
industry definition in the Industrial Relations Act. Ile same company 
management in November 1985 insisted that recognition at each company was 
the prerogative of the Chief Executive of that company and was not a case for 
recognition through the Joint Industrial Council. 
During 1986, the management of Ubombo Ranches Limited continued 
to indicate that Government should act against unions. Through a last-minute 
attempt to introduce a highly contentious merit-rating requirement, it was this 
(Lonrho) company which almost destroyed the 1987 Wages Agreement with 
the existing workers representatives at the Joint Industrial Council. In 1988, 
during that year's wages negotiations the introduction of a contentious last 
minute attempt to separate agreements for Daily Rated employees from other 
categories almost caused a workers' representatives walk-out. 
In March 1989, the newly established Joint Executive Committee of the 
Joint Industrial Council recommended that Ubombo Ranches resolve a 
coRective dispute on hours of work. Management refused initiallY to accept 
the Committee's findings, thus undermining the credibility of the council. At 
the end of 1989, both Ubombo Ranches Limited and MhIume management 
representatives refused to consider disciplinary cases referred to the Joint 
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Industrial Council by the General Manager of Simunye. 
It appeared throughout the long negotiating period that the Ubombo 
Ranches Ltd. industrial relations management policy (Lonrho) was anti-union. 
This policy however appears to have been in conflict with the Lonrho group 
reported financial support for the establishment of an ANC/Congress of South 
African Trade Unions (COSATU) daily newspaper in South Africa (Sunday 
Times, Johannesburg, 31 January 1993). 
10.2.4 The Need to Re-asses the 'Approach' 
Simunye management reluctantly associated itself with a constantly 
confrontational style of labour relations which resulted in forced compromise. 
Because of a renewed and more professional approach to the development of 
trade union activity during 1989 at Ubombo Ranches and a failure to observe 
the rules by one militant unionist at Mhlume, the Employers' Association 
could have found itself challenging the legality of the Swaziland Agricultural 
and Plantation Workers Union in the Industrial Court. A decision which it did 
not follow through in January 1989, because it concerned what was essentially 
an internal Union matter 
- 
'Books of Account'. Strong arrn action and the 
detention in 1989 of the General Secretary of the Bank Union, by the then 
Prime Minister, appeared to indicate possible anti-union moves by 
government. This seemed not to have been supported by the monarch. 
Whether the detention order was based upon sound intelligence is a matter of 
debate. Certainly, the overall impression was that the King acted to defuse 
what appeared to be escalating union confrontation with Government. 
However, after years of expecting government to deal decisively with 
the union movement (including rumours that unions would be banned), it 
became apparent that a government moderate climate would prevail certainly 
in the immediate future 
. 
In these changed circumstances there was need to 
rethink the Association's approach. The changes in employer strategy can be 
illustrated by using a matrix Fig. 10.1 based upon a 'Managerial Grid' 
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concept. This indicates that up to 1989 as an Employers' Association 
management had moved from 1/1 to 9/1 and maintained a 9/1 stance moving 
to 515 compromise only when forced to do so (e. g. Collective Agreements, 
draft Union Recognition Agreement). There should have been a developing 
strategy to get nearer to 9/9. It is based upon 'power sharing, not 'power 
surrender/power abdication' Collaboration does not mean surrendering 
sovereignty. 
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Fig. 10.1 
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1/9 
REACTIVE 
In order to collaborate one must 
maintain a very sensitive perception of 
the other party's feelings and 
emotional undertones and share that 
empathetically. While disregarding 
irrational and subjective ventures. 
9/9 
COLLABORATIVE 
Only the full integration of the 
concern for sensitive affective sharing 
with the concern for objective 
cognitive sharing will result in 
effective and candid collaboration. 
MODERATE 
Collaboration is established 
only when a situation is created 
where a compromise is reached 
between affective and cognitive 
sharing. 
THE ARTFUL DODGER 
Leave empathy and objective analysis 
to the experts. One is heading for 
disaster if you get involved in this 
kind of thing. Maintain an aloofness 
and steer clear of the risks involved. 
1/1 
PRESCRIPTIVE 
Effective collaboration is seen as 
sharing and searching objectively and 
correctly for both content and facts. 
Avoid getting involved in feelings and 
emotions which will muddle up 
objectivity and rational analytical 
skills. 
9/1 
CONCERN FOR OBJECTIVE COGNITIVE SHARING 
Copyright: F Maritz Johannesburg-seminars 1989 
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10.3 SUMMARY 
The results of the 1988 survey of the actors attitudes towards trade 
unionism was reported in Chapter 4. It will be recalled that the union 
representatives were of the opinion that union organisation was effective. This 
chapter has shown that there was serious disunity within the union executive 
itself. That disunity was manifested publicly. There was a power struggle 
between the supporters of the Chairman and those of the General Secretary 
during 1986/87. No satisfactory answers were ever provided to questions 
pertaining to the misuse of union funds. Certainly during the first six years 
of union activity there was little effective action to demonstrate strong and 
united leadership. 
Among the employers, disunity arose from the difference in basic 
approach to industrial relations and indeed to the differences in overall 
management style ranging from autocratic to laissez-faire to collaborative. The 
fact was that the introduction of the Industrial Relations and Employment Acts, 
effective 1982, gave initial impetus to cause some consideration of the human 
resources function in all three companies. Practically, the Royal Swaziland 
Sugar Corporation management moved rather more quickly than their 
counterparts in the other companies towards a collaborative management style. 
Inevitably therefore, what might have been a professionally conducted 
negotiating approach by both union representatives and managers to union 
recognition, became a protracted frustrating exercise in repetitive conflict 
tactics without attaining tangible results. That is certainly one perception. The 
union representatives achieved little other than gradually developing mass 
worker support for the view that employers exploited the talents and labour of 
the work force. This support finally reached proportions early in 1992 
sufficient for openly challenging management. 
More cynically it might be argued that the employer associations 
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achieved exactly what the more autocratic of its members desired. Simply to 
frustrate and delay the exercise of mobilised worker economic and possible 
political power for as long as possible. What can be stated is that the whole 
prolonged activity did nothing to enhance an effective negotiating structure for 
future industrial relations. 
There was much misunderstanding arising from values conflict and 
resultant attitudes. The approach to collective bargaining influenced both 
inter(and intra)-union and inter-employer disunity and served only to 
perpetuate covert if not overt industrial conflict. The failure for nine years of 
the employers conflict management approach towards achieving an effective 
industrial relations structure for the industry is analysed further in the next 
chapter. 
10.4 CONCLUSIONS 
Ten years (by 1992) after the introduction of legislation in Swaziland 
to promote effective industrial relations and the recognition of trade unionism 
as a major force in an industrial environment, employers continued to differ 
on basic philosophy and their approach to the union phenomena. For many 
years union officials were unable to subordinate personal power ambitions to 
the promotion of the common good. This is necessary in order to identify with 
the concept of unity as a basic requirement for union strength and also to 
ensure ethical and legitimate use of members subscriptions which form the 
largest portion of union funds. 
While access to union membership figures was not possible, press 
reports continued to promote union publicity and the comments of union 
leaders. Ilere was some evidence (ILO 
- 
PSLRA 1991 : 33) that membership 
was increasing overall in 1991 and the activity of SAPV; U officials within the 
Sugar Manufacturing and Refining Industry gave some indication that support 
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for SAPWU within the industry was developing. The unity and support was 
finally demonstrated by union members during May 1992. The demand for 
a specific sugat industry (SSMRI) union was not progressing, however. 
A fourth Collective Agreement by works council and employer 
representatives was concluded in December 1991, within the JIC. Whether or 
not, with differing management styles and philosophy, the employers could 
maintain a united force for a fifth agreement was open to speculation, at that 
time. The strike events of May 1992 showed otherwise (see chapter 9). 
END NOTES 
The Secretary-General of the Trade Union Federation was also General Secretary of SAPWU. He 
wrote the letter of suspension to himself. Who had the funds? 
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PART IV 
- 
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
CHAPTER 11 
. 
THE FAILURE OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT 
IN THE SWAZILAND SUGAR 
MANUFACTURING AND REFINING 
INDUSTRY. 
11.1 CONFLICT BEHAVIOUR (1982-1992) 
MerkI (1972: 477) has identified the results of the impact of the 
modernisation process relative to international stability, as the 
. 
'internal 
processes of mass mobilisation and modernisation in many new nations'. This 
study has fbHowed one aspect of these internal processes over ten years 
- 
the 
attempt to establish a working relationship between the largest mobilized 
industrial mass of workers in Swaziland (Swaziland Agricultural and Plantation 
Workers Union) and employers in the largest industry (Sugar Manufacturing 
and Refining). 
Inevitably, all the problems of development (economic, social, political 
and especially the search for identity and unity) have been reflected in the sub- 
system of industrial relations. The complexities of negotiation extended over 
ten years with often long periods of no contact between the parties. An 
observer may well enquire as to what prevented the conflict from being 
resolved. Identifiable negotiating issues (Chapter 8,9/10 above) were apparent 
to both parties. Why, after ten years, was no satisfactory solution reached? 
Following Mitchell (1981: 212) it is apparent that during negotiating sessions 
both parties continued to use tactics more of a pre-negotiation style particularly 
those which pertained to the 'wicked behaviour' of the opposing party and to 
steer negotiation to give a marked disadvantage to the other side (Mitchell 
: 1981: 213). Attempts to maintain a dominant position prevailed throughout. 
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Although some of the specific clauses of the draft Recognition Agreement 
became resolved through compromise the constantly recurring theme pertained 
to formal as distinct from 'implied' recognition (Mitchell 
- 
1981: 210). It will 
be recalled that as early as February 1984, the employers rejected recognition 
because the union had failed to observe strictly the legal requirements 
necessary to establish an executive committee superior to branch committees 
at Ubombo Ranches and Mhlume. Again, in February 1985 and against the 
advice of the personnel executives, the employers insisted upon a cautious (? 
delaying) approach to recognition. A second count at Ubombo Ranches had 
shown that the union well exceeded the 40% membership legally required 
(actually 51.99%) to demand formal recognition. Given the existing 
legislatipn, it can be argued that on either of the two dates March 1984 or 
February 1985 the employers should have accorded recognition. 7be terms of 
a- recognition agreement could then have been established. Ile essential 
negotiation issues of wages and conditions of service would then' have 
followed 'conflict reality'. The real purpose of collective bargaining in 
industry relates to these issues and not to union recognition itself. 
At the request of the Swaziland Government and an 11LO Consultant, 
the Federation of Swaziland Employers' proposed revised amendments 
(Industrial Relations Act (Amendment Bill 1990), but little notice appeared to 
have been taken of the proposals by those drafting the 1991 new Industrial 
Relations Act 
. 
The need for a recognition agreement as establishing formal 
recognition (Section 36 IR Act as amended) and identifying unreasonable delay 
in concluding an agreement, would have become grounds for declaring a 
dispute in terms of the employers' amendment. Thus, given enactment of the 
amendments, delay by either party would be answerable in the Industrial 
Court. In terms of the draft, however, a union can apply direct to the Industrial 
Court for recognition, without consulting and without concluding an agreement 
with an employer. The argument advanced here is that unless there is strict 
adherence to a set of rules, industrial relations becomes chaotic 
. 
The cautious 
approach manifested by the employers from February 1985 onwards through 
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insistence on this fact and a negotiated agreement (rules-of-the-game) before 
formal recognition, however suggests deliberate manipulation of the loophole 
in the then existing Act in order to block union advancement. 
It has been emphasized that this study is based upon conclusions, drawn 
from personal involvement of the writer, and it inevitably contains some 
subjective assessments. What was appafent throughout the period under review, 
was the difficulty the personnel executives had in attempting to negotiate with 
the union, in the absence of any clearly conceived espoused and operational 
policies or detailed strategy. Towards the end of 1982, a combined meeting 
of the Sugar Manufacturing and Refining Industry employers and the sugar 
cane growers' met to determine an approach to trade unionism. The cane 
growers opted not to join with the three major employers. At only one point 
thereafter, (June 1983) was any attempt made to define a policy and strategy. 
In the event, what limited discussion took place then and thereafter, (no more 
than one or two short meetings per year) was confined to specific, detailed 
points e. g. size of the annual wages increase. 
At no stage was there ever any attempt to convene an Industrial 
Relations conference of chief and senior executives of all three companies in 
order to determine strategy and to ensure that there was a common operational 
approach throughout the industry. The consequences were that each of the 
personnel executives attempted to pursue within their own companies and 
when meeting jointly with union representatives what they understood as the 
policy of their own chief executive. In those circumstances the least effective 
approach was the norm. Without consciously acknowledging the fact, blocking 
the union, became the goal. Inevitably, personnel executives found themselves 
from time to time, arguing against their professional inclinations, in order to 
present a combined front to the union representatives. 
Regular monthly production and technical meetings of the Sugar 
Millers' Association (the parent body of SSMRI E/A) took place. Only on two 
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occasions, in early 1983 and early 1985, did the personnel executives attend. 
Both occasions consisted of short discussions on the immediate union situation 
and wages review only. Given the industrial relations environment and the 
overall political developments in Southern Africa during the 1980's, it seems 
an anomaly that so little attention should have been given to industrial 
relations matters at a policy making level 
. 
It must be concluded that as 
physical scientists (e. g. Agronomists) as distinct from behavioural scientists, the 
chief executives and senior operating managers either did not understand the 
issues involved or considered them of minimal importance relative to 
production and profit. 
But, as indicated in the chapter 10.1 (Intra-union conflict), limited as 
the contents are by union unco-operativeness for this study, it must also be 
emphasized that the inevitable consequences of the personal - power in- 
fighting which took place within the union movement itself, could only favour 
the employers, in a situation in which industrial relations was a low level 
priority. 
The cynical conclusion is that in t4e Swaziland situation, in spite of 
whatever lip-service employers may have given to the need for Black 
advancement and for a negotiating stance in industrial relations, the continuing 
employer behaviour was aimed at maintaining the status-quo rather than 
resolving conflicts that might arise. The fact was also that Swazi trade 
unionists, like many of their political counterparts in Southern Africa, were 
unable to subordinate differences and present a unified front for their dealings 
with employers through their desire to obtain personal power rather than 
"Charismatic Leadership" (Robbins P. 1989: 329) 
. 
This simply reinforces the 
sceptical viewpoint that the Swaziland socio-political and economic system 
was not yet able to sustain the more sophisticated industrial relations which 
exists in industrialized countries and within their business organisations. 
Commenting on Convention NO 144: (Tripartite Consultation (ELS), 1976) a 
visiting ELO Consultant to Swaziland reported that 'Tripartism. is not healthy 
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here and in need of strengthening. I wonder how much can be done without 
a fmner commitment by the social partners to sound, communicative and 
constructive industrial relations. Considering, from a regional standpoint how 
much is at stake, some constructive management and adult education (aimed 
at attitudinal change) in collective bargaining and tripartism, could be worked 
out". (UNDP 
- 
July 1990 
- 
III Appx3). Mitchell (1991: 258) shows 'attitudes' 
as one of the three components (attitudes, behaviour, situation) of any basic 
conflict structure. 
Consideration of the theory of conflict management techniques, 
suggests that sequentially, the conflict analysed in this study never proceeded 
beyond 'Stage I- Conflict situation of Conflict suppression; initiation of 
undesired behaviour through intimated coercion or threat' (Mitchell 1981: 278). 
There was never overt conflict in terms of a strike or lock-out (until May 992) 
but there was no commitment to Stage 2 Conflict Resolution. One further 
question may be posited 
- 
did union leaders show any greater commitment? 
Moreover throughout the period, the Government Department of Labour did 
little or nothing to enforce either the spirit or the letter of the law. 
. 
11.2 THE RESULTS OF CONFLICT "MISMANAGEMENT" 
11.2.1 Participant Actions Vis-a-Vis 1988 Survey Results 
It is evident thar the actions which led to the prolonged low intensity 
conflict process were in total a reflection of the participants' attitudes revealed 
in the 1988 survey and summarised in chapter 4. Specifically. 
Employers tolerated trade union existence but did not actively 
co-operate with the union to establish a mutually acceptable recognised 
relationship as quickly as possible. 
The union, in accordance with its low political and social action 
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priority, failed to politicise the issue of recognition as a major socio- 
political and socio-economic concern. A more militant stance may 
have ensured a speedier conclusion. 
Both parties believed that conflict management rather than 
conflict resolution was what was required. Consequently they pursued 
conflict management rather than conflict resolution tactics, to maintain 
their respective 'power' capability and status-quo. This contributed to 
repetitive discussions over a long period without achieving a mutually 
acceptable union recognition situation. 
The employers viewed union organisation as ineffective and 
exploited the practical deficiencies in intra-union communications and 
union leadership disunity. This delayed the effective mobilisation by 
the union leadership of the power of labour withdrawal; the possible 
use of the ultimate *strike sanction, which actually occurred in 1992. 
The union leadership, somewhat unprofessionally, attempted to 
gain judicial support on occasion but neither party sought to reach a 
speedy conclusion through the good offices of either a mediator or 
arbitrator. The 1988 survey showed that employers and union leaders 
believed they should deal with the differences between them without 
recourse to a third party. Such recourse however might have achieved 
a conclusion more speedily than actually happened. - 
Added to these factors was the necessity for the participants to 
develop values, attitudes and actions consistent with and capable of 
sustaining the Western industrialised. type of industrial relations 
structure. 'Ibis could only take effect over a considerable period of 
time. 
This was the situation in the Sugar Manufacturing and Refining 
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Industry, which was identical to the situation in the rest of Swaziland's 
industry. 
11.3 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN SWAZILAND 1990 
It is worth stating that even after eight years of employer/union contact 
the Executive Director' of the Federation of Swaziland Employers in his 
Annual Report for 1990, highlighted the following as indicative of the disarray 
in Swaziland's Industrial Relations: 
- 
No particular policy 
- 
reaction (immaturely) to situations; 
Unions reject freedom of association for employers and do not accept 
that employers' federation or associations have any legitimate place in 
the industrial relations structure; 
Unions recourse to attorneys from the South African bar (intra-Union 
contact) at great costs, reflects union unwillingness to accept 
obligations under their own recognition agreements; 
Attempts at gaining autonomy for in-plant branches of unions (viz the 
spersonal power' accrual at local level); 
Government Department of Labour not enforcing the 'time-period' in 
which disputes may be referred (Section 36 (5) 
- 
Act). 
Attempts by union officials to interfere in other union affairs by 
representing members of other unions in the Industrial Court. 
There is a union leadership vacuum developing not in terms of 
numbers of officials, but through lack of authority and knowledge. 
Early in 1990 following a suggestion by the Swaziland Minister for 
Labour and Public Service after a Southern African Labour Commission 
Conference, an attempt was made to arrange a discussion on the industrial 
relations situation between the employers federation (FSE) and the union 
federation (SFFU). The Union representatives failed to attend. No reasons were 
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given. 
During that Labour Commission Conference and in the presence of the 
Assistant Director-General of the ELO and a number of international guests, the 
union representatives launched a series of critical attacks on the employers to 
the embarrasment of the guests. In line with political developments in 1990 
in South Africa, it may be postulated that rhetorical attacks on authority was 
one means of attempting or in the case of Swaziland regaining credibility with 
the rank and file, for the mass movement leaders. The Executive of the 
Federation of Swaziland Trade Unions lacked credibility with the Union 
movement in Swaziland at that time (TOS July 1990). During a review in the 
FSE Annual Report (1989 
- 
90) employers conduct was also criticised, but 'in 
general, [they] made a much more determined effort to get their affairs right'. 
Specific to the Swaziland sugar industry, the Agricultural and Plantation 
Workers' Union (SAPWU) failed to resolve its domestic affairs. 
Action was taken in 1985 by the Commissioner for Labour in a rare 
attempt to regularise union organization. He referred SAPWU to the Industrial 
Court for failure to submit annual returns and audited accounts. That still 
remained open in 1992. The Court had done nothing to enforce its decision 
that the Union should produce its books for the Court scrutiny. At the end of 
1989 SAPWU endeavoured to break the SSMRI Employers' Association by 
seeking Company only recognition from Ubornbo Ranches Limited. Failure 
to register the dispute in accordance with Sections 50151 of the Act resulted 
in dismissal of the case by the Industrial Court. It seemed unlikely that this 
technical rejection would stop the union from a new attempt following the 
correct procedure. Once again, as indicated in the chapter on inter-management 
conflict, the management of Ubornbo Ranches acted unilaterally and failed to 
support its own employers' association membership, by opting to represent 
itself before the court instead of arranging representation by the employers 
association. The company itself, again, disrupted employer solidarity. The 
legal consequences of that act, alone, could have reinforced the union's 
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demand for company recognition. This was further evidence of the failure by 
employers to establish policy and strategy. 
The largest potential union, SAPWU, had been unable to gain 
recognition from the largest group of employers for nine years. It could be 
argued that the leaders had failed to realise their major power-base. Had they 
cooperated in the functioning of the original Joint Industrial Council within 
which they could have negotiated amendments to its Constitution in 1983, they 
might have gained the initial advantage, while the employers were still trying 
to adjust to the new situation of union power. Thus the union may have 
steered the situation thereafter. At least focus of the continuing negotiations 
would have been on the vital bread and butter issues of major concern to the 
workers rather than the much more nebulous recognition. Was it only the 
apparent inability to gain internal leadership agreement or was it a much 
greater strategic plan to be able to show continually that the major employers 
were not only the enemy of the workers but also the enemy of the Black man? 
And the employers? In spite of attitudes shown in the survey outlined 
in chapter 4 indicating general acceptance of unions it was difficult to ignore 
the verbal comments commonly expressed during the study period. The law 
provided for trade unions, but recognition would be on the employers' terms 
unless they were forced to accept (not negotiate) other terms! In the prevailing 
situation of minimal employer concern and union disorganization and 
ineptitude, even the major employers ignored the need for a clear industrial 
relations policy and strategy. Enactment of a new Act drafted in 1991 
however, will compel employers to accept other terms. 
At the time the major difficulty lay in trying to change the different 
attitudes of the parties towards each other. The spectre of power-hung'ry 
Marxists on the one hand and Colonial, Capitalist exploiters on the other 
overshadowed the entire period 
- 
not perhaps so blatantly stated, but 
nevertheless ever present. Employers lacked appreciation of the political nature 
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of labour relations and the potential for political conflict resolution, as distinct 
from rejection of Marxist-agitation. There was a failure by the union leaders 
to recognise that charismatic leadership requires the subordination of personal 
aspiration in the interests of the common good (Robbins S. P., 1989). 
11.4 CONFLICT SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
While the Industrial Relations Act provided a set of rules within which 
both employers and unions could operate from the same basic rational 
considerations, the history of the conflict suggests that both chose to see 
industrial relations more emotively, as a fight situation in which 'the opponent 
is merely a nuisance to be eliminated, subjugated, cut down to size' (Frankel 
J 1973: 50). Extreme words, perhaps, to describe an internal industry, and in 
Swaziland also a national issue as distinct from an international situation, but 
nevertheless appropriate to the record of interaction between the employers and 
SAPWU. This approach was the result of a number of influences as practised 
by the parties which impacted upon the relationship between them. These 
influences were: 
- 
Individual attitudes arising from stereotyped perceptions 
of the role of trade unions within society (see chapters I and 4 
concerning influential attitudes). 
Perceptions of individual actors (colonialist vs black 
political activist) 
Outdated management styles (autocratic vs participative) 
Failure to observe the law both in tinns of practice and 
intent 
Lack of understanding by union officials and members, 
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of the profit concept inherent in a Western-type of industrial 
society and thus a dichotomy of view about the role of industry 
in a developing nation. 
A lack of understanding by both parties of the socio- 
political nature of the conflict. 
Lack of charismatic leadership in the union and the 
apathy for some eight years of union members towards union 
action. 
Autocratic political structure in Swaziland which 
inhibited many of the rank and file union members from 
challenging the socio-economic status-quo and thus diminishing 
the strength of the union executives and representatives in the 
work place. 
Initially a lack of management education among the 
employers' managers and a lack of education per se among 
union members. 
Difficulties of physical communications for union 
officials leading to an inability by the union to organize 
executive and member meetings sufficient to sustain prolonged 
recruitment. 
Lack of cross-cultural contact leading to 
misunderstanding of respective view points 
Divisions between union leaders on the approach to 
discussions between employers (see Chapter 10) 
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The fact that as a small relatively insignificant country 
with limited natural resources and political influence, Swaziland 
is of limited interest to the major industrial and politically 
influential nations. Given, oil, for example, attention focussed 
upon Swaziland would have forced industrial development and 
a more realistic appreciation by government, workers and 
employers of what was necessary for an adequately functioning 
industrial relations sub-system. 
The following and final chapter further discuses these negative 
influences as they require corrective action by goverment, industry and unions 
in a developing state. 
The conflict management studied in this survey can be described as a 
"futile exercise"! It contributed nothing of consequence towards the 
development of effective conflict resolution. 
Or was it, albeit sub-consciously, one More part of the greater conflict 
for socio-political alignment indicative of Southern Africa during the 1980s 
and still to be resolved in the 1990's? 
]END NOTES 
It must be stated clearly here, that of all the major employers in Swaziland, the Royal Swaziland Sugar 
Corporation at Simunye, both under the direction of its first Chief Executive Officer, Mr JB Ranger 
and later CEO Mr MR Boast, constantly pursued a policy of constructive local employee advancement 
and 'negotiating' industrial relations. This policy accorded with its stated philosophy of participative 
management. This organisation is one, only, of the three Sugar Manufacturing and Refining Industry 
employers. 
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Government of Swaziland extended this Executive's temporary residence permit by one year until April 
1991 only. Attempts by OAU 'agents' to remove him from representing Swaziland FSE at the 1989 
Geneva Conference 
- 
through pressure on the Swaziland Government, of a 'racialist' nature caused 
conflict between the FSE and Minister of Labour. It is believed that the Director's residence permit 
was 'refused' because of this and only the personal intervention of the monarch, caused the one year 
extension. 11is departure in 1991 caused the ILO to comment on the 'Leadership gap which will be left 
on management's ide'. (UNDP July 1990). 
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CHAPTER 12 BEYOND COMPROMISE 
12.1 COLLABORATION 
Reference was made in the previous chapter to the concept of 
collaboration rather than conflict or confrontation as a more satisfying and 
productive approach to Industrial Relations. This theme will be followed 
through in more detail here, as indicative of positive efforts which if pursued 
by employers (and investors) vis-a-vis employer/union relationships might 
result in industrial productivity levels higher than those generally associated 
with emergent third world countries. The use of the word 'might' is 
deliberate. This thesis is not a psychological study in scientific terms of 
industrial conflict and thus of psychological conclusion from group and intra- 
group dynamics. Scientific predictions are not posited here. The observation 
is that for all practical purposes in industrial relations situations, it would be 
wise to accept that particular behavioural results 'might' occur. What can be 
stated however, is that a constructive approach to industrial relations rather 
than an indifferent or negative approach is more likely to produce positive 
results. 'Effective groups have a learned tolerance of conflict and see it as an 
opportunity to enhance both task and social-emotional functioning rather than 
as a personal issue with ego-maintenance properties' (Hall Jay 1988 : 322). 
In wide terms, it might be said that the concept of collaboration in 
industrial relations stems from an earlier concept of worker participation in 
management. Walker (Barrett B et al 1975 : 434) noted that, while the 
concept is 'plentifully supplied with ideas, institutions and opinions', 
information on what actually occurs (or does not occur) to give practical 
effect to the concept is not 
, 
readily or easily available'. This research might 
make a minor contribution to the issue. The important point however is that 
the research does describe one attempt, specifically in a developing country, 
to gain entry to, some of the management decision making in an industry by 
a worker collective organization 
-a trade union. Significance lies in the fact 
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that there must surely be differences between employee collective organisations 
struggling to gain acceptance in a socially, economically, politically and 
technologically transitional society and attempts to increase worker 
involvement in management decision making in the countries of the First 
World. This is a primary recognition for any investor/employer or managers 
of an enterprise in the Third World. This final chapter reports the perceptions 
and observations of one such manager, but it is not a comparative exercise. 
It deals with Swaziland; it does not suggest a theory for all Third World 
nations. It states simply 'this is what happened, there might be lessons here 
for others'. 
It should also be noted in practical everyday operations that not all 
employers/managers remember that labour relations are part of and take place 
within and impact upon the wider society. What happens in the work place 
both reflects that society and reflects upon it. In particular, long-term 
organisation strategic management must, if it is to be effective, consider the 
social and political influences emanating from and impacting upon 
management decisions. There is more to business enterprise, than 'the bottom 
line'. As was stated in Ch. 11, wrong perceptions relevant to the future and 
even a failure to consider the wider society other than in platitudinous terms, 
contributed to the long drawn-out and probably unnecessary conflict in 
Swaziland. 
Collaboration is the theme for this chapter. This involves the idea that 
industry should move beyond the compromise approach to participation, and 
develop collaborative enterprises, in which conflict is used to generate 
productive ideas and successful solutions to the problems of managing 
enterprise. 
There is little or no originality in recording the following perceptions; 
there is, however, much practical experience by the researcher which motivates 
the re-emphasizing of what can be found in many text books. The issues are 
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the subject of comment for two main categories: 
- 
the wider society 
the industrial enterprise. 
12.2 THE WIDER SOCIETY 
For the employers and managers who endeavoured to maintain 
profitable enterprises in third world countries (and, in this case, Southern 
Africa), the impact was identified in the common place killings, coups and 
counter-coups arising from nationalism, perceived as attributable to 
Marxist/Leninism, or as 'Liberation' which could result in anarchy. For many 
such managers it would have meant the loss of livelihood if not of their own 
and families' actual lives. Some had indeed been subject to that direct risk. 
It was understandable therefore, even if not universally accepted, that initially 
any possible linkage of organisations to socialist doctrine and thought ensured 
outright condemnation from many managers. Even for those of moderate 
persuasion, there was unease at the possibility for development of 'leftist' 
thought and militant action by the unsophisticated mass population. While 
many condemned apartheid, the political events and violence of post- 
colonialism and developing Nationalism did nothing to encourage confidence 
in pursuing the benefits of a participative society. A simplistic overview 
perhaps which does not explain in detail the reasons fbý industrial conflict in 
Southern Africa, but there was a fundamental difference between reasons and 
attitudes for anti-unionism in, for example, the United Kingdom and for an 
anti-union stance in the countries of Africa. In the former, it might have had 
a political bias but was perhaps more concerned with encroachment upon 
management/employer perhaps even government prerogatives. In the latter, it 
was this and much more. Not only was management power seen to be 
threatened but the very socio-political fabric of society and the livelihood if 
not the lives, of the managerial class were seen to be at stake. Chapter 4 
reported upon a detailed attitudinal survey which revealed a moderate approach 
by progressive (cautious) managers as being one of the parameters within 
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which unionisation could occur in Swaziland during the 1980 decade. 
What was not foreseen was the dramatic collapse of apartheid and of 
communist (Soviet) influence and aid to African Nationalist movements. No 
evidence is offered in this thesis that there ever was any such aid to the 
Swaziland Trade Union movement. Indeed, it will be recalled from Chapter 
4 that, during the survey, the union officials saw political power as a relatively 
low priority. Nevertheless at the annual conference of the Congress of South 
African Trade Unions (COSATU) in July 1991, 
-those present, (and this 
included executives of the Swaziland Federation of Trade Unions), vowed to 
'liberate our oppressed brothers in Lesotho and Swaziland'. In elementary 
terms, it can be stated that if Swaziland's employers and managers, ranging 
from those who advocated autocratic rejection of unionism to those following 
a cautious approach, believed their views to be in the interests of the country 
during a non-militant phase of union activity in Swaziland, what should be the 
approach for a future, free of apartheid in South Africa, free of Communism 
but one in which unions could well become more militant in their demands 
even in Swaziland? As seen by this researcher, the following emphasises (all 
are important), those matters to which employers and managers in Third World 
countries must give attention, if they are to reduce industrial conflict situations 
and consequently encourage productivity. They are not in priority order, 
12.2.1 Industrial Relations Legislation 
It is true that the embryo Federation of Swaziland Employers 
commented (1980) upon proposed Industrial Relations legislation before it was 
enacted in 1982. In 1984, in conjunction with the Federation of Trade Unions 
and within the Labour Advisory Board, joint amendments to the legislation 
were proposed 
- 
and again in 1989. But this was the work of the Executive 
Director of FSE and a small number of Industrial Relations specialist 
managers. During the years 1982-1991, a number of industrial relations 
seminars/symposiums, sometimes in conjunction with the ILO were held, but 
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attendance by senior managers and the involvement of such in the proceedings 
was minimal. At the end of 1982, a joint meeting was convened at the request 
of one industrial relations specialist manager, between the General Secretary 
of SFIU, the Executive Director FSE and the Chief Executives and Personnel 
Executives of SSMRI to discuss co-operative effort vis-a-vis the new 
legislation permitting trade unions. No joint strategy was developed and no 
joint follow-up arranged. These employers (and all other employers in 
Swaziland) simply became negatively reactive to unionism and used the law 
to protect themselves. No practical attempt was made to utilise the law to 
facilitate joint socio-economic strategy for Swaziland with the trade union 
movement. Even early in 1992 a symposium sponsored by ILO and the 
Swaziland Government to discuss the tripartite nature of industrial relations 
prior to the presentation of a new draft Act, which was well attended by senior 
trade union officials, attracted only two senior employer executives. When the 
draft Act was made generally available to employers, the reaction was shock 
and anger at many of the Provisions, but throughout the years few employers 
had evinced interest in industrial relations unless compelled by an employee 
or union to do so. As recently as 1987, the annual report of the Swaziland 
Sugar Association, contained no reference to labour matters nor to socio- 
economic, socio-political matters (see Appx. 17). 
, The author, as an assessor of the Industrial Cýurt (1985-86) for some 
eighteen months, was constantly reminded of how little effort had been made 
by employers to understand the law and to use it in a positive manner. 
The lesson is obvious. Particularly in countries where there is a 
comparatively low standard of education, employers have an opportunity, (if 
not a social responsibility) to influence and utilise industrial relations 
legislation positively. Simply put, it is socially and morally unacceptable to 
dismiss an employee and thus deprive him and his family of their livelihood, 
for some minor misdemeanour, if he did not know the consequences of his 
action and had no part in formulating a disciplinary code. 
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The Swaziland Industrial Relations Act (No. 4 of 1980) contains a non- 
mandatory Code of Practice as an annexure 
. 
Employers and also trade union 
officials could do well to study this. In Chapters 1 and 2 it was noted that 
industrial relations matters have a direct involvement with and impact upon the 
wider socio-economic and political environment. Industrial Relations law is 
not criminal law, it exists to facilitate relationships rather than to punish or 
deter wrongdoers. It is a requirement for effective relationships between 
industry and the wider society, as well as within the enterprise itself, that all 
parties recognise this fact. 
12.2.2 Institutional Involvement 
In Chapter 2 reference was made to Rostow's model of economic 
development. Although it is recognised that economics must involve the 
efforts of human beings, the major socio-political concerns are subordinated 
to the concern with the components of production, land, labour, capital. 
For those operating businesses in developing societies, however, equal 
attention must be given to the socio-political aspects 
-a 'holistic' approach is 
required. One such model is that of Beck and Linscott who consider social 
paradigms 'the basic operating assumptions that hold the social system 
together' (Productivity : 1991 : 22). Collectively held paradigms are expressed 
by individuals in their personal value systems. 'These find substance in views 
of religion, human destiny, the future and bottom lines 
...... 
reflected in 
economic, social, political and philosophical theories and attitudes towards sex, 
marriage, health care, working, sport, social relationships, community 
development, race, ethnicity and human development' (as reported in 
Productivity : 1991 : 22). One paradigm merges into another in a spiral of 
higher order development ranging from 'Bands (AN), through Tribal Orders 
(BO); Empires (CP), Authoritation Systems (DQ), Capitalistic Democracies 
(ER), Social Democracies (FS), Integrated Networks (GT), Global Structures 
(HV) and 'each new ring on the spiral produces a different economic and 
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political system to deal with the unique problems at that level' (Productivity 
: 1991 : 22). There are two issues here: 
first, the investors/employers managers are generally operating from ER/FS 
and GT 'rungs' of Capitalistic Democracies to Social Democracies to 
Integrated Networks. Second, those they employ are constrained by values 
within the BO, CFIDQ 'rings'; tribal orders, Empires, Authoritarian systems. 
From the Swaziland experience, employers and managers, expected the work 
force to reason from the higher order values, while as managers they 
continued to maintain as much as possible the authoritarian values inherent in 
the lower order values. They also omitted to recognise the evolutionary forces 
at work to produce the new system necessary to deal with the unique problems 
of the spiralling effect. Both managers and work force, where they sought 
solutions, attempted to do so from the same level of thinking as produced the 
problems they were attempting to resolve! (Beck and Linscott, 1991: 22). 
Management almost subconsciously failed to perceive the distinc tion between 
conflict management as the preservation of the status quo, to avoid escalation 
and to retain control and conflict resolution, which 'seeks to resolve the 
problem, even though this requires change' (Burton John W 1987: 8). 
Much more so than those in the First World, employers and managers 
in a developing country must be consciously aware of the impact of their 
actions upon the wider society, while scrupulously avoiding direct political 
involvement; they should endeavour to influence the positive development of 
the wider society through those institutions and direct participation in events 
and activities available to them. 
In union/employer relationships, the aim should be conflict resolution, 
beyond accommodation and compromise, through a collaborative effort. The 
fact is that 'deep-rooted' conflict becomes magnified in perceived situations 
of deprivation (Burton, J. 1987: 8). By focusing upon the wider society, 
managers as executive officers have a unique opportunity to influence positive 
development. One model to follow, is that of Interactive Planning. ' The 
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central ideas of this model pertain to the creation of vision, 
- 
the sharing of a 
common vision by parties to the conflict; development of multiple 
perspectives, to include the perspectives of all interested parties and not only 
the parties to the cofiflict; implementation as a major and first step to be 
considered (the 'law') of planning 
- 
not the final step in the process. It is 
essentially a participative, not an imposed activity. The concept includes the 
principle of continuity 
- 
continuous updating and modification of plans; the 
holistic principle 
- 
no plan can be prepared independent of others; to achieve 
the vision all parts must be integrated. And for the manager who rejects the 
centralised bureaucratic planning of extreme socialist societies, interactive 
planning enables him to participate for the benefit of the wider society and for 
his enterprise as part of it. For the practical manager 
- 
the theme is 
collaboration. The suggestion is that the collective bargaining approach 
reinforces entrenched positions and fails to concentrate the conflict 
participants' attention on conflict resolution. 
12.3 THE INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE 
- 
MANAGEMENT APPROACH TO 
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
References to concepts in industrial relations have been made in 
previous chapters. In this final section comment will be made upon what the 
researcher has observed and personally experienced as being of practical 
management benefit to the handling of industrial relations in the work place, 
in a developing society. 
12.3.1 Culture Change and Trust 
It requires little imagination to recognise that for collaborative conflict 
resolution to suceceed, as distinct from a collective bargaining approach to 
unionism and worker participation, organisation cultures must change. From 
what may be seen as a generally authoritarian state to a participative 
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management style requires considerable effort to move individual and 
collective attitudes of managers and also of workers who have been subjected 
to authoritarian structures and action. It would be naive to think that in 
industrial relations 'one big happy family' is a possible scenario, 
. 
Conflict, 
if only arising from differing perceptions of issues, win persist. Trust building 
in everyday operational activities however can begin to develop a climate of 
understanding of issues and the socio-economic effects of decisions. 
With the collapse of apartheid, the legitimizing of disagreement and 
acceptance of opposition in South Africa, a tendency developed for progressive 
business throughout Southern Africa to indulge in mass effort to change their 
organisation cultures. Many organisations, utilising Organisation Development 
specialists adopted major, esoteric values-change programmes from top 
management downwards through the hierarchy, as a beginning of change. It 
is the perception of this observer that a more effective approach would have 
been the'development of problem-solving, decision-making team activity for 
everyday issues, at all levels of the organisation. The techniques have been 
available for at least 25 years, if not longer. Thig does not require studying 
Kaizen and the perceived Japanese miracle cures, many of which techniques 
were already available and used, (but not widely publicised) in the United 
States, United Kingdom and Western Europe during and immediately following 
the Second World War. 
Such programmes as Management by Objectives, Problem Solving- 
Decision-Making, Job Evaluation, Competence Analysis and similar procedures 
if implemented correctly, with full management support, would have a more 
immediate and meaningful impact at worker/management interface than more 
conceptual sociological, psychological workshops designed to explore attitudes 
and values. Trust and mutual understanding might more easily evolve at the 
interface, in working together on commonly shared and understood working 
problems. 
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The lesson becomes clear 
- 
Develop trust within the organisation. Do 
not view unions and union officials as enemies but as those who, while not 
always agreeing with management, on all decisions, will recognise that some 
decisions are essentially for management to make, and who have an input to 
developing productivity agreements acceptable to workers, management and 
the employer. It is fashionable in industdal personnel and organisation 
development programmes to embrace constantly the latest package; to be seen 
to be among the progressive employers. Management per se, is not new. It 
has been practised, particularly by the world's conventional military 
organisations, for centuries. It is essentially the management of people and the 
effective involvement of people in management. Industrial managers must 
continue to learn and practice effective techniques. 
12.3.2 Understanding Industrial Relations 
One of the major difficulties attached to labour relations legislation is 
the misunderstanding pertaining to law. The author has noted that operating 
managers frequently fail to note that there is an essential difference between 
the minimum protective nature of labour legislation and the punitive nature of 
criminal law. Labour law and that part which establishes the parameters for 
industrial relationships, is concerned with facilitating arrangements for 
minimising conflict and contributing to conflict resolution in the work place. 
The requirement is to move from legalism towards proceduralism; (see Appx 
29 for a model Grievance Procedure) to recognise that 'rules' define the 
permissible boundaries. Working within the rules helps to establish 
perspective on conflict which arises within hierarchical structures based on 
authoritative powerý Within a wider society based upon the democratic 
process of 'people' power, management and workers while accepting the need 
for rules (law), should accept that flexibility in application, based on custom 
and practice is important. 
Investors, employers, managers should initiate in-company training 
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programmes for all structural levels from top management downwards to the 
lowest levels of supervision. Those responsible for the management of people, 
including worker representatives and shop stewards, should be well versed in 
conflict and grievance handling, disciplinary enquiries and appeals, disciplinary 
investigations and labour law arising from negotiated disciplinary codes and 
grievance procedures and work stoppages and strike procedures. The long- 
term strategy however, should be to emphasise to management and workers 
that education in conflict resolution of immediate work-problems leads to trust 
and understanding for conflict resolution at major problems. 
Constant and regular interaction between management and union 
officials can clarify the interpretation of a procedural union recognition 
agreement. Such an agreement should define the bargaining units and the 
substantive measures pertaining to equity and fair labour practice contained in 
collective agreements providing for wages and conditions of service. Such 
interaction demands an understanding that modem industrial relations in its 
disciplinary mode extends beyond the master/servant contract to equity on the 
balance of probabilities, not on the establishment of proof or guilt or innocence 
beyond all reasonable doubt. 
Custom and practice based upon: 
(i) what is reasonable in a given set of circumstances; 
(ii) what is clear from the evidence available; 
(iii) what is recognised. by the worker community as fair and 
Ov) what has become established over a reasonable period of time, 
detennine effective work place labour relations, rather than any set of 
laws and regulations. 
252 
This thesis and this section do not purport to be a 'Handbook of Do's 
and Don'ts' for labour relations. Numerous text books and publications exist 
more erudite and comprehensive than this research, but observations from 
some 30 years of practical involvement may assist students and practitioners 
to identify the critical elements in labour conflict. 
From a management perspective it behoves those involved in 
employer/management/union interaction to avoid ideological issues, engage in 
conflict resolution rather than conflict management and estimate, rather than 
under-estimate, the economic power of employers and the people power 
concentration of trade unions. Constant interaction allows for the promoting 
of conflict resolution as a more enduring solution to industrial relations 
problem situations, than the more limited concept of the widely pursued 
collective bargaining approach. Conflict resolution however, requires open and 
honest interaction and the release of all information pertaining to a problem 
situation. 
12.3.3 A 14-stepl Guide to Management Practice 
The following four steps are derived from many years involvement by 
the researcher from post-colonialism to post-apartheid, in Southern Africa, in 
the field of industrial relations and actively concerned with conflict 
management and attempts to move towards conflict resolution. The following 
four steps have proved invaluable as a simple guide to the implementation of 
labour relations practiced in the work-place. 
Developed by Andrew Levy, a Johannesburg based labour relations 
consultant and emphasized constantly in seminars he conducts, they 
encapsulate the recommended approach: 
- 
LAW 
- 
Could I? 
- 
the labour legislation sets the parameters 
- 
is the 
action permissible in law? 
- 
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MANAGEMENT 
- 
Should I? 
- 
is the proposed action in the interests 
of management and integrated with company interests? 
IMPLICATIONS 
- 
Will I? get away with it? 
- 
this is essentially the 
domain of industrial relations 
- 
is the action acceptable and will it be 
supported by employees and management? 
(iv) SURPRISE 
- 
Will it? 
- 
come as a surprise? 
- 
all implementation of 
action causes problems; the more time given for people to know and 
talk about it, the less of a surprise it will be, the less resistance there 
is likely to be. 
12.4 CONCLUSION 
It might perhaps be stated that this final chapter has been something of 
a plea for a clear understanding in labour terms by investors, employers and 
managers of the implications of business enterprise, for operating in 
developing nations. Experience in Swaziland has shown that invariably 
enterprise and investment is initiated, planned and established by entrepreneurs 
assisted by engineers, accountants and primary producer specialists (e. g. 
geologists, agronomists and sometimes economists) all of whom are essential 
to the successful progress of the project. What this thesis has perhaps shown, 
(albeit as a by-product of the research) is that the major factor in implementing 
any project is the 'people contribution'. No business enterprise can be 
successful in the long-term if managers ignore the socio-economic and political 
ambience within which the enterprise operates. Certainly a major investment 
cost, if not the largest initially and certainly a major on-going cost, is that of 
labour. In economic terms alone, as well as part of a social and moral 
responsibility, it is suggested that productivity is a prime consideration. 
Productivity is greatly dependent upon a productive labour-force which is 
primarily dependent upon a good people relationship. Loss in revenue terms 
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of the mishandling of labour relations is not easily calculated, even during 
strike situations and over a long term it is perhaps even more difficult. Rather 
than the prolonged exercise of conflict mismanagement in the Sugar 
Manufacturing and Refining Industry of Swaziland during the 1980's, it is 
suggested that conflict resolution would have resulted in a more economically 
and socially satisfied work force, management, investor and nation. 
The fact was that employers continued paternalistically to pay good 
wage increases. The socio-economic and political situation of South Africa 
resulted in an internationally unfavourable monetary exchange rate for the 
Swaziland Lilangeni (Rand) vis-a-vis major world currencies during the period 
of the research (in April 1992 fl= R+/-5). 71bis phenomenon, however, 
enabled a very profitable sugar industry to operate, in local monetary terms, 
which enhanced employer power. The 1982 rate of fl=RI. 6, rapidly 
changed. Had it not done so, the long-drawn out low profile union/employer 
conflict might well have become a much more overt, high-profile, socio- 
political conflict, with damaging effects for the Swazi Nation not dissimilar to 
those which obtained in neighbouring South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia, 
Mozambique. 
Swazi society does not appear to change quickly. However, a severely 
disruptive labour relations situation could have accentuated socio-political 
conflict and in the short term accelerated the same type of violent conflict 
which occurred in many of the developing African states. 
Moreover by 1992 Union Recognition was inevitable. Tlere seemed little 
purpose to the extended attempt to frustrate unionisation in Swaziland and in 
the sugar industry. 
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ENDNOTES 
1. An approach pursued at the CODESA talks (1992) in South Africa. 
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